Cosmopolitanism as Nonrelationism: Who is Cosmopolitan Now?

Description

This book suggests that more can be said about cosmopolitanism than either the bold endorsement of a world state or the humble recognition of the equal moral worth of individuals, which makes everybody cosmopolitan. Identifying problems with the traditional concept and disentangling a variety of positions within the cosmopolitan paradigm, it introduces the more refined concept of cosmopolitanism as nonrelationism, which denies underived special duties among fellow citizens or other related individuals, such as family members or friends. Cosmopolitanism as nonrelationism promises to overcome an entrenched debate wherein everybody is a cosmopolitan, and brings back the radical character traditionally associated with the term. It portrays cosmopolitanism as a distinct and thorough position challenging classic proponents such as Barry, Caney, Nussbaum, and Pogge, and questioning their theories’ cosmopolitan character. Cosmopolitanism as nonrelationism has consequences for world politics without prescribing any unfeasible global order: It establishes normative criteria for evaluating institutions and provides guidance for the development of new ones. Preface Contents List of Figures List of Tables Chapter 1: Introduction References Part I: Cosmopolitanism as Moral Egalitarianism: The Standard Definition Chapter 2: Analysis of the Standard Definition of Cosmopolitanism 2.1 Individualism 2.2 Universality 2.3 Generality 2.4 Results References Chapter 3: The Problems of the Standard Definition of Cosmopolitanism 3.1 Broadness First Premise: All Positions Qualify as Cosmopolitan Second Premise: A Broad Concept Is Not Useful 3.2 Synonymy 3.3 Ambiguity First Premise: Cosmopolitanism Is an Ambiguous Term Second Premise: Ambiguity Is Problematic 3.4 Results References Part II: Specifying the Concept of Cosmopolitanism Chapter 4: Cosmopolitanism About Justice: Specifying Universality 4.1 Extreme Cosmopolitanism About Justice 4.2 Moderate Cosmopolitanism About Justice 4.3 Problems of Assignment General Claim: There Are (Substantive) Global Principles of Justice Specific Claim: There Are No Independent Social Norms of Justice 4.4 Discussion References Chapter 5: Cosmopolitanism About Culture: Specifying Individualism 5.1 Extreme Cosmopolitanism About Culture 5.2 Moderate Cosmopolitanism About Culture 5.3 Discussion General Claim Moderate Cosmopolitanism About Culture Extreme Cosmopolitanism A New Category: Cosmopolitanism About Relations 5.4 Results: An Extended Typology of Cosmopolitanism References Part III: Cosmopolitanism as Nonrelationism: A Defence Chapter 6: Cosmopolitanism as Nonrelationism and Relevant Duties of Justice 6.1 Cosmopolitanism as Nonrelationism 6.2 Duties and Rights (Hart’s and Rawls’ Account) 6.3 Obligations and Virtue (O’Neill’s Account) 6.4 Assigned Responsibility (Goodin’s and Pettit’s Account) 6.5 The Responsibility Framework and the Concept of Duty 6.6 Results References Chapter 7: Refuting the Relationist Challenge: Room for Partiality Rather Than Advocating Special Duties 7.1 Special Responsibilities and Valuable Relations 7.2 The Voluntarist Objection 7.3 The Distributive Objection 7.4 Results References Chapter 8: Consequences and Conclusion References Index