The Origin of Oughtness: A Case for Metaethical Conativism

Description

How come we ought to do things? Current metanormative debates often suffer from the fact that authors implicitly use adequacy conditions not shared by their opponents. This leads to an unsatisfying dialectical gridlock (Chang): One author accuses her opponents of not being able to account for stuff she judges essential, but the opponents do not think this to be a major flaw. In an attempt to meet the problem of gridlock head-on, the current investigation approaches oughtness differently. I start with the introduction of a grounding framework for thinking about oughtness that allows a lucid presentation of the views on the market. It soon becomes clear that one necessary part of any plausible assessment of accounts of oughtness is a discussion of their adequacy conditions. I continue with a detailed evaluation of four different accounts, as presented by Halbig (2007), Schroeder (2007), Stemmer (2006), and Scanlon (2014). My main result is that desire-based or Humean theories of oughtness are more plausible because desire-independent accounts fail to explain something crucial: the for-me character of oughtness. Based on the insights gathered thus far, I then develop a new Humean theory - metaethical conativism - and defend it against some historically influential objections. Preface and acknowledgments Contents Part i: the phenomenon and how to explain it 1 the phenomenon of oughtness 2 the grounds for explaining oughtness 3 two angles and a dialectical dead end Part ii: four theories of oughtness 4 stemmer’s humean theory of oughtness 5 halbig’s value realism 6 schroeder’s hypotheticalism 7 scanlon’s reasons fundamentalism 8 why humeanism ‘wins’ Part iii: constructing conativism 9 a look ahead 10 an anthropological framework for humeanism 11 the argument from favored desires 12 the nature of desiring 13 promoting desires 14 idealization, epistemic error, and autonomy 15 the nature of practical reasons 16 the weight of favorings 17 conativism and the morality angle 18 the origin of oughtness: a recapitulation Bibliography Index