EU Liability and International Economic Law

Description

The book provides both a legal and economic assessment of an increasingly important issue for the EU: the question of whether individuals can hold the European Union liable for damages they suffer due to its infringement of international economic law. However, liability regimes vary depending on the issue concerned. In international trade law the individual holds a weak position, being deprived of both legal remedies to seek annulment and damages. This is due to the constant refusal of the direct effect of WTO law. By contrast, international investment law has been designed in an ‘individualistic’ manner from the outset—states agree reciprocally to grant certain procedural and substantial individual rights, which they invoke to claim damages before international tribunals rather than domestic courts. The divergent role of the individual in the respective area of international economic law leads to a different set of research questions related to liability. In international trade law, the doctrinal exercise of de-coupling the notion of direct effect from liability is at the core of establishing liability. In international investment law, liability is connected to a number of issues emerging from the recent transfer of competence pertaining to investment issues from Member States to the EU and the nature of investment agreements as mixed agreements. Against this backdrop, exploring liability issues in the area of international economic law reveals a heterogeneous set of questions depending on the area of law concerned, thus offering different perspectives for studying liability issues. Volume 74 in the Series Modern Studies in European Law Preface Table of Contents Introduction Part One:
EU Liability and Violations of WTO law 1 Analytical Preliminaries I. Terminological issues-the term 'direct effect' II. The line of argument III. Relevant damage situations IV. General principles common to the laws of the Member States V. The standard of unlawfulness 2 The Lack of Direct Effect of DSB Rulings I. Direct effect of DSB decisions in the Court"s jurisprudence II. "Whether" to comply with the DSB ruling III. No unconditionality regarding the "how" of a compliance obligation 3 Dispensability of Direct Effect for EU Liability I. Introduction II. Effet utile and Article 216 para 2 TFEU III. The need for legal redress IV. The principle of cooperation under Article 4 para 3 TEU 4 DSB Ruling and the Protection of Individual Rights I. The requirements of individual protection under Article 340 para 2 TFEU II. The protective character of WTO law and DSB decisions III. Interim conclusions on the quality of WTO law as a Schutznorm 5 Identifiability of an Individual Right I. Addressee of the DSB decision II. The declaratory character of the DSB decision III. Identifiability in the bananas and hormones disputes 6 Further Liability Requirements I. The 'sufficiently serious breach' requirement II. Damage III. Causality 7 Damage Claims and Fundamental Rights Part Two:
Economic Analysis of Liability for WTO Violations 8 Analytical Foundations I. Economic analysis and liability II. Institutional economics and EU liability III. Incomplete information and the compliance standard 9 Compensation of Financial Losses and Over-deterrence I. The level of welfare maximising protectionism II. The paralysing effect resulting from WTO liability claims III. Interim conclusions 10 Liability Rule and Incentives I. No-liability rule and malincentives II. Incentive scheme and liability for WTO breaches III. Conclusions Part Three:
EU Liability and Investment Treaties 11 Introduction I. Investment Agreements as Mixed Agreements II. New EU Rules on Investor-State Disputes III. Liability Issues Under the New EU Investment Policy 12 Responsibility of Union and Member States for Breaches of Mixed Investment Agreements I. Attributing Responsibility to the Union II. Attributing Responsibility to the Member State III. Joint and several liability of EU and Member States? 13 Internal Allocation of Financial Responsibility within the EU I. Difficulties in attribution II. Apportionment of Financial Responsibility III. Who should be a Party to the dispute? IV. Cooperation in Proceedings V. Liability Claims between Union and Member States VI. Conclusions Summary References Index