Aviation Security: Countermeasures, Access Control, Air Cargo and Charter Operations

Description

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has spent billions of dollars on aviation security programs. However, recent attacks involving aircraft and airports in other countries underscore the continued threat to aviation and the need for an effective aviation security program. Chapter 1 examines the extent to which TSA has (1) information on the effectiveness of selected passenger aviation security countermeasures and (2) systematically analyzed the cost and effectiveness tradeoffs among countermeasures.Incidents of aviation workers using access privileges to smuggle weapons and drugs into security-restricted areas and onto planes has heightened awareness about security at commercial airports. TSA, along with airport operators, has responsibility for securing the nation's approximately 440 commercial airports. Chapter 2 reports on (1) the extent to which TSA has assessed the components of risk and (2) the extent to which TSA has taken actions to oversee and facilitate security, among other objectives.U.S. policies and strategies for protecting air cargo have focused on two main perceived threats: the in-flight detonation of explosives concealed in an air cargo shipment and the hijacking of a large all-cargo aircraft for use as a weapon to attack a ground target such as a major population center, critical infrastructure, or a critical national security asset. Additionally, there is concern that chemical, biological, or radiological agents or devices that could be used in a mass-casualty attack in the United States might be smuggled as international air cargo as discussed in chapter 3.On August 31, 2016, as part of a shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba, air carriers resumed scheduled commercial flights between the United States and Cuba, a route previously only open to public and private charter carrier operations. Chapter 4 examines (1) the extent to which TSA followed its standard operating procedures when assessing aviation security at Cuban airports in fiscal years 2012 through 2017; (2) the results of TSA's Cuban airport assessments in fiscal years 2012 through 2017; and (3) the results of TSA's air carrier inspections for Cuba in fiscal years 2016--when commercial scheduled air service between the United States and Cuba resumed--and 2017. Contents Preface Chapter 1 Aviation Security: Actions Needed to Systematically Evaluate Cost and Effectiveness across Security Countermeasures( Abbreviations Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Recommends What GAO Found Background Overview of Selected Aviation Security Countermeasures Passenger Prescreening (Secure Flight) Checkpoint Screening Checked Baggage Screening Explosives Detection Canines Behavior Detection and Analysis U.S. Federal Air Marshal Service TSA’s System of Aviation Security Countermeasures TSA Has Effectiveness Data on Some Countermeasures That Show Mixed Results, But Does Not Measure Deterrence Data on the Effectiveness of Selected Countermeasures in Detecting and Disrupting Threats to Aviation Security Vary in Extent and Reliability TSA Effectiveness Data on Selected Countermeasures Indicate Mixed Results TSA Does Not Measure Deterrence for Any of Its Aviation Security Countermeasures TSA Can Compare the Effectiveness of Certain Combinations of Aviation Security Countermeasures, but Does Not Systematically Analyze Cost and Effectiveness Tradeoffs Across All Countermeasures TSA Has a Tool to Assess the Security Effectiveness of Alternate Combinations of Some Countermeasures TSA Has Not Systematically Analyzed Potential Cost and Effectiveness Tradeoffs across the Entire System of Aviation Security Countermeasures Conclusion Recommendations for Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation List of Requesters Appendix I: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Information on the Direct Costs of Selected Countermeasures Appendix II: Fiscal Year 2015 Effectiveness Data for Selected Passenger Aviation Security Countermeasures Overview of Passenger Prescreening The Effectiveness of Passenger Prescreening in Fiscal Year 2015 Overview of Checkpoint Screening The Effectiveness of Checkpoint Screening in Fiscal Year 2015 Checkpoint Screening TSOs Annual Proficiency Reviews Threat Image Projection (TIP) Testing Aviation Screening Assessment Program (ASAP) Advantage Testing Checkpoint Screening Technology TSA’s Checkpoint Screening System as a Whole Overview of Checked Baggage Screening The Effectiveness of Checked Baggage Screening in Fiscal Year 2015 Checked Baggage Screening TSOs Annual Proficiency Reviews (APR) Aviation Screening Assessment Program (ASAP) Advantage Checked Baggage Screening Technology and TSA’s Checked Baggage Screening System as a