Properties and Propositions: The Metaphysics of Higher-Order Logic

Description

This book articulates and defends Fregean realism, a theory of properties based on Frege's insight that properties are not objects, but rather the satisfaction conditions of predicates. Robert Trueman argues that this approach is the key not only to dissolving a host of longstanding metaphysical puzzles, such as Bradley's Regress and the Problem of Universals, but also to understanding the relationship between states of affairs, propositions, and the truth conditions of sentences. Fregean realism, Trueman suggests, ultimately leads to a version of the identity theory of truth, the theory that true propositions are identical to obtaining states of affairs. In other words, the identity theory collapses the gap between mind and world. This book will be of interest to anyone working in logic, metaphysics, the philosophy of language or the philosophy of mind. Cover Half-title Title page Copyright information Dedication Contents Acknowledgements Introduction I.1 Properties as Second-Order Existents I.2 The Concept Horse Paradox I.3 Properties as Satisfaction Conditions I.4 Williamson on Absolute Generality 1 Substitution in a Sense 1.1 Some Counterexamples to the Reference Principle 1.2 Sense-Substitution 1.3 A New Reference Principle 1.4 The Sense in Sense-Substitution 1.5 A Circularity Objection 1.6 The Differences between Reference Principles 2 The Term/Predicate Distinction 2.1 The Senses of Terms and the Senses of Predicates 2.2 Substituting Predicates for Predicates 2.3 Substituting Predicates for Terms 2.4 Substituting Terms for Predicates 2.5 Type-Shifting Principles 2.6 An Assumed Distinction 3 Ramsey's Challenge 3.1 Socrates and Wisdom 3.2 Complex Predicates 3.3 Ramsey’s Alternative Scheme 3.4 Subsentential Monism 3.5 Back to the Term/Predicate Distinction 4 Two Types of Reference 4.1 The Argument in Brief 4.2 Preliminaries: Disquotation and Singular Terms 4.3 The Disquotation Problem for Predicate-Reference 4.4 Disquotation and Sense-Substitution 4.5 A Different Type of Reference 4.6 No Co-reference between Terms and Predicates 4.7 Looking Ahead 5 The Reference Principle 5.1 Sense-Substitution 5.2 Premise 0 5.3 Premise 1 5.4 Premise 2 5.5 Premise 3 5.6 The Proof 6 Fregean Realism 6.1 Predicate-Reference and Satisfaction 6.2 Properties Are Satisfaction Conditions 6.3 The Property/Object Distinction 7 Fregean Nominalism 7.1 Two Different Ways of Reading (S)? 7.2 Against a Quinean Suggestion 7.3 Non-Nominal Quantification 7.4 Set-Theoretic Semantics 7.5 Quantification over Satisfaction Conditions 7.6 Beyond Nominalism and Realism 7.A Appendix: Second-Order Semantics 8 Some Alternatives 8.1 Wright’s Ascription 8.2 Hale’s Primary/Secondary Distinction 8.3 MacBride’s Impure Reference 8.4 Wiggins, Strawson and the Copula 9 The Concept Horse Paradox 9.1 The Property Horse Is Not a Property? 9.2 Categorial Differences 9.3 Categorial Similarities 9.4 Saying and Showing 10 The Metaphysics Exam 10.1 The Problem of Universals 10.2 Bradley’s Regress 10.3 Are Properties Immanent or Transcendent? 10.4 Converse Relations 11 States of Affairs 11.1 Fregean Realism about States of Affairs 11.2 Negative and Disjunctive States of Affairs 11.3 Facts as Obtaining States of Affairs 11.4 The Structure of States of Affairs 12 The Prenective View of Propositional Content 12.1 Propositional Content 12.2 Two Views of Propositional Content 12.3 Formalising Inferences 12.4 The Prenective View versus Natural Language 12.5 The Standard View versus Natural Language 13 On Content and Object 13.1 The Limits of the Standard View 13.2 A Truth Conditional Approach 13.3 The Constituents of Propositions 13.4 Propositions Are Propositional Contents 13.A Appendix: Contemporary Approaches to Structured Propositions 14 The Identity Theory of Truth 14.1 An Immodest Identity Theory 14.2 The Core of the Identity Theory 14.3 The Identity Theory as a Form of Direct Realism 14.4 Falsehood and Unity 14.5 The Individuation Problem 14.6 Truths Unmade and Ungrounded 14.7 Believing the Facts References Index