Existential Inertia and Classical Theistic Proofs

Description

This book critically assesses arguments for the existence of the God of classical theism, develops an innovative account of objects’ persistence, and defends new arguments against classical theism. The authors engage the following classical theistic proofs: Aquinas’s First Way, Aquinas’s De Ente argument, and Feser’s Aristotelian, Neo-Platonic, Augustinian, Thomistic, and Rationalist proofs.  The authors also provide the first systematic treatment of the ‘existential inertia thesis’.  By connecting the thesis to relativity theory and recent developments in the philosophy of physics, and by developing a variety of novel existential-inertia-friendly explanations of persistence, they mount a formidable new case against classical theistic proofs. Finally, they defend new arguments againstclassical theism based on abstract objects and changing divine knowledge. The text appeals to students, researchers, and others interested in classical theistic proofs, the existence and nature of God, and the ultimate explanations of persistence, change, and contingency. Preface Aims Structure Previous Work Hope Style and Format Acknowledgments Rights and Permissions Contents Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Change, Classical Theism, and Neo-classical Theism 1.2.1 Change 1.2.2 Classical and Neo-classical Theism 1.2.3 Simplicity and Parthood 1.3 Classical Theistic Proofs 1.4 Dialectical Context 1.5 Conclusion References Chapter 2: Aquinas’s First Way 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Validity 2.2.1 Reliance on (a) and (b) 2.2.2 Why This Reliance Is Problematic* 2.2.2.1 First Claim 2.2.2.2 Second Claim 2.3 A Path Forward? 2.4 Mind the Gap 2.4.1 Objection One 2.4.2 Objection Two 2.4.3 Objection Three 2.5 Summary Thus Far 2.6 Rejoinders 2.6.1 Act’s Priority 2.6.2 Occam’s Revenge 2.6.3 Particular and General Change 2.7 Conclusion References Chapter 3: Stage One of the Aristotelian Proof 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Dialectical Context 3.3 Premise (7) 3.4 Per se Chains 3.4.1 Undercutting Defeater 3.4.2 Objections 3.5 A Dilemma 3.6 Purely Actual 3.6.1 Action Follows Being 3.7 Conclusion References Chapter 4: Existential Inertia and the Aristotelian Causal Principle 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The Thesis 4.3 The Argument 4.4 Objection 4.5 Conclusion References Chapter 5: Existential Inertia: Thesis and Taxonomy 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Existential Inertia 5.3 Clarifying the Thesis 5.3.1 Scope 5.3.2 Persistence and Relativity Theory* 5.3.3 Modal Register 5.3.4 Dependence and Destruction 5.3.5 Metaphysical Accounts* 5.4 EIT* 5.4.1 Temporal Ontology* 5.5 Conclusion References Chapter 6: The Metaphysics of Existential Inertia 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Tendency-Disposition Accounts 6.3 Transtemporal Accounts 6.3.1 Causal Simultaneity* 6.3.1.1 Objection 6.3.1.2 Preliminary Notes 6.3.1.3 Orthodox Relativity and Causal Simultaneity 6.3.1.4 Relativistic Alternatives to the Rescue? 6.3.1.5 Electromagnetic Interactions to the Rescue? 6.3.1.6 Electromagnetic Interactions: Reply #1 6.3.1.7 Electromagnetic Interactions: Reply #2 6.3.1.8 Electromagnetic Interactions: Reply #3 6.3.1.9 Conclusion: Phew! 6.4 Law-Based Accounts 6.5 Necessity Accounts 6.6 No-Change Accounts 6.7 Conclusion References Chapter 7: Existential Inertia: Motivations and Defense 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Motivating Inertial Persistence 7.2.1 Theoretical Virtues 7.2.2 Divine Temporality 7.2.3 Aristotelian Proof Argument 7.2.4 Probabilistic Argument 7.2.5 PMC Argument 7.3 Defending Inertial Persistence 7.3.1 Alleged Counterexamples 7.3.2 Red Chairs 7.3.3 Hsiao and Sanders 7.3.3.1 Counterexamples to EIT 7.3.3.2 First Metaphysical Argument 7.3.3.3 Second Metaphysical Argument 7.3.3.4 Third Metaphysical Argument 7.3.4 Proportionate Causality 7.3.5 Form-matter Interdependence 7.3.6 Contingent Natures 7.3.7 Vicious Circularity 7.3.8 De Ente Argument 7.3.9 Pruss and Four-dimensionalism* 7.4 Conclusion References Chapter 8: Mind the Gap 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Gap Problem 8.2.1 Timelessness 8.2.2 Perfection 8.2.3 Uniqueness 8.2.4 Goodness 8.2.5 Omnipotence 8.2.6 Intelligence 8.2.7 Omniscience 8.2.8 Free Will 8.2.9 Immateriality 8.3 Strengthening the Gap Problem: Atemporal Wavefunction Monism* 8.4 Conclusion References Chapter 9: The Neo-Platonic Proof 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Preliminaries 9.3 Premise Three 9.3.1 Mindedness 9.4 Trinitarianism 9.4.1 Uniqueness 9.4.2 NPCP, the Trinity, and the Incarnation 9.5 Existential Inertia 9.6 Conclusion References Chapter 10: The Augustinian Proof and Theistic Conceptualism 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Augustinian Proof 10.2.1 Premises (9), (7), and (11) 10.2.2 Premise (4) 10.2.3 Incompatibility with Classical Theism 10.2.4 Platonism 10.2.4.1 Epistemic Access 10.2.4.2 Explanatory Impotence 10.2.4.3 Incoherence 10.2.4.4 Third Man Argument 10.2.4.5 Individuality and Incoherence 10.2.4.6 Immanence Problem 10.2.4.7 Brentano Problem 10.2.5 Theistic Conceptualism 10.3 Conclusion References Chapter 11: The Thomistic and Rationalist Proofs 11.1 Introduction 11.2 Thomistic Proof 11.3 Rationalist Proof 11.4 Conclusion References Chapter 12: Conclusion 12.1 Informal Summary 12.2 Formal Summary 12.2.1 First Way 12.2.2 Aristotelian Proof 12.2.2.1 Stage One 12.2.2.2 Stage Two 12.2.3 Neo-Platonic Proof 12.2.4 Augustinian Proof 12.2.5 Thomistic Proof 12.2.6 Rationalist Proof 12.2.7 Classical and Non-classical Theism 12.3 Conclusion Reference Index