National and Regional Parliaments in the EU-Legislative Procedure Post-Lisbon: The Impact of the Early Warning Mechanism

Description

Much has changed in European constitutional law after the Lisbon Treaty, not least the efforts to increase democratic legitimacy by engaging national legislatures and introducing a stricter subsidiary review process, namely the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM). This collection looks at the how national parliaments have adapted to their new roles and at how the new system has impacted on relations between the EU legislative bodies and these national parliaments. A team of experts from across Europe explores the effect of the EWM on the national constitutional orders, analyses the regional impact of EWM and evaluates the new system of scrutiny. Acknowledgements Contents List of Contributors 1 Introduction Part I:
Subsidiarity Review—Goals Achieved and Future Challenges 2 Is the Early Warning Mechanism a Legal or a Political Procedure? Three Questions and a Typology I. Introduction: Legal or Political? A Highly Instructive Question II. Are Subsidiarity and the EWM Best Studied by Legal Scholars or Political Scientists? III. Should Subsidiarity and the EWM be Implemented by Legal or Political Institutions? IV. Should Subsidiarity and the EWM Entail a Political or Legal Mode of Reasoning? V. Three Approaches to the EWM: Legal Rule-Following, Political Bargaining, and Policy Arguing VI. Conclusion: It Takes Two to Tango 3 Reconstructing the EWM? I. Introduction II. The Nature of The Present System III. Cards in the Hands of National Parliaments IV. How "Legal" Should the Political Control Be? V. Should National Parliaments Have the Same Impact in All Areas? VI. How Limited in Scope Should the Subsidiarity Review Be? VII. Should the National Parliaments Have a Collective Right of Initiative? VIII. Bring the Court in Earlier? IX. Conclusions 4 Mapping out the Procedural Requirements for the Early Warning Mechanism I. Introduction II. The Evolving Participation of National Parliaments in EU Affairs III. Rights of National Parliaments IV. Rights of National Parliaments Reflected in the Duties of EU Institutions V. What is the View of the Court of Justice on Procedural Subsidiarity Review? VI. Looking Ahead-How is the EWM Best Protected? VII. Final Remarks 5 Interparliamentary Cooperation between National Parliaments I. Introduction II. Interparliamentary Cooperation-A Conceptual and Systemic Approach III. The Matrix of Interparliamentary Cooperation and the Influence of National Parliaments IV. The Present and the Future of Interparliamentary Cooperation Between National Parliaments-Trends and Proposals V. Concluding Remarks Part II:
Regional Parliaments 6 Regional Parliaments and the Early Warning System: An Assessment and Some Suggestions for Reform I. Introduction II. The Participation of Regional Parliaments with Legislative Competences in the Early Warning System III. Is a Systematic Regional Participation in the EWS Desirable in the Current Context? IV. The Role of Regions in the EU and a Need for Reform 7 A New Player in the "Multi-Level Parliamentary Field". Cooperation and Communication of Regional Parliaments in the Post-Lisbon Scenario I. Introduction II. Regional Parliaments in the Post-Lisbon Scenario III. Types of Inter-Parliamentary Relations and Their Contextual Factors IV. Cross-Country Overview V. Conclusions 8 Italian Regional Councils and the Positive Externalities of the Early Warning Mechanism for National Constitutional Law I. The Effects of a "European" Procedure on National Constitutional Law II. The Constitutional Prohibition on Calling Regional Councils "Parliaments" III. The (Weak) Position of Regional Councils in the Italian Constitutional Context IV. The Positive Externalities of the Early Warning Mechanism for the Italian Regional Councils V. Case Studies. The Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and the Reform of the Cohesion Policy VI. Conclusion 9 Belgian Parliaments and the Early Warning System I. Introduction II. Subsidiarity Scrutiny and the Belgian Federal System III. The Institutional Set-Up: The Differing Parliamentary Procedures and the Perspectives on EU Subsidiarity IV. Perspective(s) on Subsidiarity V. An Analysis of the Reasoned Opinions VI. Conclusions Part III:
The Early Warning Mechanism in National Constitutional Orders 10 Similar but Different-Comparing the Scrutiny of the Principle of Subsidiarity within the EWM in Denmark, Finland and Sweden I. The Constitutional Context of the Scrutiny of the Subsidiarity Principle by National Parliaments II. Scrutiny of the Principle of Subsidiarity within the EWM-Procedural Aspects III. The Scope of the Review-Different Understandings of the Principle of Subsidiarity IV. Similar but Different-Concluding Analysis 11 The Scrutiny of the Principle of Subsidiarity in the Procedures and Reasoned Opinions of the Italian Chamber and Senate I. Introduction II. The Italian Parliament: A Symmetric Bicameralism, Currently Under Revision III. The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Italian Constitution IV. EU Affairs in the Italian Parliament V. The Different Implementation of the EwM in the Two Houses VI. The Reasoned Opinions Submitted VII. Four Examples of Reasoned Opinions VIII. Some Trends from the Italian Experience IX. Conclusion: Towards a more Formalised and Homogeneous Procedure? 12 Speaking with One Voice? The French Parliament"s Use of the EWM I. The French Parliament and The Early Warning Mechanism: A Politicised Use of A Legal Instrument II. The Control of Subsidiarity within The National Constitutional System: Similar Formal Competences, Differentiated Use Between The Two Houses III. The EWM: An Instrument Reversing the Fusion of Powers in Parliamentary Systems? Iv. Cooperation with other National Legislatures In Subsidiarity Review: More Consideration Than Cooperation V. Conclusions 13 Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Affairs by the UK Parliament: The Primacy of Ministerial Accountability I. Introduction II. The Political, Legal and Constitutional Context of Scrutiny III. The Work of The EU Scrutiny Committee IV. The House of Lords EU Select Committee V. UK Parliamentary Scrutiny as a Form of Substitute Sovereignty? VI. The Provision of Information and Scrutiny Reserves VII. Concluding Remarks-The Impact of EU Scrutiny within The UK Parliament 14 Able and Willing? Early Warning System and Political Dialogue in the Bundestag and the Nationalrat I. The Challenges: Getting It Right In Time II. Is it all Worth the Effort? MPs as Rational Actors30 III. The Role of Norms and Values67 IV. Conclusion 15 Like Two Peas in a Pod? The Functioning of the Early Warning Mechanism in the Czech Republic and Poland I. Introduction II. Position of Parliament In The Constitutional System of Poland and The Czech Republic III. EWM Procedures IV. Reasoned Opinions V. Debates and Votes under The EWM VI. Assessment VII. Conclusion 16 The Trajectory of the Early Warning Mechanism I. Introduction II. The Nature of the Early Warning Mechanism III. The Style and Content of Reasoned Opinions IV. The EWM"s Internal and External Impact V. The Role of Regional Parliaments VI. The Future of the EWM VII. Conclusions Index