Inconsistency in Science

Description

For centuries, inconsistencies were seen as a hindrance to good reasoning, and their role in the sciences was ignored. In recent years, however, logicians as well as philosophers and historians have showed a growing interest in the matter. Central to this change were the advent of paraconsistent logics, the shift in attention from finished theories to construction processes, and the recognition that most scientific theories were at some point either internally inconsistent or incompatible with other accepted findings. The new interest gave rise to important questions. How is `logical anarchy' avoided? Is it ever rational to accept an inconsistent theory? In what sense, if any, can inconsistent theories be considered as true? The present collection of papers is the first to deal with this kind of questions. It contains case studies as well as philosophical analyses, and presents an excellent overview of the different approaches in the domain. Front Matter....Pages i-ix From Copernicus to Ptolemy: Inconsistency and Method....Pages 1-33 Inconsistent Reasoning Toward Consistent Theories....Pages 35-41 Inconsistencies in the History of Mathematics....Pages 43-57 Mathematical Change and Inconsistency....Pages 59-79 Approximate Truth....Pages 81-103 Inconsistency in Science: A Partial Perspective....Pages 105-118 Inconsistency and the Empirical Sciences....Pages 119-128 In Defence of a Programme for Handling Inconsistencies....Pages 129-150 How to Reason Sensibly Yet Naturally from Inconsistencies....Pages 151-164 Why the Logic of Explanation is Inconsistency-Adaptive....Pages 165-184 A Paradox in Newtonian Gravitation Theory II....Pages 185-195 Inconsistency, Generic Modeling, and Conceptual Change in Science....Pages 197-211 Back Matter....Pages 213-223