Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Vol.4

Description

The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s. Focuses on innovation in games and economic behaviorPresents coherent summaries of subjects in game theoryMakes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics Content: Vol. 1. Game of chess / Herbert A. Simon and Jonathan Schaeffer -- Games in extenive and strategic forms / Sergiu Hart -- Games with perfect information / Jan Mycielski -- Repeated games with complete information / Sylvain Sorin -- Repeated games of incomplete information: zero-sum / Shmuel Zamir -- Repeated games of incomplete information : non-zero-sum / Françoise Forges -- Noncooperative models of bargaining / Ken Binmore, Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein -- Strategic analysis of auctions / Robert Wilson -- Location / Jean J. Gabszewicz and Jacques-François Thisse -- Strategic models of entry deterrence / Robert Wilson -- Patent licensing / Morton I. Kamien -- Core and balancedness / Yakar Kannai -- Axiomatizations of the core / Bezalel Peleg -- Core in perfectly competitive economics / Robert M. Anderson -- Core in imperfectly competitive economies / Jean J. Gabszewicz and Benyamin Shitovitz -- Two-sided matching / Alvin E. Roth and Marilda Sotomayor -- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets / William F. Lucas -- Bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus / Michael Maschler -- Game and decision theoretic models in ethics / John C. Harsanyi. Vol. 2 . Zero-sum two-person games / T.E.S. Raghavan -- Game theory and statistics / Gideon Schwarz -- Differential games / Avner Friedman -- Differential games -- economic applications / Simone Clemhout and Henry Y. Wan, Jr. -- Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility / Roger B. Myerson -- Signalling / David M. Kreps and Joel Sobel -- Moral hazard / Prajit K. Dutta and Roy Radner -- Search / John McMillan and Michael Rothschild -- Game theory and Evolutionary biology / Peter Hammerstein and Reinhard Selten -- Game theory models of peace and war / Barry O'Neill -- Voting procedures / Steven J. Brams -- Social choice / Hervé Moulin -- Power and stability in politics / Philip D. Straffin Jr. -- Game theory and public economics / Mordecai Kurz -- Cost allocation / H.P. Young -- Cooperative models of bargaining / William Thomson -- Games in coalitional form / Robert J. Weber -- Coalition structure / Joseph Greenberg -- Game-theoretic aspects of computing / Nathan Linial -- Utility and subjective probability / Peter C. Fishburn -- Common knowledge / John Geanakoplos. Vol. 3 . Strategic equilibrium / Eric Van Damme -- Foundations of strategic equilibrium / John Hillas and Elon Kohlberg -- Incomplete information / Robert J. Aumann and Aviad Heifetz -- Non-zero-sum two-person games / T.E.S. Raghavan -- Computing equilibria for two-person games / Bernhard Von Stengel -- Non-cooperative games with many players / M. Ali Khan and Yeneng Sun -- Stochastic games / Jean-François Mertens -- Stochastic games: recent results / Nicolas Vielle -- Game theory and industrial organization / Kyle Bagwell and Asher Wolinsky -- Bargaining with incomplete information / Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton and Raymond J. Deneckere -- Inspection games / Rudolf Avenhaus, Bernhard Von Stengel and Shmeuel Zamir -- Economic history and game theory / Avner Greif -- Shapley Value / Eyal Winter -- Variations on the Shapley value / Dov Monderer and Dov Samet -- Values of non-transferable utility games / Richard P. McLean -- Values of games with infinitely many players / Abraham Neyman -- Values of perfectly competitive economies / Sergiu Hart -- Some other economic applications of the value / Jean-François Mertens -- Strategic aspects of political systems / Jeffrey S. Banks -- Game-theoretic analysis of legal rules and institutions / Jean-Pierre Benoît and Lewis A. Kornhauser -- Implementation theory / Thomas R. Palfrey -- Game theory and experimental gaming / Martin Shubik.