Synthetic Friends: A Philosophy of Human-Machine Friendship

Description

This book explores the notion of whether we can be friends with machines in a philosophically meaningful way. Depending on our concept of friendship, we may be inclined to answer differently. Since social technology has made new forms of friendships possible between people across the globe, the author argues that the philosophical concept of friendship, forged thousands of years ago, should be re-examined. The author proposes a new approach to the debate that reflects the unique relationship we can build with machines as our synthetic friends.   Acknowledgments Contents 1 Introduction References 2 Why Even 2.1 Three Challenges 2.1.1 First Challenge: Social Ontology for Whom 2.1.2 Second Challenge: Technosolutionism 2.1.3 Third Challenge: Contexts, Economic, Political, Social 2.2 What Is Not a Challenge 2.3 Conclusion References 3 Critical Perspectives on Technology and Friendship 3.1 Economic Incentives 3.1.1 Data-Driven Development 3.1.2 Subscription Services, Additional Features 3.1.3 “Replika” and the Gamification of Social Machines 3.1.4 Purchasing Closed Systems 3.1.5 Market Conditions 3.2 Political Agendas and Legal Requirements 3.2.1 GDPR and Other Consumer Protection Regulations 3.2.2 Trustworthy AI as an Opening in Regulation 3.3 Social Norms and Production Biases 3.3.1 Social Norms 3.3.2 Production Bias and Technology 3.4 Conclusion: What About All Three at Once? References 4 Social Philosophy of Technology 4.1 Social Philosophy—Relational Philosophy 4.1.1 Othering 4.1.2 Conclusion 4.2 Terminology of Social Technology 4.2.1 Why Are Social Machines Relevant 4.3 David Gunkel and Moral Patiency 4.3.1 Moral Standing Leads to Rights? 4.4 Coeckelbergh on Growing Moral Relations 4.4.1 Expanding the Premise 4.4.2 Somewhat Similar Approaches 4.5 Pragmacentrism 4.6 Synthesis 4.6.1 Interactivity, Autonomy, and “Relatability” 4.6.2 Counters 4.7 Conclusion References 5 Concepts and Theories of Friendship 5.1 The Sociology and Psychology of Friendships 5.2 Philosophy of Friendships: What Makes a Philosophically Meaningful Friendship? 5.2.1 Conceptual Conditions 5.2.2 Features of Friendship 5.2.3 Normative Conditions 5.3 Aristotle 5.3.1 Aristotle and the Three Forms of Friendship (Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII and IX) 5.4 Nehamas: “Friendship as an Aesthetic” 5.5 “Chosen Family”—Most Modern Friendships 5.5.1 Interim Conclusion: Three Offers 5.6 What Makes a Friend a Bad Friend 5.7 Friendship with Technology 5.7.1 Danaher 5.7.2 Elder: The Most Excellent Friendship 5.7.3 Ryland’s Twist: Degrees-of-Friendship? 5.8 Conclusion References 6 Digital Hermits 6.1 A Word on Hermits 6.2 Ways of Being a Hermit 6.3 What Hermits Are not 6.4 A Fifth Feature of Being a Hermit: Digital Only 6.5 Hermits and Friendship 6.5.1 Four Arguments in Favor of Digital Hermits 6.5.2 Interim Conclusion—Being Friends with a Hermit 6.6 The Normativity of Immediateness, the Normativity of Opportunity 6.7 Conclusion: Friends Through Technology, Friends with Technology References 7 Synthetic Friends 7.1 What Is the Right Question to Ask 7.2 The Argument for Human–Machine Friendship 7.2.1 Discussion 7.3 Counterarguments 7.3.1 Creation vs. Finding 7.3.2 The Positive Argument 7.3.3 The Judgment of Wanting Better Friends from the Normativity of Opportunity 7.3.4 The Problems with the Positive Argument 7.3.5 Growing Up, Growing Out 7.3.6 Fact-Checking Friend-Finding 7.3.7 Should We Want Better Friends? 7.3.8 The Negative Argument 7.3.9 Rejecting Robots 7.3.10 Slippery Slopes 7.3.11 Friends Are a Moral Entryway 7.3.12 Friends Are an Aesthetic 7.4 Some Constructive Proposals 7.5 Conceptual Interlude: Are We Still Talking About Friendships? 7.6 Synthetic Friends, the Very Idea 7.6.1 Conditions 7.6.2 Relatability—Social Technology 7.6.3 Non-Coerciveness 7.6.4 Non-Exploitativeness 7.6.5 Non-Deception 7.6.6 Non-Exclusiveness 7.6.7 Non-Criminal/Violent 7.7 Constructive Suggestions 7.7.1 An Understanding of Human Emotion and Suffering 7.7.2 Empathy 7.7.3 Empathy vs. Sympathy 7.7.4 Sympathetic Synthetic Friends 7.7.5 Suffering 7.7.6 Playing to the Immortality 7.7.7 Secret Keeping, Memory Keeping 7.8 Social Markers and Anthropomorphization 7.8.1 Anthropomorphism, Anthropomorphization 7.8.2 The Pro of Anthropomorphization 7.8.3 Anthropomorphism in Human–Machine Friendships 7.8.4 Gender 7.8.5 The Issue with Deception 7.9 Conclusion References 8 Social Integration 8.1 Robophobes and Robophiles 8.1.1 The Problem with Robophobes 8.2 Corrosion and Atrophy of Sociality 8.2.1 Social Corrosion 8.2.2 Social Atrophy 8.3 How to Integrate Machines into Social Networks 8.3.1 Danaher’s Conception of Incorporated Friends 8.4 Social Norms for Social Integration 8.4.1 Social Norms, Realized 8.4.2 Social Numbers 8.4.3 Social Loyalty 8.4.4 Social Discretion and Socially Expected Lies 8.4.5 One Big Issue: Anthropomorphism? What Else? 8.4.6 Social Standing and Social Integration 8.5 Conclusion References 9 Criticism 9.1 Overgeneralizing Friendships—Conceptual 9.2 Unknowable Fakes, Unknowable Friends—Ethics 9.3 Souls, Vibes, and Creativity—Friends as Vibes 9.4 Definitely Aging—Existentialism 9.5 The Ethical Permissibility of It All 9.6 Unknowability of Consequences 9.7 Machine–Machine Friendships and Other Absurdities References 10 Almost a Conclusion 10.1 Onward? References Index