Biological Naturalism and the Mind-Body Problem

Description

This book offers a new theoretical framework within which to understand “the mind-body problem”. The crux of this problem is phenomenal experience, which Thomas Nagel famously described as “what it is like” to be a certain living creature. David Chalmers refers to the problem of “what-it-is-like” as “the hard problem” of consciousness and claims that this problem is so “hard” that investigators have either just ignored the issue completely, investigated a similar (but distinct) problem, or claimed that there is literally nothing to investigate – that phenomenal experience is illusory. This book contends that phenomenal experience is both very real and very important. Two specific “biological naturalist” views are considered in depth. One of these two views, in particular, seems to be free from problems; adopting something along the lines of this view might finally allow us to make sense of the mind-body problem. An essential read for anyone who believes that no satisfactory solution to “the mind-body problem” has yet been discovered. Contents 1: Introduction References 2: The Explanatory Gap 2.1 Introduction: The Explanatory Gap and What-it-is-like 2.2 Dualism, Materialism, and the Explanatory Gap 2.2.1 The Explanatory Gap and (Cartesian) Dualism 2.2.1.1 Bodies 2.2.1.2 Minds 2.2.1.3 Properties and Substances 2.2.1.4 The Lesson (of ‘The Explanatory Gap and Cartesian Dualism’) for Philosophy 2.2.2 The Explanatory Gap and Materialism 2.2.2.1 Reductive Materialism 2.2.2.2 Non-reductive Materialism 2.2.2.3 Awareness of Mental States 2.2.2.4 The Lesson (of ‘The Explanatory Gap and Materialism’) for Philosophy 2.2.3 Dualism, Materialism, and the Explanatory Gap: Conclusion 2.2.3.1 Reification: Recognition of the Existence of an ‘Explanatory Gap’ is Constitutive of Dualism 2.3 The Explanatory Gap in Twentieth-Century Philosophy 2.3.1 Gilbert Ryle (1949): The Concept of Mind 2.3.1.1 The Problem Addressed by Ryle: The Official Doctrine 2.3.1.1.1 Category Errors 2.3.1.1.2 The Dualist Intuition 2.3.1.2 Ryle’s Solution: Philosophical Behaviorism 2.3.1.3 My Assessment 2.3.1.3.1 Category Errors/The Dualist Intuition 2.3.1.3.2 Philosophical Behaviorism 2.3.1.3.3 Ryle’s Reification 2.3.1.4 Gilbert Ryle and the Explanatory Gap 2.3.2 Patricia Churchland (1986): Neurophilosophy 2.3.2.1 The Problem Addressed by Churchland: Acceptable Theories 2.3.2.2 Churchland’s Solution: Tensor Network Theory 2.3.2.3 My Assessment 2.3.2.3.1 Nervous Systems vs Computers 2.3.2.3.2 Churchland’s Reification 2.3.2.4 Patricia Churchland and the Explanatory Gap 2.3.3 David Chalmers (1995): Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness 2.3.3.1 The Problem Addressed by Chalmers: The Hard Problem Persists 2.3.3.2 Chalmers’ Solution: Taking Experience as Fundamental 2.3.3.2.1 Information Processing 2.3.3.3 My Assessment 2.3.3.3.1 Hard/Easy Problems 2.3.3.3.2 Taking Experience as Fundamental 2.3.3.3.3 Information Processing 2.3.3.3.4 Chalmers’ Reification 2.3.3.4 David Chalmers and the Explanatory Gap 2.3.4 John Searle (1997): The Mystery of Consciousness 2.3.4.1 The Problem Addressed by Searle: Obsolete Categories 2.3.4.2 Searle’s Solution: Non-event Causation 2.3.4.3 My Assessment 2.3.4.3.1 Obsolete Categories/Dualism vs Materialism 2.3.4.3.2 Non-event Causation/Blindsight 2.3.4.3.3 Searle’s Reification 2.3.4.4 John Searle and the Explanatory Gap 2.3.5 The Explanatory Gap in Twentieth-Century Philosophy: Conclusion 2.4 The Explanatory Gap: Conclusion References 3: The Hard and the Easy Problems of Consciousness 3.1 Introduction: Investigating ‘The Easy Problems’ 3.2 The Easy Problems of Perception and Cognition 3.2.1 Blindsight 3.2.1.1 Patient TN 3.2.1.2 HOT Theory 3.2.1.3 Dual Streams Theory 3.2.1.4 The Lesson (of ‘Blindsight’) for Philosophy 3.2.2 Priming 3.2.2.1 The Lexical-Decision Task 3.2.2.2 Semantic Resemblance 3.2.2.3 The Lesson (of ‘Priming’) for Philosophy 