Petroleum and Progress in Iran: Oil, Development, and the Cold War

Description

From the 1940s to 1960s, Iran developed into the world's first 'petro-state', where oil represented the bulk of state revenue and supported an industrializing economy, expanding middle class, and powerful administrative and military apparatus. Drawing on both American and Iranian sources, Gregory Brew outlines how the Pahlavi petro-state emerged from a confluence of forces – some global, some local. He shows how the shah's particular form of oil-based authoritarianism evolved from interactions with American developmentalists, Pahlavi technocrats, and major oil companies, all against the looming backdrop of the United States' Cold War policy and the coup d'etat of August 1953. By placing oil at the centre of the Cold War narrative, Brew contextualises Iran's pro-Western alignment and slide into petrolic authoritarianism. Synthesising a wide range of sources and research methods, this book demonstrates that the Pahlavi petro-state was not born, but made, and not solely by the Pahlavi shah. Cover Half-title Title page Copyright information Dedication Contents List of Figures Acknowledgments Note on Transliteration List of Abbreviations Introduction 0.1 ''A Modern Major General'' 0.2 The Dual Integration of Oil 0.3 Themes and Structure Part I 1 Iran, Global Oil, and the United States, 1901-1947 1.1 Oil Imperialism and Petro-Nationalism 1.2 ''A Bird That Lost Its Feathers'': Oil and Pahlavi Iran, 1921-1941 1.3 Occupation, ''Incapacity,'' and Expertise: American Advisors in Iran, 1941-1945 1.4 Oil, Iran, and the Cold War 1.5 The Dual Integration of Iranian Oil 1.6 Conclusion 2 ''We Have Done Nothing'': The Seven-Year Plan and the Failure of Dual Integration in Iran, 1947-1951 2.1 Development in Iran 2.2 ''Know-How'': The World Bank, Max Thornburg, and the Plan, 1947-1949 2.3 Paying for the Plan: AIOC and Iran, 1946-1949 2.4 The Collapse of Dual Integration, July 1949-March 1951 2.5 Conclusion 3 The Mosaddeq Challenge: Nationalization and the Isolation of Iranian Oil, 1951-1952 3.1 Mosaddeq and ''Nationalization'' 3.2 Defining Nationalization: Negotiations, June 1951-March 1952 3.3 Embargo: Iran's De-integration and the Myth of Iranian Incapacity 3.4 Conclusion 4 The Collapse Narrative: The Coup and the Reintegration of Iranian Oil, 1952-1954 4.1 ''Oil-Less'' Economics 4.2 Judging Collapse: Analyzing the Oil-Less Economy 4.3 Making the Coup Decision, August 1952-March 1953 4.4 Settling Accounts 4.5 Conclusion Part II 5 The Petrochemical Paradise: Oil-Driven Development and the Second Plan, 1954-1963 5.1 After AJAX: Pahlavi Power Post-coup 5.2 Modernization Theory, Ebtehaj, and the Second Plan 5.3 ''A Pioneering Kind of Pattern'': Lilienthal, Clapp, and the KDS 5.4 Scapegoat: The Shah Turns on the Second Plan, 1958-1962 5.5 Conclusion 6 The Golden Goose: Iran, the Consortium, and the First OPEC Crisis, 1954-1965 6.1 Golden Age: The Mechanics of the Oligopoly, 1954-1960 6.2 Iran, the Consortium, and Performative Petro-Nationalism, 1954-1960 6.3 The Scholar and the ''Wild Men'' 6.4 Conciliation or Conflict: Oil Negotiations, 1962-1963 6.5 Sabotage: Fallah's Intervention 6.6 Conclusion 7 Controlled Revolution: Expertise, Economics, and the American View of Iran, 1960-1965 7.1 ''The Harvard Boys'': The Economic Bureau and the Financial Crisis of 1960 7.2 The Kennedy Administration and the Amini Experiment 7.3 ''A Revolutionary Monarch'' 7.4 The End of Development? Epilogue E.1 Unthinkable E.2 Tragedy Bibliography State Archives Non-state Archives and Personal Papers Published Document Collections and Official Publications Online Collections Published Persian Sources Secondary Sources Index