Disaster Law

Description

Disasters and their management are today central to public and political agendas. Rather than being understood as exclusively acts of God and Nature, natural disasters are increasingly analysed as social vulnerability exposed by natural hazards. A disaster following an earthquake is no longer seen as caused exclusively by tremors, but by poor building standards, ineffective response systems, or miscommunications. This book argues that the shift in how a disaster is spoken of and managed affects fundamental notions of duty, responsibility and justice. The book considers the role of law in disasters and in particular the regulation of disaster response and the allocation of responsibility in the aftermath of disasters. It argues that traditionally law has approached emergencies, including natural disasters, from a dichotomy of normalcy and emergency. In the state of emergency, norms were replaced by exceptions; democracy by dictatorship; and rights by necessity. However, as the disaster becomes socialized the idea of a clear distinction between normalcy and emergency crumbles. Looking at international and domestic legislation from a range of jurisdictions the book shows how natural disasters are increasingly normalized and increasingly objects of legal regulation and interpretation. The book will be of great use and interest to scholars and researchers of legal theory, and natural hazards and disasters. Cover Title Page Copyright Page Dedication Table of Contents Acknowledgements 1 Introduction 1.1 Structure and content of the book 1.2 Some methodological remarks 1.2.1 On the field 1.2.2 On case selection 1.3 Limitation of scope 1.4 Conclusion 2 Disasters 2.1 Scientific revolutions: paradigm theory 2.2 Three paradigms of disaster research 2.2.1 God/divinity 2.2.2 Nature/contingency 2.2.3 The social/vulnerability 2.3 The social paradigm of disaster research: positions, classifications and developments 2.4 Modern disaster research 2.4.1 Risk 2.4.2 Vulnerability 2.4.3 The impact of disasters: death and destruction 2.4.4 Disasters and catastrophes? 2.4.5 Super hazards? 2.4.6 Natural disasters? 2.5 Conclusion: disasters as social phenomena 3 Exceptions and norms 3.1 Idealised positions in emergency theory 3.1.1 Legal-executive discretion: presidential prerogative, traditional martial law and police powers 3.1.2 Extra-legal executive discretion: the Lockian prerogative and extra-legality 3.1.3 Absolute executive discretion: the Schmittian exception 3.1.4 Legislative accommodation: the enabling act 3.1.5 Legislative accommodation: legality and the état de siège 3.1.6 Individual discretion: Dicey’s martial law and necessity 3.2 Bridge: problems and presumptions of the theoretical field 3.2.1 First presumption: emergencies are generic 3.2.2 Second presumption: norms and exceptions 3.3 Sub-conclusion: exceptions and norms 3.4 Critique: dismantling the state of exception 3.4.1 On the concept of disaster 3.4.2 On the concept of law 3.5 Conclusion 4 Disaster management 4.1 Refuting exceptionalism: disaster management as a human right 4.2 Managing disasters: global disasters – global response 4.2.1 Nordic cooperation 4.2.2 European Union: to the rescue 4.2.3 International disaster response law 4.3 Conclusion: disaster management 5 Disaster responsibility 5.1 Bridge: misfortune and injustice 5.2 Excuses 5.2.1 Acts of God 5.2.2 Statutory exceptionalism: excuses and responsibility 5.2.3 Sub-conclusion: excuses 5.3 Responsibility for disaster 5.3.1 ‘Insouciance, myopia and shortsightedness’ 5.3.2 A disaster ‘made in Japan’ 5.3.3 The L’Aquila Seven and penal law 5.3.4 Sub-conclusion: responsibility 5.4 Conclusion: disaster responsibility 6 Disaster law 6.1 Findings 6.2 A theoretical field on disaster law 6.3 A final perspective 6.3.1 The blame cycle 6.3.2 A line in the sand 6.3.3 The rationalist fantasy 6.4 Conclusion Index