Motives and Functions of Patenting in Public Basic Science

Description

Taking German public basic research as an example, this book explores how the ongoing implementation of knowledge and technology transfer as the Third Mission of academic science creates not only new incentives for academic patenting, but also triggers new patenting motives and strategies of researchers and organizations. Analyzing these motives and strategies, the book highlights how the complex regulatory interplay of the patent system, research policy and self-governed academic communities creates a situation in which new patent functions emerge: beyond their intended function as a protection for upstream inventions, patents become a signaling device for scientists to communicate their commitment and competence in the Third Mission. As an exploratory study, this book combines qualitative empirical research with concepts and insights from multiple fields such as economics, law, political sciences and regulation. In consequence, the book addresses anyone interested in patenting incentives and motives and their impact on the functional change and regulatory effectiveness of patents in polycentric regulatory environments. Abstract Table of Contents List of Figures List of Tables Acronyms Preface Acknowledgments 1 Introduction 1.1 Patents in Regulatory Complexity 1.2 Defining Public Basic Science 1.2.1 The linear model: An old but surviving approach 1.2.2 The quadrant model 1.2.3 The social system model 1.2.4 Social norms in science 1.3 Shifts in Research Policy - The Rise of the Third Mission 1.4 A Primer on Patents in Science 1.4.1 Patents as regulatory instruments 1.4.2 Patentable basic science? 1.4.3 Academic patents as service inventions 1.4.4 Disclosure 1.4.5 Exclusive rights and their exemptions 1.4.6 Summary 1.5 The Resulting Friction: Private Ownership, Third Mission, and Basic Science 1.5.1 Theoretical concerns 1.5.2 Evidence 1.6 Research Question: What Are the Real Consequences of Theoretical Friction in Institutional Complexity? 1.7 Methodological Considerations 1.7.1 Context and data 1.7.2 Analysis of individual attitudes and strategies toward patenting 1.8 Thesis Structure 2 Methodology 2.1 Research Design 2.1.1 Why a Case Study? 2.1.2 What is the “case?” 2.1.3 Choice of case study type 2.2 Research Questions 2.3 Prior Information and Theoretical Propositions: 2.4 Units of Analysis 2.4.1 Scientists in Germany 2.4.2 Non-university research 2.4.3 Public basic science 2.4.4 Technologically relevant disciplines 2.5 Data Collection and Processing 2.5.1 Interview design 2.5.2 Interview selection 2.5.3 Interview process 2.5.4 Transcription 2.5.5 Translation 2.6 Interview Analysis 2.6.1 Coding 2.6.2 Interpretation 2.6.2.1 Pattern matching 2.6.2.2 Explanation-building 2.6.2.3 The role of the Knowledge Commons Framework 2.7 Quality Criteria 3 Theory: Community Governance and Patenting in Science 3.1 Commons Governance as a Research Perspective 3.1.1 Default neutrality towards markets, authority, and community management 3.1.1.1 Three forms of neutrality 3.1.1.2 Theoretical fundaments of descriptive neutrality 3.1.2 Understanding institutional diversity and complexity 3.2 Analytical Tools of the Commons Perspective 3.2.1 The IAD framework 3.2.1.1 Resource characteristics 3.2.1.2 Attributes of the community 3.2.1.3 Rules-in-use 3.2.1.4 Action arena 3.2.1.5 Action-outcome linkages 3.2.1.6 Patterns of interaction 3.2.1.7 Evaluative criteria: 3.2.2 Multiple sources of rule-making 3.2.3 Multiple levels of rule-making 3.2.4 A grammar of institutions – What kind of rules are established? 