Three pillars of skepticism in classical India: Nagarjuna, Jayarasi, and Sri Harsa

Description

This book argues that the philosophical history of India contains a tradition of skepticism about philosophy represented most clearly by three figures: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa. Furthermore, understanding this tradition ought to be an important part of our contemporary metaphilosophical reflections on the purposes and limits of philosophy.;Cover; Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India; Series page; Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa; Copyright page; Dedication; Contents; Preface; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations for Classical Texts; Introduction; 0.1 Telling the Story of Skepticism in Classical India; 0.2 Skepticism about Philosophy versus Epistemological Skepticism; 0.3 The Scope of This Study and Preview of Contents; 0.4 Expanding the History of Philosophy; Notes; Chapter 1; Skeptical Roots in Early Indian Philosophy; 1.1 Digging for Skeptical Roots Cover Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India Series page Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa Copyright page Dedication Contents Preface Acknowledgments Abbreviations for Classical Texts Introduction 0.1 Telling the Story of Skepticism in Classical India 0.2 Skepticism about Philosophy versus Epistemological Skepticism 0.3 The Scope of This Study and Preview of Contents 0.4 Expanding the History of Philosophy Notes Chapter 1 Skeptical Roots in Early Indian Philosophy 1.1 Digging for Skeptical Roots 1.2 Skepticism in the Ṛg Veda: The Shadow of Philosophical Inquiry1.3 Upaniṣadic Mystical Skepticism: Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Kaṭha, and Kena Upaniṣads 1.4 Materialism, Sañjayan Eel-Wriggling, and Early Buddhist Quietism 1.5: Can Skepticism about Philosophy be a Tradition?: Vitaṇḍa, Prasaṅga, and Prasajya 1.6 Conclusion: Previewing the Fruits of these Skeptical Roots Notes Chapter 2 Nāgārjuna's Buddhist Skepticism 2.1 Interpreting Nāgārjuna: Mysticism, Anti-Realism, and Epistemological Skepticism 2.2 The Middle Way between Mysticism and Anti-Realism 2.3 Nāgārjuna's Two Phases 2.4 How Skepticism about Philosophy Takes Both Phases Seriously2.5 Nāgārjuna's Development of Early Buddhist Quietism: Religiosity without Belief 2.6 Other Historical Precedents: Candrakīrti, Kumārajīva, Khedrupjey's Opponent, and Patsab Nyimadrak 2.7 Conclusion Notes Chapter 3 Nāgārjuna and the Cause of Skepticism 3.1 An Overview of Nāgārjuna's Argumentative Strategies 3.2 Brief Tour of Arguments Concerning the Means of Knowledge in the Vigrahavyāvartanī 3.3 Nāgārjuna's Critique of Theories of Causation 3.4 Conventionalist, Anti-Realist, and Epistemological Skeptical Interpretations 3.5 The Cause of Skepticism3.6 Conclusion: Combining Analysis-Insight and Quietism Notes Chapter 4 Jayarāśi's Cārvāka Skepticism 4.1 The Need for Cārvāka Studies 4.2 Jayarāśi's Method of Destruction: Developing the Materialist and Sañjayan Strains of Early Indian Skepticism 4.3 Jayarāśian Contextualism 4.4 A Contextualist Response to the Inconsistency Objection 4.5 How to Stop Worrying and Love a Life without Philosophy or Religion 4.6 Conclusion Notes Chapter 5 Jayarāśi and the Delightful Destruction of Buddhist Epistemology 5.1 Jayarāśi's Denial of Epistemological Realism 5.2 Buddhist Epistemological Realism: Dignāga and Dharmakīrti5.3 The Non-Establishment of Difference Argument 5.4 The Impossibility of Considering Duality Argument 5.5 The Delightful Destruction of Epistemology and Jayarāśi's Skepticism About Philosophy 5.6 Conclusion Notes Chapter 6 Śrī Harṣa's Advaita Skepticism 6.1 The Rise of Advaita Vedānta and the Continuing Refinement of Realism 6.2 Interpreting Śrī Harṣa: Negative Dialectic, Positive Idealism, and Non-Realism 6.3 The Critique of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā Realism 6.4 The Possibility of Mystical Experience