Out of Error: Further Essays on Critical Rationalism

Description

If there has been some modest advance, since Karl Popper's death in 1994, in the general understanding of his critical rationalist theory of knowledge and philosophy of science, there is still widespread resistance both to it and to the recognition of the magnitude of his contribution. Popper long ago diagnosed the logical problems of traditional enlightenment rationalism (as did some irrationalists), but instead of pretending that they are readily solved or embracing irrational defeatism (as do postmodernists), he provided a cogent and liberating rationalist alternative. This book promotes, defends, criticizes, and refines this alternative. David Miller is the foremost exponent of the purist critical rationalist doctrine and here presents his mature views, discussing the role that logic and argument play in the growth of knowledge, criticizing the common understanding of argument as an instrument of justification, persuasion or discovery and instead advocating the critical rationalist view that only criticism matters. Miller patiently and thoroughly undoes the damage done by those writers who attack critical rationalism by invoking the sterile mythology of induction and justification that it seeks to sweep away. In addition his new material on the debate on verisimilitude is essential reading for all working in this field. Cover Half Title Title Page Copyright Page Table of Contents List of Figures and Tables Preface 1 Karl Popper: A Scientific Memoir 0 Introduction 1 In Vienna, 1902–1936 2 Logik der Forschung 3 In New Zealand, 1937–1945 4 At the LSE, 1946–1959 5 The Postscript 6 At the LSE, 1960–1969 7 In Retirement, 1969–1994 2 Three Stages of Critical Rationalism 0 Karl Popper 1 Epistemology and Methodology Contrasted 2 The First Stage: Fallibilism 3 The Second Stage: Negativism 4 The Third Stage: Scepticism 5 Conclusion Addendum: Last Words on a Paradox 3 What Do Arguments Achieve? 0 Introduction 1 Traditional Answers 2 Partial Justification 3 Critical Argument 4 A Mistake to be Avoided 4 Falsifiability: More than a Convention? 0 Introduction 1 The Problem of Demarcation 2 The Principle of Empiricism 3 Interlude: The Uniformity of Nature 4 Popular Objections to the Demarcation Criterion 5 First Philosophy 6 Objectivism Addendum 0: Popper’s Response to Duhem Addendum 1: How Much We Disagree 5 Induction: A Problem Solved 0 A Warning 1 Popper on Applied Science 2 A Response to Popper’s Critics 3 Applied Science 4 Acceptance or Preference? Addendum 0: An Objection Addendum 1: Planning Ahead 6 Back to the Frying Pan 0 Introduction 1 Where Intellectual Impostures Fails 2 Authoritarian Rationalism 3 Radical Rationalism 4 Conclusion 7 Being an Absolute Sceptic 0 Absolute Scepticism 1 Scepticism is Not Relativism 2 Anything You Can Do I Can Do Better 8 How Little Uniformity Need an Inductive Inference Presuppose? 0 A Problem 1 A Solution 2 A Generalization Addendum 0: An Objection Addendum 1: A Note of Caution 9 Critical Rationalism’s Debt to Tarski 0 Introduction 1 Tarski’s Theory of Truth 2 Criteria of Truth 3 Imperfect Correspondence 4 Concluding Remarks 10 Beauty: A Road to the Truth? 0 Introduction 1 Approximation to the Truth 2 Empirical Decidability 3 Kuipers on Beauty 4 McAllister on Beauty Addendum 0: Support for Table 10.0 Addendum 1: Support for Table 10.1 11 Thirty Years of Language Dependence 0 Historical Introduction 1 A Tour of No Man’s Land 2 Unacceptable Relativism 3 Unacceptable Vocabulary, Acceptable Translations 4 Acceptable Vocabulary, Unacceptable Translations 5 Acceptable Relativism 6 Conclusion 12 Is Paraconsistent Logic Ever Used? 0 Introduction 1 The Azande 2 The Nuer 3 Discussion 13 Making Falsification Bite 0 Introductory Remark 1 The Logic of Inquiry 2 Summary of Falsificationism 3 Semantics for Brouwerian Logic 4 Conclusion 14 In Memoriam Note Bibliography Index