Ideas for a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. First book, General introduction to pure phenomenology

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Preliminaries Cover Contents Translator's Preface Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy Introduction Section I: Essence and Knowledge of Essence Chapter 1: Fact and Essence §1 Natural knowledge and experience §2 Fact and the inseparability of fact and essence §3 Discernment of essence and individual intuition §4 Phantasy and discernment of essence: knowledge of essence independent of all knowledge of facts §5 Judgments about essences and universally valid, eidetic judgments §6 Some basic concepts: universality and necessity §7 Sciences of facts and sciences of essences §8 Relations of dependency between sciences of facts andsciences of essences §9 Region and regional eidetics §10 Region and category: the analytic region and its categories §11 Syntactic objectivities and ultimate substrates: syntactic categories §12 Genus and species §13 Generalization and formalization §14 Substrate-categories: the essence of a substrateand the 'tode ti' §15 Independent and dependent objects: concretum andindividuum §16 Region and category in the substantive sphere: synthetic knowledge a priori §17 Conclusion to the logical considerations Chapter 2: Naturalistic Misconceptions §18 Introduction to the critical discussions §19 The empiricist identification of experience and acts that afford something in an originary way §20 Empiricism as skepticism §21 Obscurities on the idealistic side §22 The reproach of Platonic realism: essence andconcept §23 Spontaneity of ideation, essence, and fiction [Fiktum] §24 The principle of all principles §25 The positivist in practice as natural scientist, the natural scientist in reflection as positivist §26 Sciences in the dogmatic attitude and sciences in the philosophical attitude Section II: The Fundamental Phenomenological Consideration Chapter 1: The Thesis of the Natural Attitude and Its Suspension §27 The world of the natural attitude: I and my environment §28 The cogito, my natural environment, and the ideal environments §29 The "other" ego-subjects and the intersubjective natural environment §30 The general thesis of the natural attitude §31 Radical alteration of the natural thesis: the "suspension," "bracketing" §32 The phenomenological epokhē Chapter 2: Consciousness and Natural Actuality §33 Preview of the "pure" or "transcendental consciousness" as the phenomenological residuum §34 The essence of consciousness as theme §35 The cogito as "act" and modification in the sense ofnon-actualization §36 Intentional experience and experience in general §37 The "being-directed-at" of the pure ego in the cogito, and the process of noticing by apprehending §38 Reflections on acts: immanent and transcendent perceptions §39 Consciousness and natural actuality: the "naive"human being's construal §40 "Primary" and "secondary" qualities: the thing given in person and "mere appearance" of the "physically true" §41 The real [reell] constitution of perception and its transcendent object §42 Being as consciousness and being as reality: intrinsic difference in the manners of intuition §43 Clarification of a fundamental mistake §44 Merely phenomenal being of the transcendent, absolute being of the immanent §45 Unperceived experience, unperceived reality §46 lndubitability of the immanent, dubitability of thetranscendent perception Chapter 3: The Region of Pure Consciousness §47 The natural world as the correlate of consciousness §48 Logical possibility and material absurdity of a worldoutside our world §49 Absolute consciousness as the residue of completelynullifying the world §50 The phenomenological attitude and pureconsciousness as the field of phenomenology §51 The meaning of transcendental pre-considerations Remark §52 Addenda: the physical thing and the "unknown cause of appearances" §53 The animalia and psychological consciousness §54 Continuation: the transcendent, psychological experience as contingent and relative, the transcendental experience as necessary and absolute §55 Conclusion: all realities are "through an affordanceof sense," no "subjective idealism" Chapter 4: The Phenomenological Reductions §56 The question of the scope of the phenomenological reduction: sciences of nature and the mind §57 The question of the suspension of the pure ego §58 The transcendence of God suspended §59 The transcendence of the eidetic and the suspension §60 The suspension of material-eidetic disciplines §61 The methodological significance of the systematic scope of phenomenological reductions §62 Epistemological anticipations: the "dogmatic" and the