3.2.5 Applying the tools: Dissecting rules-in-use of the patent system 3.2.5.1 Rules 3.2.5.2 Norms 3.2.5.3 Strategies 3.2.5.4 Resulting explanatory advantages 3.2.6 Summary 3.3 Commons Governance as a Research Object 3.3.1 Commons - A disambiguation 3.3.2 Common-property regimes: Legal variables of community governance 3.3.2.1 Property rules as bundle-of-rights 3.3.2.2 Manageable rules-in-use in community governance 3.3.3 Common-pool resources - Economic variables in community governance 3.4 Cultural Variables in Community Governance 3.4.1 “Culture” as a category of informal institutions 3.4.2 Interplay of informal and formal institutions 3.4.2.1 Substituting formal institutions 3.4.2.2 Invalidating formal institutions 3.4.2.3 Counteracting formal institutions 3.4.3 Summary 3.5 Community Governance as Self-Regulation 3.5.1 Main elements of commons governance 3.5.2 Openness as an important property of commons governance 3.5.3 Summary 3.6 Peculiarities of Knowledge Commons 3.6.1 The interdependency of economic variables and rules-in-use 3.6.2 The need for knowledge to be created 3.6.3 Specific types of governance failures 3.6.4 Summary: Complexity in the governance of knowledge commons 3.7 Understanding Science as a Commons 3.7.1 What makes commons “scientific”? 3.7.2 What makes science a commons? 3.7.2.1 Science as a community-based activity 3.7.2.2 Science as a self-governed resource production system 3.7.2.3 Mertonian norms as informal institutions in open self-governance 3.7.2.4 The “open-science” paradigm as a reminder for the rationality and efficiency of communalism for science 3.7.3 Nestedness of scientific commons 3.7.4 Commons governance in science 3.7.4.1 Community governance in research organizations 3.7.4.2 Governance of scientific resource systems 3.7.5 Summary: Science as a commons vs. scientific commons 3.8 Two Explanations for Overvaluations of Anticommons in Science 3.8.1 Instrumentalism I: Patent instrumentalism on research instruments 3.8.2 Instrumentalism II: Exogenous patents versus endogenous self-governance 3.8.3 Anticommons effects in institutional complexity 3.9 Chapter Summary 4 Policy Analysis: Patenting for the Third Mission 4.1 Shifts in Research Policy - The Rise of the “Third Mission” of Public Basic Science 4.1.1 Historical perspective 4.1.2 Conceptual perspective 4.1.3 The regulatory perspective 4.1.3.1 Modes and sources of regulation 4.1.3.2 New Public Management as market-oriented regulation 4.1.4 Policy tools to create regulatory overlaps for the Third Mission 4.2 Expectations and Mission Formulation 4.2.1 European level 4.2.2 National level 4.2.3 Organizational level 4.3 Third Mission-Directed Resources 4.3.1 European level 4.3.2 National level 4.3.3 Organizational level 4.4 Mission-Directed Evaluation 4.4.1 European level 4.4.2 National level 4.4.3 Organizational level 4.4.4 Properties of polycentrism 4.4.5 Regulatory indetermination of polycentric environments 4.5 Summary: Patents as a Proxy for the “Third Mission” 4.5.1 Embeddedness of patents in the governance of science 4.5.2 Exogenous Third-Mission regulations in the IAD framework 5 Empirics: Patenting Motives in Basic Science 5.1 Basic Science Defined by Basic Scientists 5.1.1 Institutional environment - Basic science as a mission 5.1.2 Personal motives: Individual quests for understanding 5.1.3 Research activities 5.1.4 Research results 5.1.5 Sources of innovation: Four dimensions of basic research 5.1.5.1 Patentability of basic research results 5.1.5.2 Sample selection in view of the research question 5.1.5.3 Empirical implications for theoretical models of science 5.2 How are Scientists Affected by Existing Patents? 5.2.1 Passive ignorance of patents 5.2.2 Assessing patent content 5.2.3 Active ignorance of patents 5.2.4 Two sides of the ignore-patents norm 5.3 Mental Models of Intellectual Property and the Third Mission 5.3.1 The traditional First Mission versus the new Third Mission 5.3.1.1 Summary: Mertonian disinterestedness 5.3.2 Mental models of patents and intellectual property 5.3.2.1 Sources of learning, and weak initial IP-awareness 5.3.2.2 Inclusive understanding of ownership 5.3.2.3 Open property 5.3.2.4 Summary: Mertonian communalism 5.3.3 Mertonian norms: Ideals and reality 5.3.3.1 Different starting conditions 5.3.3.2 Factors of changing norms and habits 5.3.4 Summary: Pragmatism about Mertonian norms 5.4 Resulting