Cooperative Game Theory Tools in Coalitional Control Networks

Description

This book analyzes coalitional control schemes by incorporating concepts of cooperative game theory into a distributed control framework. It considers a networked architecture where the nodes are the agents and the edges are their communication links and either the agents or the links are established as the players of cooperative games related to the cost function of the coalitional schemes. The book discusses various cooperative game theory tools that are used to measure/analyze the players’ features, impose constraints on them, provide alternative methods of game computation, detect critical players inside the control scheme, and perform system partitioning of large-scale systems, such as the Barcelona drinking water network, which is described in a case study. Front Matter ....Pages i-xxii Introduction (Francisco Javier Muros)....Pages 1-8 Cooperative Game Theory (Francisco Javier Muros)....Pages 9-40 Coalitional Systems in Optimal Control (Francisco Javier Muros)....Pages 41-67 The Shapley and Position Values to Design Coalitional Networks (Francisco Javier Muros)....Pages 69-91 The Banzhaf Value as a Design Tool in Coalitional Control (Francisco Javier Muros)....Pages 93-117 Harsanyi Power Solutions in Coalitional Control Systems (Francisco Javier Muros)....Pages 119-143 Detection of Critical Agents by the Position Value (Francisco Javier Muros)....Pages 145-160 Partitioning of Coalitional Networks by Cooperative Game Theory (Francisco Javier Muros)....Pages 161-207 Conclusions and Future Research (Francisco Javier Muros)....Pages 209-216 Back Matter ....Pages 217-218