3.2.3 Introspective Access to Cognitive Processes 3.2.3.1 Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes (Nisbett and Wilson 1977) 3.2.3.1.1 Cognitive Dissonance 3.2.3.2 Unconscious Influences on Decision-Making: A Critical Review (Newell and Shanks 2014) 3.2.3.2.1 Deliberation Without Attention 3.2.3.3 The Lesson (of ‘Introspective Access to Cognitive Processes’) for Philosophy 3.2.4 The Easy Problems of Perception and Cognition: Conclusion 3.3 The Hard Problem of What-it-is-like/experience 3.3.1 What-It-Is-Like in Philosophy of Mind 3.3.1.1 Chalmers 3.3.1.2 Churchland 3.3.1.3 Searle 3.3.1.4 Ryle/Tanney 3.3.1.5 The Lesson (of ‘What-It-Is-Like in Philosophy of Mind’) for Philosophy 3.3.2 ‘Consciousness’ vs Attention 3.3.2.1 The Filtering Paradigm and the Selective Set Paradigm 3.3.2.2 Attention and Priming 3.3.2.3 The Lesson (of ‘Consciousness vs Attention’) for Philosophy 3.3.3 The Hard Problem of What-It-Is-Like/Experience: Conclusion 3.4 The Hard and the Easy Problems of Consciousness: Conclusion References 4: (Un)Consciousness and (Ir)Rationality in Psychology 4.1 Introduction: Radical Behaviorism 4.2 (Psychological) What-it-is-like/experience and (Introspective) Consciousness 4.2.1 Sigmund Freud 4.2.1.1 An Outline of Psycho-Analysis 4.2.1.2 Science and Psychoanalysis 4.2.1.2.1 Freud and Darwin 4.2.1.2.2 The Pleasure Principle 4.2.1.3 Motivating a Psychology of the Unconscious 4.2.1.3.1 The Structure of Consciousness 4.2.1.4 The Lesson (of ‘Sigmund Freud’) for Philosophy 4.2.2 Psychoanalytic Techniques 4.2.2.1 Hypnosis 4.2.2.1.1 Hypnosis and the Unconscious 4.2.2.2 Repression and Free Association 4.2.2.2.1 Repression 4.2.2.2.2 Free Association 4.2.2.3 Dream Analysis 4.2.2.3.1 Stimulus Dreams 4.2.2.3.2 Children’s Dreams 4.2.2.3.3 Dream Distortion 4.2.2.4 The Lesson (of ‘Psychoanalytic Techniques’) for Philosophy 4.2.2.4.1 Recovering Dynamically Unconscious Material 4.2.3 (Psychological) What-It-Is-Like/Experience and (Introspective) Consciousness: Conclusion 4.3 (Psychological) What-it-is-like/experience and Rationality 4.3.1 Accounting for Irrationality 4.3.1.1 The Psychodynamic Account of Irrationality 4.3.1.1.1 Clinical Considerations 4.3.1.1.2 Recent Studies 4.3.1.2 The Structures of the Mind 4.3.1.2.1 The Id 4.3.1.2.2 The Ego 4.3.1.2.3 The Super-Ego 4.3.1.3 The Lesson (of ‘Accounting for Irrationality’) for Philosophy 4.3.2 Solms on Consciousness, the Body, and the Structures of the Mind 4.3.2.1 Psychical Systems vs Ways of Representing the Body 4.3.2.1.1 Psychical Systems 4.3.2.1.2 Ways of Representing the Body 4.3.2.2 The Structures of the Mind vs the Structure of Consciousness 4.3.2.2.1 Consciousness and the Ego 4.3.2.2.2 Consciousness and the Id 4.3.2.3 The Lesson (of ‘Solms on Consciousness, the Body, and the Structures of the Mind’) for Philosophy 4.3.3 (Psychological) What-It-Is-Like/Experience and Rationality: Conclusion 4.4 (Un)Consciousness and (Ir)Rationality in Psychology: Conclusion References 5: The Brain and the Mind-body-self 5.1 Introduction: The Cerebral Cortex 5.1.1 Historical Views 5.1.1.1 Late Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Views 5.1.1.1.1 Psychophysical Parallelism 5.1.1.1.2 The Cerebral Reflex 5.1.1.2 Twenty-First-Century Views 5.1.1.2.1 The Pre-frontal Cortex 5.1.1.2.2 The Subcortical Brain 5.2 The Cerebral Cortex and Consciousness 5.2.1 ‘Consciousness’ in Hydranencephaly 5.2.1.1 Shewmon et al.’s Cases 5.2.1.1.1 Shewmon et al. on Cortical Remnants 5.2.1.2 Merker’s Cases 5.2.1.2.1 Merker on Cortical Remnants 5.2.1.3 The Lesson (of ‘Consciousness in Hydranencephaly’) for Philosophy 5.2.2 Solms on Types of Consciousness, the Structure of the Brain, and the Structures of the Mind 5.2.2.1 The Structure of the Brain vs Types of Consciousness 5.2.2.1.1 In Hydranencephaly 5.2.2.1.2 In Freud 5.2.2.2 The Essential Nature of Consciousness 5.2.2.2.1 In Hydranencephaly 5.2.2.2.2 In Freud 5.2.2.3 Types of Consciousness vs the Structures of the Mind 