Habit and the History of Philosophy

Description

For Aristotle, habit was a fundamental aspect of human nature; and for William James, it was the "enormous flywheel" of society. In both the history of philosophy and contemporary research, it is acknowledged as a fundamental topic in ethics, moral psychology, philosophy of action, and phenomenology. This major volume, written by a team of international contributors, is an outstanding collection that offers a thorough and diverse philosophical exploration of habit from the classical period to the modern day. Carefully edited to reflect the breadth of the subject, its 18 chapters are divided into four clear parts: Habit and Ancient PhilosophyHabit and Early Modern PhilosophyHabit and Modern PhilosophyContemporary Perspectives on Habit. Key topics, debates, and figures are covered such as the emotions, perception, free will, William James, John Dewey, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, John McDowell, and Hubert Dreyfus. Habit and the History of Philosophy is essential reading for students and researchers in the history of philosophy, ethics, phenomenology, philosophy of action, and pragmatism. It will also be extremely useful for those in related disciplines such as religion, sociology, and history. Cover Half Title Series Page Title Page Copyright Page Contents Contributors Introduction 0.1. The Philosophy of Habit 0.2. Background 0.3. Habits in Ancient Philosophy 0.4. Habit and Early Modern Philosophy 0.5. Habit and Modern Philosophy 0.6. Contemporary Perspectives on Habit References Part I: Habit and Ancient Philosophy 1. Socrates on Habituation and Politics: Plato's Gorgias 509c6-510a4 1.1. Introduction 1.2. Not Suffering from Unjust Actions: The Role of Habituation to Partisans of Regimes 1.3. Not Committing Unjust Actions 1.3.1. What Is Meant by "Doing What's Unjust" (Adikein)? 1.3.2. What Is Meant by "Power" (Dynamis) and "Craft" (Technē)? 1.3.3. What Is Meant by "Learning" (Mathēsis) and Training (Askēsis)? 1.4. Conclusion Notes References Primary Sources Secondary Sources 2. Guided Practice Makes Perfect: Habituation into Full Virtue in Aristotle's Ethics 2.1. Virtue, Full Virtue, and Phronêsis 2.2. Three Models of Virtue Acquisition 2.3. Virtue of Character: Aristotle's Definition 2.4. Disambiguating EN II 1, 1103a15-17 2.5. Explaining the Appeal of the α-Model Notes References 3. Aristotle on the Nature of Ethos and Ethismos 3.1. Introduction 3.2. An Assumption about the Nature of Habituation 3.3. Ethos and Ethismos in Aristotle's Ethics 3.3.1. Ethos in the Eudemian Ethics 3.3.2. Ethos and Ethismos in the Nicomachean Ethics 3.3.3. Ethos and Teaching in NE 10.9 3.4. Approaching Aristotelian Habituation Afresh 3.4.1. What Kind of Activity? 3.4.2. The Contribution of "Activity" Notes References 4. Making Progress: Epictetus on Habituation 4.1. Training Students 4.2. Making Progress 4.3. Contrary Habits 4.4. Negative Influences 4.5. Non-Cognitive Training Notes References Part II: Habit and Early Modern Philosophy 5. Forming the Habit of Thinking Well: Descartes's Reshaping of the Act of Reasoning Notes References Abbreviations Other References 6. Habit in Hartley's Reconciling Project: Between Christian Morality and the Usual Course of Nature 6.1. Habit in Neural Vibrations 6.2. The Impact of Mental Habits on Moral Behaviour 6.3. Artificial Associations in Moral Education 6.4. The Subtlety of Hartley's Materialist Determinism 6.5. Conclusion Notes References 7. Habit and Will in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy 7.1. Voluntary and Involuntary Habit in Locke's Philosophy 7.2. Joseph Butler and George Turnbull on the Will and the Double Law of Habit 7.3. David Hume on Habit and the Will 7.4. William Porterfield on the Pervasiveness of the Will 7.5. Thomas Reid: Mechanical Habits and Habits of Art 7.6. Dugald Stewart: Habits Are Voluntary and Not Mechanical 7.7 Conclusion. Notes References 8. Kant's Account of Intellectual Habit and Moral Education 8.1. The Moral Education of Children 8.2. Grounding Character 8.3. The Moral Value of Habit 8.4. Kantian Autonomy and the Influence of Inclinations Notes References Part III: Habit and Modern Philosophy 9. The Dispositional Account of Habits and Explanation of Moral Action in F.H. Bradley 9.1. In Support of the Habit Hypothesis 9.2. Against the Habit Hypothesis 9.3. Habits, Dispositions, and Tendencies 9.4. Fictions 9.5. Moral Danger of Habits 9.6. Habits and the Prediction of Actions Notes References 10. Phenomenology as Vocation - A Project Instituted and Habituated by the Will 10.1. Introduction: Phenomenology as Vocation 10.2. Habituation and Institution of Vocational Tasks 10.3. Personal and Generational Aspects of Vocational Time 10.4. Volitional Grounds of Decisions and Commitments 10.5. Periodical Alteration or Irrecoverable Transformation? Notes References 11. Personal Acts, Habit, and Embodied Agency in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception 11.1. Introduction 11.2. Habit, Action, and Merleau-Ponty 11.3. Merleau-Ponty's Conception of Habit 11.4. Personal Acts, Habit, and Aspiration Notes References 12. Deleuze on Habit and Time; or, How to Get, and How Not to Get, from Hume to Bergson 12.1. Hume (and Reid) on the Force of Habit 12.2. Tendency and Time in Nineteenth-Century France 12.3. Repetition and the Instant Notes References Part IV: Contemporary Perspectives on Habit 13. Habit and the Spiritual Life: Perspectives from Christian Mysticism and the Philosophy of Religion 13.1. Habit and Prayer: Augustinian Mysticism 13.2. Habit and Grace: French Spiritualism 13.3. Habit and the Contemplative Turn: Hadot, Murdoch, Weil Notes References 14. Are Habits Inherited? A Possible Epigenetic Route from Charles Darwin to the Contemporary Debate 14.1. Introduction 14.2. Habits and Instincts in the Young Charles Darwin's Theory 14.3. Moving from a Transformational to a Variational View of Evolution 14.4. What Is Epigenetics? Notes References 15. The Discourse Ecology Model: Changing the World One Habit at a Time 15.1. Habit and Habitat 15.2. The Lexico-Political 15.3. Reversals in Objective Arrangements 15.4. How the World Has Changed 15.5. Conclusion Notes References 16. Habit and Practice 16.1. The Concept of Habit 16.2. The Concept of Practice 16.3. Three Kinds of Practice 16.4. Conclusion Notes References 17. Habit-Formation: What's in a Perspective? 17.1. Merleau-Ponty on the Habit-Bearer's Perspective 17.2. A Problem for Merleau-Ponty 17.3. Familiarity and Habit-Formation 17.4. Conclusion Notes References 18. Habits in Perception: A Diachronic Defence of Hyperinferentialism 18.1. Introduction 18.2. From "Strong" to "Hyper" Inferentialism in Perception 18.3. Challenges to Naïve Perceptual Hyperinferentialism 18.4. Peirce's 1902-3 Theory: Percept, Perceptual Judgment, and Percipuum 18.5. Cognitive Underpinnings of Symbol as Habit 18.6. Bergman's Criticisms of Peirce's 1902-3 Theory of Perception 18.7. The Temporally Structured Percipuum 18.8. Conclusions Notes References Index