The Subject of Consciousness

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Cover Half Title Title Page Copyright Page Original Title Page Original Copyright Page Dedication Table of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION [1] The distinction between awareness of self and knowledge of persons [2] Predilection of modern philosophy in direction of knowledge of persons [3] Theories of self and awareness of self 2. CONSCIOUSNESS 1. Problems of Existence and Meaning [1] It is shown that William James’s denial of consciousness is a rejection of a philosophical theory of consciousness and is no repudiation of consciousness itself [2] An argument centring on Ryle and Wisdom to show that there is a basic sense of consciousness [3] A rejection of the view that ‘consciousness’ is indefinable, followed by a proposed definition along the lines suggested 2. The Nature of the Concept [4] A comparison of the concepts ‘conscious’ and ‘colour’ to show a disanalogy which if not recognized leads to a false ‘mosaic’ view of consciousness [5] Rejection of the view that ‘consciousness’ stands for a common property of mental phenomena in favour of treating it as a polymorphous concept [6] The concept of consciousness gains its applicability through the existence of the reader 3. Sir William Hamilton and His Critics [7] Hamilton’s theory of consciousness [8] The attack on Hamilton’s Duality of Consciousness [9] The implications of the historical survey and the direction the self-approach must take [10] The view of Samuel Alexander presented as heading in the right direction [11] Conclusions presupposed in the analysis offered in succeeding chapters 3. ATTENTION 1. Consciousness and Change [1] The two dimensions of consciousness [2] TH. Ribot on the dependence of consciousness on change [3] A contrast between the theories of attention of James Ward and William James [4] Attention seen as the structuring of consciousness into foreground and background 2. Rejection of the Notion of an Attention-Free Consciousness [5] The presence of attention in a pure sensuous consciousness [6] Its presence in a state of reverie [7] Conclusions drawn from this study 3. The Varieties of Attention [8] Rejection of Ribot’s distinction between ‘spontaneous’ attention and ‘voluntary’ attention [9] The weaknesses in Hamilton’s theory of attention [10] The relation between ‘mere vital attention’ and ‘voluntary’ attention [11] ‘Unordered’ attention, ‘interrogative’ attention, and ‘executive’ attention: an alternative to the classifications offered 4. UNPROJECTED CONSCIOUSNESS 1. The Structure of Consciousness [1] Attention and unprojected consciousness viewed as complements [2] The character of unprojected consciousness 2. Unprojected Consciousness and Interrogative Attention [3] The logical character of ideational elements in mental preparedness [4] The question of the possibility of simultaneous attention to a number of objects [5] Answer given in terms of the notion of a ‘relevancy system’ [6] Ribot’s theory that attention demands the suspension of change shown to be a misconception which the notion of a relevancy system can overcome 3. Unprojected Consciousness and Executive Attention [7] The role of kinaesthetic sensation in executive attention [8] The logical status of physiological processes in attention 4. The Logical Dependence of Mental Images and Thoughts on Bodily Activity [9] A defence of Ribot’s theory that even innerdirected attention (reflection) is dependent on bodily activity [10] Arguments against the ‘phantom approach’ according to which the occurrence of mental imagery is logically independent of bodily activity [11] The alternative ‘sentient approach’ defended in terms of the notion of the ‘origin’ of a mental image [12] Utilization of the distinction between compatible and incompatible activities in support of the sentient approach [13] The most mental of all forms of reflection - the having of thoughts - held to be logically dependent on bodily activity 5. THE EXPERIENTIAL SELF 1. The Self as Unprojected Consciousness [1] The rationale of the theory [2] The elusiveness of the self explained [3] Rejection of the no-subject position 2. The Problems the Theory Solves [4] Consideration of James’s theory of the self [5] Explanation of the connection between bodily sensation and the self [6] Making of the self its own object only partially possible [7] Analysis of Ayer’s supplementation of James’s theory 3. Support from Unexpected Quarters [8] The loss of self in mystical ecstasy [9] Theories foreshadowing the one presented here 4. A Defence against Some Objections [10] Difficulties which the theory has to surmount [11] An answer to Strawson 6. YESTERDAY’S SELF 1. The Past of a Self and the Past of a Person [1] The manner in which this is a concern of the self-approach as distinct from a concern of the persons approach [2] Distinction between subjective time and objective time brought in to account for interruptions in consciousness 2. Awareness as a State and Attention as an Activity [3] The meaning I give to ‘awareness’ [4] The logical characteristics of verbs of perception and the relation between perceiving and awareness [5] The criteria of states and activities [6] The logic of ‘awareness’ and the logic of ‘attention’ 3. The Dependence of a Persisting Self on Sustaining Activity [7] The relation between attention and unprojected consciousness argued to demand a revision of Ryle’s adverbial theory of attention [8] Application to perceptual concepts of the distinction between states and activities [9] The continuous creation of the self 7. BODILY EXISTENCE [1] Selves and their bodily possibilities [2] Our kind of body [3] The point of contact between the selfapproach and the persons approach [4] Appeal to mental acts rendered unnecessary by the present theory INDEX