War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives

Description

In this landmark work, two leading theorists of international relations analyze the strategies designed to avoid international conflict. Using a combination of game theory, statistical analysis, and detailed case histories, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman evaluate the conditions that promote negotiation, the status quo, capitulation, acquiescence, and war. The authors assess two competing theories on the role that domestic politics plays in foreign policy choices: one states that national decision makers are constrained only by the exigencies of the international system, and the other views leaders as additionally constrained by domestic political considerations. Finding the second theory to be more consistent with historical events, they use it to examine enduring puzzles such as why democracies do not appear to fight one another, whether balance of power or power preponderance promotes peaceful resolution of disputes, and what conditions are necessary and sufficient for nations to cooperate with one another. They conclude by speculating about the implications of their theory for foreign policy strategies in the post-Cold War world. Contents Figures Tables Preface Part I. A Theory of Foreign Policy Chapter 1. Reason and War Chapter 2. The International Interaction Game Chapter 3. Foreign Policy Decisions with Full Information Part II. Domestic Constraints and Foreign Policy Chapter 4. Norms, Beliefs, and International Cooperation Chapter 5. Five Democratic Puzzles Part III. Power and Foreign Policy Chapter 6. International Power Relations and War Chapter 7. The Seven Weeks' War and System Transformation Part IV. Foreign Policy Implications of the International Interaction Game Chapter 8. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World Chapter 9. War's Reason and the National Interest Appendix 1. Measurement of the Variables Appendix 2. Domestic Constraints and the Prospects of Bluffing Bibliography Index