ENGLISH

The Sanctions Paradox : Economic Statecraft and International Relations

By Daniel W. Drezner

Book information

Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Year
1999
ISBN
0521644151, 9780521644150
LCC
HF1413.5 .D74 1999
Language
english
Format
PDF
Filesize
2 MB (1732627 bytes)
Series
Cambridge Studies in International Relations 65
Pages
364\362
Topic
Economy
Time added
2011-06-04 13:46:07

Description

The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries will be most eager to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. States anticipate frequent conflicts with adversaries, and are therefore more willing to use sanctions. However, precisely because they anticipate more conflicts, sanctioned states will not concede, despite the cost. Economic sanctions are thus far less likely to be effective between adversaries than between allies.

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