Game Theory and Fisheries Management: Theory and Applications

Description

This book is the first to present in a systematic manner the application of game theory to fisheries management at both international and national levels. Strategic interaction among fishers and nations exploiting fishery resources is an inescapable fact of life. This has long been recognized at the international level, and is becoming increasingly recognized at the national/regional level. It follows, therefore, that, in order to be able to analyse effectively the management of these resources, the theory of strategic interaction ̶ game theory ̶ must be brought to bear. In this book the step-by-step development of the game theory is accompanied by numerous applications to the real world of fisheries management policy. As such, it is designed to appeal to policy makers and stakeholders, as well as to graduate students in Economics. Preface Contents 1 Introduction to the Application of Game Theory in Fisheries Management 1.1 Evolution of the Application of Game Theory to Fisheries Economics: The Era of Irrelevance 1.2 The UN Third Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Coming of the International Transboundary Fish Stock Issue: Game Theory Achieves Relevance 1.2.1 Transboundary Fish Stocks: The Legal Aspects 1.3 The Emerging International Straddling Fish Stock Issue and the Need for Game-Theoretic Models of Increasing Complexity 1.3.1 Straddling Fish Stocks: The Legal Aspects 1.3.2 Impact of Game-Theoretic Analysis of International Fisheries Management Upon Policymakers 1.4 The Management of Fish Stocks at the National/Regional Level References 2 Basic Concepts in Game Theory 2.1 What is a Game? 2.2 The Nash Equilibrium 2.3 Non-cooperative Games 2.4 Cooperative Games 2.5 Case Study: The North Sea Herring Fishery References 3 Introduction to Non-cooperative Fisheries Games 3.1 A Static Game 3.1.1 Symmetric Game 3.1.2 Asymmetric Game 3.2 Dynamic Non-cooperative Fisheries Game 3.2.1 The Sole Owner Optimum 3.2.2 Symmetric Game 3.2.3 Asymmetric Game 3.3 Comparison of Static and Dynamic Games 3.4 Case Study: The South Tasman Rise Trawl Fishery 3.5 Policy Implications References 4 Two-Player Cooperative Games 4.1 On Understanding Cooperative Games in Fisheries 4.1.1 The Nash Bargaining Solution 4.2 Two-Player Cooperative Fishery Games Without Side Payments 4.2.1 A Symmetric Cooperative Game 4.2.2 An Asymmetric Cooperative Game 4.3 Two-Player Cooperative Fishery Games with Side Payments 4.4 Case Studies 4.4.1 Arcto-Norwegian Cod Fishery 4.4.2 Pacific Salmon Treaty of 1985 4.4.3 North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty 4.5 Policy Implications References 5 Cooperative Games in Fisheries with More than Two Players 5.1 An Introduction to Cooperative Games with More than Two Players: The Importance of Coalitions 5.2 The Concept of Characteristic Function Games 5.2.1 The Theory Behind the Characteristic Function 5.2.2 The Characteristic Function Applied to a Simple Fishery Model 5.2.3 A Numerical Example 5.3 The Allocation Problem, Sharing Rules and Side Payments 5.3.1 Nash Bargaining Solution 5.3.2 The Shapley Value 5.3.3 The Nucleolus 5.3.4 The Satisfactory Nucleolus 5.4 Case Study: Example of a Model Applied to the Baltic Cod Fishery 5.5 Policy Implications Appendix References 6 Non-cooperative Coalition Formation Games in Fisheries 6.1 p-Game: The Concept 6.2 A Standard p-Game 6.2.1 The Bioeconomic Model 6.2.2 The Coalition Formation Model 6.2.3 Properties of the Game 6.2.4 Solution of the Game 6.2.5 A Numerical Example 6.3 Extension: The Role of Asymmetry 6.3.1 The Coalition Formation Model 6.3.2 A Numerical Example 6.3.3 Simulation Results 6.4 Case Study: The Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Bluefin Tuna Fishery 6.5 Case Study: The Norwegian Spring Spawning (Atlanto-Scandian) Herring 6.6 Policy Implications Appendix Proof of Proposition 6.1 Proof of Proposition 6.2 References 7 Other Fishery Game Approaches 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Multi-stage Games and Principal–Agent Theory 7.3 Repeated Games 7.4 Fish War Games 7.5 Games with Spatial Dimensions 7.6 Games Under Uncertainty 7.7 Case Study: The Groundfish Trawl Fishery of British Columbia, Canada 7.8 Policy Implications References 8 Conclusions 8.1 Major Lessons and Conclusions 8.1.1 Non-cooperative Games 8.1.2 Theory of Cooperative Games 8.2 Future Challenges 8.2.1 Uncertainty 8.2.2 Evolutionary Games 8.2.3 Ecosystem Games 8.2.4 Multi-sector Games 8.2.5 National/Regional Fisheries Management and Game Theory 8.3 Concluding Remarks References