Motives not to Patent 5.4.1 Academic culture 5.4.2 Improving via sharing 5.4.3 Priority for science and cost-benefit considerations 5.4.3.1 Summary: Reasons not to patent 5.5 Motives for Patenting 5.5.1 Private income - or not? 5.5.2 Protection for diffusion into application 5.5.2.1 Transfer to application by licensing 5.5.2.2 Transfer to application by creating spin-offs 5.5.2.3 Own translational research, before transfer to application 5.5.3 Access to funding 5.5.4 Patents used as a certificate and signal 5.5.5 Individual signaling 5.5.5.1 Certifying priority and inventiveness 5.5.5.2 Addressing industrial labor markets 5.5.5.3 Addressing the academic labor markets 5.5.5.4 Summary: Individual signaling 5.5.6 Organizational signaling 5.5.6.1 Meeting public expectations 5.5.6.2 Qualitative signaling 5.5.6.3 Quantitative signaling 5.5.7 Patenting motives: Conclusion 5.6 Scientific Forms of Strategic Patenting 5.6.1 Patenting motives between external incentives and intrinsic motivation 5.6.2 Patenting motives and self-determination theory in the IAD framework 5.6.3 Patenting strategies in science and industry 5.6.3.1 Comparison of academic and commercial strategies 5.6.3.2 Variation of patenting motives over organizational levels 5.7 Chapter Summary 6 Synthesis: Contextual Patent Functions 6.1 Disambiguating Legitimation, Purpose, and Function of Patents 6.1.1 An instrumentalist view on patents 6.1.2 A look back 6.1.2.1 A closer look: Prospect theory 6.1.2.2 Primary and secondary functions 6.1.3 Fencing a moving target: Distinguishing micro-functions and macro-purposes 6.1.3.1 More abstract views 6.1.3.2 Macro-purpose and micro-function 6.1.4 Summary 6.2 Functions as Contextual Action-Outcome Links 6.2.1 Shortcomings in the previous view 6.2.1.1 Legislative purpose vs. actual consequences 6.2.1.2 Heterogeneous sources and purposes of regulation 6.2.1.3 Summary 6.2.2 The analytical alternative: Contextual functions of patents 6.2.2.1 Consequent instrumentalism about patent functions 6.2.2.2 Separating purpose, function, and evaluation of patenting 6.2.2.3 Patent functions as action-outcome links 6.2.2.4 Matching outcomes with intentions 6.2.2.5 Action-outcome links established by rules-in-use 6.2.2.6 Rules-in-use defining contextual patent functions 6.2.3 Summary 6.3 Contextual Efficacy of Patent Law 6.3.1 Disclosure 6.3.2 Exclusivity 6.3.3 Licensing 6.3.4 Summary 6.4 Contextually Emerging Patent Functions 6.4.1 Linking motives and contextual regulations 6.4.2 “Traditional” functions 6.4.2.1 Contextual characteristics of the reward function 6.4.2.2 Academic patents as prospects 6.4.3 Funding 6.4.4 Qualitative organizational signaling 6.4.5 Quantitative organizational signaling 6.4.6 Individual signaling 6.4.7 Complexity: Emerging patent functions as patterns of interaction 6.4.8 Evaluating new patent functions 6.4.8.1 Successful regulation: Markets for innovation 6.4.8.2 Unintended effects: Quantitative signaling as an adaptive strategy 6.4.8.3 New function: Individual signaling: Knowledge diffusion 6.4.9 Summary 6.5 Patents as Signals 6.5.1 Patent signals in legal and economic research 6.5.2 Patent signals in the Triple Helix 6.5.3 Summary and implications 6.6 Chapter Summary 6.6.1 Contextual rules-in-use and functions of patenting 6.6.2 Symbolic patenting in science 7 Summary 7.1 Recapitulating the Argument 7.1.1 Initial considerations 7.1.2 Theory: Commons governance and the absence of anticommons effects 7.1.3 Policy analysis: Patents in polycentric regulation 7.1.4 Empirics: Strategic patenting motives in science 7.1.5 Synthesis: From motives to functions – Signaling as a contextually emerging patent function 7.2 The Big Picture: Understanding the Institutional Complexity of Patenting in Public Basic Science 7.3 Implications for Existing Discussions 7.3.1 Incentives and motives for academic patenting 7.3.2 Acceptance and functional change of patent law 7.3.3 Governing knowledge commons 7.3.4 Exploring conceptual bridges Bibliography