Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate: Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes

Description

This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, published by Springer in 2017, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes. Front Matter ....Pages i-xv Introduction (Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi)....Pages 1-6 Voting Paradoxes (Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi)....Pages 7-14 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate (Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi)....Pages 15-25 The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes (Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi)....Pages 27-48 The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that Are Not Condorcet–Consistent to Various Paradoxes (Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi)....Pages 49-79 The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet–Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes (Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi)....Pages 81-124 Summary (Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi)....Pages 125-134