The Limitations of the Open Mind

Description

When should you engage with difficult arguments against your cherished controversial beliefs? The primary conclusion of this book is that your obligations to engage with counterarguments are more limited than is often thought. In some standard situations, you shouldn't engage with difficult counterarguments and, if you do, you shouldn't engage with them open-mindedly. This conclusion runs counter to aspects of the Millian political tradition and political liberalism, as well as what people working in informal logic tend to say about argumentation. Not all misleading arguments wear their flaws on their sleeve. Each step of a misleading argument might seem compelling and you might not be able to figure out what's wrong with it. Still, even if you can't figure out what's wrong with an argument, you can know that it's misleading. One way to know that an argument is misleading is, counterintuitively, to lack expertise in the methods and evidence-types employed by the argument. When you know that a counterargument is misleading, you shouldn't engage with it open-mindedly and sometimes shouldn't engage with it at all. You shouldn't engage open-mindedly because you shouldn't be willing to reduce your confidence in response to arguments you know are misleading. And you sometimes shouldn't engage closed-mindedly, because to do so can be manipulative or ineffective. In making this case, Jeremy Fantl discusses echo chambers and group polarization, the importance in academic writing of a sympathetic case for the opposition, the epistemology of disagreement, the account of open-mindedness, and invitations to problematic academic speakers. Cover......Page 1 The Limitations of the Open Mind......Page 4 Copyright......Page 5 Dedication......Page 6 Contents......Page 8 Preface......Page 10 PART I: The Epistemology of Open-Mindedness......Page 20 1.1 Open-Mindedness Toward Arguments......Page 22 1.2 Conceptions of Open-Mindedness......Page 24 1.3 Open-Mindedness and Outright Belief......Page 37 1.4 Conclusion......Page 44 2.1 Knowledge and Closed-Mindedness......Page 46 2.2 Forward-Looking Dogmatism......Page 48 2.3 The Case for Dogmatism FL......Page 53 2.4 Conclusion......Page 67 3.1 Coins and Counterarguments......Page 68 3.2 Higher-Order Evidence......Page 71 3.3 The Epistemic Efficacy of Amateurism......Page 74 3.4 The Novice Knowledge Principle and the Case for the Other Side......Page 89 3.5 Conclusion......Page 92 4.1 Sources of Knowledge......Page 94 4.2 Felt Obviousness......Page 95 4.3 Prima Facie Goat and Atheistic Knowledge......Page 102 4.4.1 The fine-tuning argument......Page 105 4.4.2 Statistical arguments for psi......Page 113 4.5 Conclusion: The Position of the Expert......Page 118 PART II: The Ethics of Participation in Argumentation......Page 120 5.1 Introduction......Page 122 5.2 Is the Obligation a Role Ought?......Page 124 5.3 The Duty to Maximize Good Epistemic Consequences......Page 135 5.4 The Rights of Disputants......Page 141 5.5 Conclusion......Page 146 6.1 Introduction......Page 147 6.2 The Case Against Open-Mindedness......Page 148 6.3.1 Worries about the linking premise......Page 151 6.3.2 The argument for the linking premise......Page 155 6.4 Dealing with the Arguments for Open-Minded Engagement......Page 169 7.1 The Pitfalls of Closed-Minded Engagement......Page 173 7.2 The Pitfalls of Insincerity......Page 178 7.3 The Pitfalls of Sincerity......Page 190 8.1 Introduction......Page 196 8.2 Learning from Problematic Speakers......Page 198 8.3.1 Problematic speakers and psychological harm......Page 203 8.3.2 Problematic speakers and intrinsic harm......Page 208 8.3.3 Problematic speakers and the respect for truth......Page 217 8.4 Conclusion......Page 220 References......Page 222 Index......Page 242