Israel's long war with Hezbollah : military innovation and adaptation under fire

Description

The ongoing conflict between Israel and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah is now in its fourth decade and shows no signs of ending. Raphael D. Marcus examines this conflict since the formation of Hezbollah during Israel's occupation of Lebanon in the early 1980s. He critically evaluates events including Israel's long counterguerrilla campaign throughout the 1990s, the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, the 2006 summer war, and concludes with an assessment of current tensions on the border between Israel and Lebanon related to the Syrian civil war. Israel's Long War with Hezbollah is both the first complete military history of this decades-long conflict and an analysis of military innovation and adaptation. The book is based on unique fieldwork in Israel and Lebanon, extensive research into Hebrew and Arabic primary sources, and dozens of interviews Marcus conducted with Israeli defense officials, high-ranking military officers of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), United Nations personnel, a Hezbollah official, and Western diplomats. As an expert on organizational learning, Marcus analyzes ongoing processes of strategic and operational innovation and adaptation by both the IDF and Hezbollah throughout the long guerrilla conflict. His conclusions illuminate the dynamics of the ongoing conflict and illustrate the complexity of military adaptation under fire. With Hezbollah playing an ongoing role in the civil war in Syria and the simmering hostilities on the Israel-Lebanon border, students, scholars, diplomats, and military practitioners with an interest in Middle Eastern security issues, Israeli military history, and military innovation and adaptation can ill afford to neglect this book. Cover Title Copyright Contents Acknowledgments Abbreviations Introduction Part I. Strategic Adaptation Introduction to Part I 1: IDF “Routine Security” and the Evolution of Hezbollah (1985–92) 2: Deterrence, Guerrilla Warfare, and the Establishment of the “Rules of the Game” (1993–99) 3: A Change in the Strategic Equation: The IDF Withdrawal from Lebanon (2000) 4: The Erosion of Deterrence, the 2006 War, and the Dahiya Doctrine (2000–2017) Conclusion to Part I Part II. Operational Adaptation Introduction to Part II 5: The Origins of the RMA in Israel 6: The RMA in Action: IDF Operations in Lebanon and Hezbollah’s Adaptation in the 1990s 7: The Rise of the IDF’s Operational Theory Research Institute and Systemic Operational Design 8: The 2006 Lebanon War: Military Adaptation and Counteradaptation 9: The Blame Game: A Reappraisal of the IDF’s 2006 Operational Concept Conclusion to Part II Conclusions Afterword: Back to the Future: IDF Force Planning and Hezbollah’s Military Adaptation in Syria Chronology Selected Bibliography Index A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z About the Author