A Critical Introduction to Formal Epistemology

Description

Formal methods are changing how epistemology is being studied and understood. A Critical Introduction to Formal Epistemology introduces the types of formal theories being used and explains how they are shaping the subject. Beginning with the basics of probability and Bayesianism, it shows how representing degrees of belief using probabilities informs central debates in epistemology. As well as discussing induction, the paradox of confirmation and the main challenges to Bayesianism, this comprehensive overview covers objective chance, peer disagreement, the concept of full belief, and the traditional problems of justification and knowledge. Subjecting each position to a critical analysis, it explains the main issues in formal epistemology, and the motivations and drawbacks of each position. Written in an accessible language and supported study questions, guides to further reading and a glossary, positions are placed in an historic context to give a sense of the development of the field. As the first introductory textbook on formal epistemology, A Critical Introduction to Formal Epistemology is an invaluable resource for students and scholars of contemporary epistemology. Cover Half-Title Series Title Imprint Contents Series editor’s preface Acknowledgments Introduction What is formal epistemology? Why do we need probability? How to use this book 1 Belief and probability 1.1 Degrees of belief 1.2 Conditional probability and conditional belief 1.3 Confirmation 1.4 Epistemology of beliefs Summary 2 Belief and acceptance 2.1 Acceptance 2.2 Belief and acceptance: The Threshold Theory 2.3 Argument against the Threshold Theory of Acceptance: The Lottery Paradox 2.4 Responses to the Lottery Paradox 2.5 Actual and ideal agents Summary Study questions Advanced questions Further reading 3 Rationality constraints I: Probabilism 3.1 Probabilism 3.2 Dutch Book Argument 3.3 Joyce’s Accuracy Argument for probabilism 3.4 Representation Theorem Argument Summary 4 Rationality constraints II: Conditionalization 4.1 Conditionalization 4.2 Diachronic Dutch Book Argument for conditionalization 4.3 Objections to Diachronic Dutch Books 4.4 Counter-example to conditionalization: Waiting for a train Summary Study questions Advanced questions Further reading 5 Rationality constraints III: Subjective and inductive probability 5.1 Inductive probabilities 5.2 Second argument for inductive probabilities: Arbitrariness 5.3 First objection to inductive probabilities: Evidence and regress 5.4 Second objection to inductive probabilities: Disagreement about values 5.5 Third objection to inductive probabilities: Failure of principles of indifference Summary Study questions Advanced questions Further reading 6 The problem of induction 6.1 Beliefs about the future 6.2 Extending the problem 6.3 Circularity 6.4 Sampling 6.5 Semantic justification 6.6 Skeptical responses Summary Study questions Advanced questions Further reading 7 Grue: The new problem of induction 7.1 Bad inferences 7.2 Warm-up: Greenblue 7.3 Grue 7.4 First response: Projectible properties 7.5 Second response: Sampling Summary Study questions Advanced questions Further reading 8 The paradox of the ravens 8.1 The Paradox 8.2 Deny equivalence 8.3 Instance-observed 8.4 Instance-unobserved Summary Study questions Advanced questions Further reading 9 Chance and credence 9.1 Chance and credence 9.2 Actual Frequency Theory 9.3 Actual frequentism and the Principal Principle 9.4 Objections and hypothetical frequentism 9.5 Two metaphysical views 9.6 Propensity theory of chance 9.7 Propensities and the Principal Principle Summary Study questions Advanced questions Further reading 10 Reflection and disagreement 10.1 Reflection 10.2 Disagreement Summary 11 Confirmation and the old evidence problem 11.1 Deductive theories 11.2 Surprising and unsurprising evidence 11.3 The old evidence problem Summary Study questions Advanced questions Further reading 12 Justification and probability 12.1 Foundationalism 12.2 Coherentism 12.3 Infinitism Summary 13 Knowledge and probability 13.1 Conspiracy 13.2 Knowledge-requires-certainty 13.3 Knowledge-skepticism 13.4 Defense of knowledge-skepticism: Assertibility 13.5 Relevant Alternatives Theory of Knowledge 13.6 Evaluating theories of relevant alternatives Summary Study questions Advanced questions Further reading Notes References Index