Direct reference : from language to thought

Description

In this book Professor Recanati sets out to defend and systematize the much-discussed 'theory of Direct Reference', according to which the contribution made by a referential term (e.g. a proper name or demonstrative) to the proposition expressed by the sentence where it occurs is its reference. To deal with the objections traditionally levelled against the theory he puts forward a general account of de re thoughts and their communication which blends insights from both the Fregean and the Russellian traditions. In the second part of the book recent advances in pragmatics are presented and used to shed light on the referential/attributive distinction (with respect to both definite descriptions and indexicals) and belief reports. New treatments of some of the major topics in the philosophy of mind and language are offered along the way. Read more... Abstract: In this book Professor Recanati sets out to defend and systematize the much-discussed 'theory of Direct Reference', according to which the contribution made by a referential term (e.g. a proper name or demonstrative) to the proposition expressed by the sentence where it occurs is its reference. To deal with the objections traditionally levelled against the theory he puts forward a general account of de re thoughts and their communication which blends insights from both the Fregean and the Russellian traditions. In the second part of the book recent advances in pragmatics are presented and used to shed light on the referential/attributive distinction (with respect to both definite descriptions and indexicals) and belief reports. New treatments of some of the major topics in the philosophy of mind and language are offered along the way