Whole Explosives Detection Canines The Effectiveness of Explosives Detection Canines in Fiscal Year 2015 Annual Certification Evaluations Short Notice Assessments Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security Chapter 2 Aviation Security: Airport Perimeter and Access Control Security Would Benefit from Risk Assessment and Strategy Updates( Abbreviations Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Recommends What GAO Found Background Airport Perimeter and Access Control Security Roles and Responsibilities Risk Management Approach TSA Has Made Progress Assessing Risks to Airport Security, but Limitations Remain in Updating Assessments, Assessing System-Wide Vulnerability, and Monitoring Trends TSA Has Assessed All Three Components of Risk TSA Has Not Updated Its Risk Assessment of Airport Perimeter and Access Control Security or Shared Updated Risk Information with Stakeholders TSA Has Not Assessed Vulnerability of Airports System-Wide TSA Does Not Analyze Its Security Event Data Specifically for Perimeter and Access Control Security TSA Has Taken Actions to Oversee and Facilitate Airport Security, but Has Not Updated its Strategy to Reflect Changes in Risk Assessments and Other Actions TSA Has Taken Various Actions since 2009 to Oversee and Facilitate Perimeter and Access Control Security TSA Developed a National Strategy to Guide Oversight of Airport Security, but Has Not Updated It to Reflect Changes in Its Risk Assessment of Airport Security and Other Actions Selected Commercial Airports Have Taken a Variety of Approaches Intended to Strengthen Perimeter and Access Control Security Technology-Based Approaches to Airport Security Nontechnology-Based Approaches to Airport Security Conclusion Recommendations for Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation List of Requesters Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Appendix II: Requirements Addressing Security Measures at Commercial Airports Appendix III: Ongoing Efforts Initiated Prior to 2009 to Regulate and Facilitate Airport Perimeter and Access Control Security Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) Program Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Chapter 3 Security of Air Cargo Shipments, Operations, and Facilities( Summary The Air Cargo Industry Security Threats to Air Cargo Hijackings Explosives The Insider Threat Enforcement Challenges Risk-Based Evaluations of Shipments The Known Shipper Program Vulnerability Assessments and Risk-Based Targeting Adopting and Harmonizing Global Standards and Industry Best Practices Cargo Screening Procedures The Certified Cargo Screening Program Cargo Screening Technologies Canine Teams Security of Air Cargo Facilities and Operations Supply Chain Security Measures Tamper-Evident and Tamper-Resistant Packaging Tracking Technologies Screened Cargo Identifiers In-Flight Security Measures Hardened Cockpit Doors and Protective Barriers Arming All-Cargo Pilots Blast-Resistant Cargo Containers Current Legislative Issues Chapter 4 Aviation Security: Actions Needed to Better Identify and Track U.S.-Bound Public Charter Operations from Cuba( Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Recommends What GAO Found Background History of Civil Aviation between the United States and Cuba DHS Responsibilities for Ensuring the Security of U.S.-Bound Flights from Cuba TSA’s Process for Conducting Foreign Airport Assessments TSA’s Process for Conducting Air Carrier Inspections TSA’s Assessments and Inspections in Cuba Generally Followed Standard Operating Procedures, but Improvements Can Help Ensure They Occur at the Established Frequency TSA’s Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections in Cuba Followed Standard Operating Procedures Documentation Recording, Tracking, and Resolving Findings Timeliness TSA Inspections of Air Carriers Did Not Always Occur at the Established Frequency TSA Assessments of Cuban Airport Security Found Mixed Levels of Compliance TSA Found Mixed Levels of Compliance with ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices at Cuban Airports Access Control Quality Control Aircraft and Inflight Security Passenger and Baggage Security Fencing Most Inspections Showed Air Carriers Fully Implemented All TSA Security Requirements and Cuban Personnel Continue to Oversee Security Measures for Each U.S.-Bound Flight Most Inspections Showed Air Carriers Fully Implemented All TSA Security Requirements Bilingual Signs/Notifications TSA-Approved Amendments to Air Carriers’ Security Programs Allow Carriers to Use Cuban Personnel to Oversee Security Measures for Each U.S.-Bound Flight Conclusion Recommendations for Executive Action Agency Comments and our Evaluation Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Appendix II: Comment from the Department of Homeland Security Index Blank Page