Lonergan and Kant: Five Essays on Human Knowledge

Description

Lonergan's Insight has frequently been compared with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Giovanni B. Sala, an internationally acknowledged Kant scholar, contrasts the cognitional theory of his former teacher Lonergan with the positions of Kant that have proved so influential, and in many ways so intractable, over the past two centuries. The first essay is one of the most influential papers ever written on Lonergan; it and the second one inquire into the notion of the a priori. The third essay presents a detailed analysis of Kantian intuitionism and contrasts it with the `knowledge as structure' position of Lonergan's critical realism. In this essay intuitionism is generalized, to allow Sala to address representatives of neoscholasticism as well. The argument with neoscholasticism continues in the fourth essay. The final paper discusses Kant's resolution of the question regarding the agreement of a priori concepts with things, and finds in Lonergan's work an alternative position on correspondence and truth. Each essay is a model of careful and thorough scholarship, and also - surprising in a book of such proportions - of clarity. Lonergan appeals several times in Insight to the device of `Clarification by Contrast.' Sala's essays show us in intricate detail how illuminating such comparisons can be. Contents Editor's Preface Author's Foreword 1 The A Priori in Human Knowledge: Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Lonergan's Insight 1 Kant's Reasons for His Quest of the A Priori 2 Does the Mind Impose the A Priori on Reality or Does It Question Reality through the A Priori? 3 The Intuition Principle in the KRV and the Structure Principle in Insight 4 Relation of Cognitional Activity to Reality 5 The A Priori of Sensibility 6 The A Priori of Verstand 7 The A Priori of Vernunft 8 Judgment as Adequate Response to the A Priori of Mind 9 Expansion of the A Priori: From Knowledge of Nature to Constitution of the Human World 2 The Role of the A Priori in Knowledge: On a Fundamental Problem in the Kantian Critique 1 Two Conceptions of the A Priori 2 The A Priori of Sensibility 3 The A Priori of the Understanding 4 The A Priori of Reason 5 The A Priori in the Critique of Judgment 3 Kant's Theory of Human Knowledge: A Sensualistic Version of Intuitionism 1 The Introspective Method of Developing a Theory of Knowledge 2 The Essence of Knowledge according to the KRV: Knowing is Looking 3 The Role of Thought in the Constitution of Knowledge 4 The Relation between the Various Cognitional Operations and the Object according to the KRV 5 The Intellectualistic Version of Intuitionism 5.1 The Immediate Realism of E. Gilson 5.2 Mediated Realism (Realismus Mediatus) 5.3 The Diallele of the Intuitionist Theory of Knowledge 5.4 'Cognitio debet esse originarie visio' in J. de Vries 5.5 The Contribution of the Category of Causality to Knowledge of the Object in the Kantian Tradition 6 Critical Realism: Human Knowledge Consists in the Threefold Operation of an Intelligent and Rational Intentionality 6.1 Introspective Method and Critical Realism 6.2 The Two Pillars of Critical Realism 6.3 The Relation of the Cognitional Operations to Reality 6.4 Two Meanings of 'Object' 6.5 Sensibility and Understanding Are Both Necessary for Human Knowledge. But Who Serves Whom? 4 Intentionality versus Intuition 1 Intuitionism: Knowing is Looking 2 Introspection as the Method for Attaining Knowledge of Knowledge 3 Basic Theses of an Introspectively Developed Epistemology 4 Self-knowledge – An Exception? 5 Consciousness Is (Only) Experience of Oneself as Subject 6 The Virtually Unconditioned as the Ground of the Rational Judgment 7 From the Myth of Seeing to the Rationality of the Judgment 5 Kant's Antithetic Problem and Lonergan's Rational Conception of Reality 1 The Discovery of the Antithetic Problem as the Moment at Which the KRV Was Born 2 The Significance of the Antithetic Problem in the Overall Context of Kant's Transcendental Philosophy 3 The Content of the Antithetic Problem 4 Kant's Idealistic Solution to the Antithetic Problem 5 The Principle of the Transcendental Deduction 6 Lonergan's Correspondence Thesis as the Foundation of a Rational Conception of Reality 6.1 Intentionality and Reality 6.2 The Structure of Intentionality as the Performance of an Intentionality with Several Qualitatively Different Levels 7 The Ambiguity of the Antithetic Problem in Kant as a Consequence of the Ambiguity of His Conception of the A Priori 8 The Antithetic Problem with Respect to Intentionality and Its Modes 9 The Antithetic Problem with Respect to the Structure of Cognition 10 The Antithetic Problem with Respect to Concepts in the Strict Sense Notes Index A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Z