5.2.2.4 The Intended Scope of ‘Cortical’ 5.2.2.5 The Lesson (of ‘Solms on Consciousness and the Brain’) for Philosophy 5.2.3 The Cerebral Cortex and Consciousness: Conclusion 5.3 Rudimentary Affective Awareness 5.3.1 Merker Commentaries 5.3.1.1 The Ontology of Creature Consciousness: A Challenge for Philosophy (Gualtiero Piccinini) 5.3.1.2 Levels of Emotion and Levels of Consciousness (Carroll Izard) 5.3.1.3 Affirmative-action for the Brainstem in the Neuroscience of Consciousness: The Zeitgeist of the Brainstem as a ‘Dumb Arousal’ System (Douglas Watt) 5.3.1.4 Raw Feeling: A Model for Affective Consciousness (Van Honk et al.) 5.3.1.5 Emotional Feelings Originate Below the Neocortex (Jaak Panksepp) 5.3.1.6 The Lesson (of the Merker Commentaries) for Philosophy 5.3.2 Rudimentary Affective Awareness: Conclusion 5.4 The Brain and the Mind-body-self: Conclusion References 6: Twenty-first-century Biological Naturalism: The Body-Map-Based View and the Affect-Centric View 6.1 Introduction: The Fall of Behaviorism 6.1.1 Useful Definitions 6.1.1.1 Consciousness, Mind and Self 6.1.1.1.1 Levels of Consciousness 6.1.1.2 Emotions, Feelings, and Affects 6.1.1.2.1 Levels of Emotions 6.2 Antonio Damasio: A ‘Body-Map-Based’ View of Human Consciousness and Human Reason 6.2.1 The Central Topics 6.2.1.1 Perception and Cognition 6.2.1.1.1 Perception 6.2.1.1.2 Cognition 6.2.1.2 Human Reason and Consciousness 6.2.1.2.1 Human Reason 6.2.1.2.2 Human Consciousness 6.2.1.3 The Cerebral Cortex 6.2.2 Body Maps 6.2.2.1 The Somatic Marker Hypothesis 6.2.2.1.1 Skin Conductance Studies 6.2.2.1.2 PET Studies 6.2.2.1.3 Phineas Gage 6.2.2.2 The Body-Map-Based View on the Evolutionary Advantages of Consciousness: Knowing Your Feelings 6.2.2.2.1 Novel/Flexible Responses 6.2.2.2.2 Planning Ahead 6.2.2.2.3 Feelings/Incentive 6.2.2.3 The Lesson (of ‘Body Maps’) for Philosophy 6.2.3 Damasio’s Views on the Subcortical Brain 6.2.3.1 Early Views 6.2.3.1.1 Descartes’ Error (1994), Brainstem and Life Regulation 6.2.3.1.2 The Feeling of What Happens (1999), Brainstem and Emotions 6.2.3.2 Intermediate View 6.2.3.2.1 Looking for Spinoza (2003), Brainstem and Feelings/Body Maps 6.2.3.3 Mature View 6.2.3.3.1 Brainstem and Arousal/Life Regulation 6.2.3.3.2 Brainstem and Body Maps 6.2.3.3.3 Brainstem and Feelings 6.2.3.3.4 Brainstem and Conscious Minds 6.2.3.4 The Lesson (of ‘Damasio’s views on the subcortical brain’) for Philosophy 6.2.4 The Body-Map-Based View: Conclusion 6.3 Jaak Panksepp: An ‘Affect-Centric’ View of Primary-Process Consciousness 6.3.1 Disagreeing with Damasio 6.3.1.1 Perception Or Cognition 6.3.1.1.1 Perception 6.3.1.1.2 Cognition 6.3.1.2 Human Reason Or Consciousness 6.3.1.2.1 Human Reason 6.3.1.2.2 Human Consciousness 6.3.1.3 The Cerebral Cortex 6.3.2 Biological Value 6.3.2.1 SEEKING 6.3.2.1.1 SEEKING and the Brain 6.3.2.1.2 The Affect-Centric View of Phineas Gage 6.3.2.2 The Affect-Centric View on the Evolutionary Advantages of Rudimentary Affective Awareness: Feeling Without Knowing 6.3.2.2.1 Novel/Flexible Responses 6.3.2.2.2 Planning Ahead 6.3.2.2.3 Feelings/Incentive 6.3.2.3 The Lesson (of ‘Biological Value’) for Philosophy 6.3.3 Panksepp’s Views on the Subcortical Brain 6.3.3.1 Brainstem and Arousal/Life Regulation 6.3.3.2 Brainstem and Motor Maps 6.3.3.3 Brainstem and Feelings 6.3.3.4 Brainstem and Conscious Minds 6.3.3.5 The Lesson (of ‘Panksepp’s views on the subcortical brain’) for Philosophy 6.3.4 The Affect-Centric View: Conclusion 6.4 Biological Naturalism: The Body-Map-Based View and The Affect-Centric View: Conclusion References 7: Final Thoughts 7.1 The Explanatory Gap 7.2 The Hard and the Easy Problems of Consciousness 7.3 (Un)consciousness, (Ir)rationality, and Psychological Experience 7.4 The Brain and the Mind-body-self 7.5 Twenty-First-Century Biological Naturalism: The Body-Map-Based View and the Affect-Centric View 7.6 Dualism, Biological Naturalism, and dissolving the Explanatory Gap References Index