A Philosophical Enquiry into the Nature of Suhrawardi's Illuminationism: Light in the Cave

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Tianyi Zhang offers in this study an innovative philosophical reconstruction of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī's (d. 1191) Illuminationism. Commonly portrayed as either a theosophist or an Avicennian in disguise, Suhrawardī appears here as an original and hardheaded philosopher who adopts mysticism as a tool for philosophical investigation. Zhang makes use of Plato's cave allegory to explain Suhrawardī's Illuminationist project. Focusing on three areas--the theory of presential knowledge, the ontological discussion of mental considerations, and Light Metaphysics--Zhang convincingly reveals the Nominalist and Existential nature of Illuminationism and thereby proposes a new way of understanding how Suhrawardī's central philosophical ideas cohere. Contents Acknowledgements Notes on Abbreviations and Translations Suhrawardī’s Works Commentaries on Suhrawardī’s Works Examples Introduction: The Cave Story: Suhrawardī’s Illuminationist Project 1 Background and Purpose 2 The Cave Story Approach 3 Scope and Methodology 1 From Four Peripatetic-Style Works to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq 1 The Contents of the Four Peripatetic-Style Works 1.1 Al-Talwīḥāt (The Intimations) and al-Lamaḥāt (The Glimpses) 1.2 Al-Muqāwamāt (The Oppositions) 1.3 Al-Muṭāraḥāt (The Debates) 2 The Introduction to Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (The Philosophy of Illumination) 2.1 Deification (taʾalluh) and Investigation (baḥth) 2.2 The Ranking of Philosophers 2.3 The Contents of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq 3 The Functions of the Four Peripatetic-Style Works 4 Summary of Chapter 1 2 Presential Knowledge and the Nature of Illuminationist Philosophy 1 The Context of the Theory of Presential Knowledge 1.1 Two Problems with Avicenna’s Formal Knowledge 1.2 Avicenna’s Primitive Self-Awareness as the Starting Point 2 Establishing Illuminationist Presential Knowledge 2.1 Self-Apprehension 2.1.1 The Particularity Argument 2.1.2 The I-ness Argument 2.1.3 The Priority Argument 2.2 Apprehension of One’s Body and Bodily Faculties 2.3 Apprehension of Pain Caused by Amputation 2.4 Visual Perception 3 Presence as the Nature of All Human Knowledge 3.1 Two Conditions for Knowledge 3.2 The Nature of Human Knowledge 3.3 What Is “Illumination” (ishrāq)? 4 Presential Knowledge as God’s Knowledge 4.1 God’s Presential Knowledge of Everything 4.2 God’s Knowledge of Particulars 5 The Hierarchy of Knowledge in Illuminationism 5.1 Three Levels of Presential Knowledge, and Formal Knowledge 5.2 The Relation between Presential Knowledge and Formal Knowledge 5.3 The Highest Human Presential Knowledge 6 Summary of Chapter 2 3 On Mental Considerations: Univocal Existence 1 The Context of the Discussion of Mental Considerations 1.1 Three Camps and Three Positions 1.2 Avicenna and Suhrawardī on the Quiddity–Existence Distinction 2 Suhrawardī’s Existentialism and Systematically Ambiguous Existence (al-wujūd bi-l-tashkīk) 2.1 Univocal Existence (al-wujūd bi-l-tawāṭuʾ) and Systematically Ambiguous Existence 2.2 Four Arguments for Suhrawardī’s Existentialism 3 The qusṭās (Test) and the Real–Mental Consideration Distinction 3.1 Analysis of the qusṭās 3.2 What Are Real and Mental Considerations? 4 Univocal Existence as a Mental Consideration 4.1 The Indifference Argument and the Infinite Regress of Existence 4.1.1 The Indifference Argument, Self-Predication and Non-Identity 4.1.2 Sāwī’s Argument, and Two Peripatetic Defences 4.2 The Doubt Argument and the Infinite Regress of Existence 4.3 The Hybrid Infinite Regress of Existence and Relation 4 On Other Mental Considerations 1 Oneness, Contingency, and Necessity by Another 1.1 Oneness 1.1.1 The Indifference Argument and the Infinite Regress of Oneness 1.1.2 An Inference: All Numbers Are Mental Considerations 1.2 Contingency (the Priority Argument and the Infinite Regress of Contingency) 1.3 Necessity by Another 1.3.1 The Hybrid Infinite Regress of Necessity and Contingency 1.3.2 The Hybrid Infinite Regress of Necessity and Existence 2 Summary of Suhrawardī’s Arguments from Infinite Regresses 2.1 Ten Hybrid Infinite Regresses and Their Key Premises 2.2 The Universal Patterns of the Arguments from Infinite Regresses 3 Genera and Differentiae; Determinables and Differentiae of Determinates 3.1 The Determinable–Differentia of Determinate Distinction 3.1.1 The Replaceability Argument 3.1.2 The Duality Argument 3.1.3 The Infinite Regress Argument 3.1.4 The Undefinability of Determinates (and All Simple Species) 3.2 The Genus–Differentia Distinction 3.2.1 The Replaceability Argument 3.2.2 The Infinite Regress Argument 3.3 Genera, Differentiae, Determinables, and Differentiae of Determinates as Mental Considerations 3.4 Individuation and Differentiation 3.5 Simple Species and Composite Species 4 Summary of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 5 On Light Metaphysics: An Analysis of Book I of the Second Part of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq 1 Light and Existence 1.1 Light as the Subject Matter of Metaphysics 1.2 The Advantages of Light 2 Light and Darkness 2.1 The Fourfold Light–Darkness Division 2.2 The Division of Light 2.2.1 Light in the Non-metaphorical Sense 2.2.2 Immaterial Lights, and Adventitious Lights as Visible Lights 2.3 The Division of Darkness 2.3.1 Dusky Substances, States Pertaining to Darkness, and Barriers (sing. barzakh) 2.3.2 The Division of Darkness and Suhrawardī’s Critique of Hylomorphism 3 The Argument for the Existence of Immaterial Lights 3.1 Argument I: Adventitious Lights Are Impoverished 3.2 Argument II: States Pertaining to Darkness Are Impoverished 3.3 Argument III: Dusky Substances Are Impoverished 3.4 Argument IV: Adventitious Lights, Dusky Substances, and States Pertaining to Darkness Cannot Cause Each Other 4 Immaterial Lights as Self-Apprehenders 4.1 The Immateriality and Substantiality of Immaterial Lights 4.2 The Argument that Immaterial Lights Are Self-Apprehenders 4.2.1 The Main Argument from the Fourfold Light–Darkness Division 4.2.2 Argument I: Self-Apprehension Requires No Form or Any Other Intermediaries 4.2.3 Argument II: The Constancy of Self-Apprehension 4.2.4 Argument III: Whatever the Self Cannot Apprehend Constantly Is Not the Self 4.2.5 Argument IV: The Self Is the Self-Apprehender Itself, and the Manifest to Itself by Itself 5 Summary of Chapter 5 Conclusion Bibliography Primary Sources Secondary Sources Index