phenomenological attitude Remark Section III: On the Method and Problems of Pure Phenomenology Chapter 1: Methodological Pre-considerations §63 The particular meaning of methodological considerations for phenomenology §64 The self-suspension of the phenomenologist §65 Phenomenology's reference to itself §66 Univocal terms and the faithful expression of what is given clearly §67 Methods of clarification: "proximity of givenness"and "remoteness of givenness" §68 Genuine and non-genuine levels of clarity, and the essence of normal clarification §69 The method of apprehending essences in a perfectly clear manner §70 The role of perception in the method of clarifying the essence, and the prerogative of free phantasy §71 The problem of the possibility of a descriptive eidetic of experiences §72 Concrete, abstract, "mathematical" sciences §73 Application to the problem of phenomenology: description and exact determination §74 Descriptive and exact sciences §75 Phenomenology as a descriptive doctrine of the essences of pure experiences Chapter 2: Universal Structures of Pure Consciousness §76 The theme of the following investigations §77 Reflection as what is fundamentally distinctive of the sphere of experience: studies on reflection §78 The phenomenological study of reflections onexperience §79 Critical excursus: phenomenology and thedifficulties of "self-observation" §80 The relation of experiences to the pure ego §81 Phenomenological time and time-consciousness §82 Continuation: the threefold horizon of experience, as at the same time the horizon of reflection on experience §83 Apprehending the unified stream of experienceas an "idea" §84 Intentionality as the main theme of phenomenology Regarding terminology §85 Sensual uA.11, intentional μopcp{j §86 The functional problems Remark Chapter 3: Noesis and Noema §87 Preliminary remarks §88 Really obtaining and intentional components of experience: the noema §89 Noematic assertions and assertions of actuality: the noema in the psychological sphere §90 The "noematic sense" and the distinction between "immanent" and "actual objects" §91 Carryover to the widest sphere of intentionality §92 Shifts in attention in noetic and noematic respects §93 Transition to the noetic-noematic structures of the higher sphere of consciousness §94 Noesis and noema in the domain of judgment §95 The analogous distinctions in the sphere of emotion and of willing §96 Transition to subsequent chapters: concluding remarks Chapter 4: On the Problems of Noetic-Noematic Structures §97 The inherent hyletic and noetic aspects as really obtaining aspects of experience, the noematic as an inherent irreal aspect of experience §98 The manner of being of the noema, the doctrine of the forms of noeses, and the doctrine of the forms of noemata §99 The noematic core and its distinguishing characters in the sphere of presently-presenting and re-presenting something §100 Essential formations of levels of presentations in noesis and noema §101 Characteristics of levels: diverse kinds of "reflections" §102 Transition to new dimensions of characterizations §103 Characters of belief and characters of being §104 The doxic modalities as modifications §105 Modality of belief as belief, modality of being as being §106 Affirmation and denial along with their noematic correlates §107 Iterated modifications §108 Noematic characters of experience are not determinations of "reflection" §109 The neutrality modification §110 Neutralized consciousness, reason's jurisdiction, and assuming §111 Neutrality modification and phantasy §112 Iterability of the phantasy modification and noniterabilityof the neutrality modification §113 Actual and potential positings §114 Further on the potentiality of the thesis and theneutrality modification §115 Applications: the expanded concept of act,implementations of an act, and stirrings of an act §116 Transition to new analyses: the founded noeses andtheir noematic correlates §117 The founded theses and the conclusion of the doctrine of neutrality modification: the universal concept of the thesis §118 Syntheses of consciousness and syntactic forms §119 Transformation of polythetic acts into monothetic acts §120 Positionality and neutrality in the sphere of syntheses §121 The doxic syntaxes in the sphere of emotion and the sphere of willing §122 Modes of implementation of the articulated syntheses: "Theme" §123 Confusion and distinctness as modes of implementing synthetic acts §124 The noetic-noematic layer of the "Logos": to mean and meaning §125 The modalities ofimplementing acts in the sphere of logical expression and the method of clarification §126 Completeness and universality of the expression §127 Expression of judgments and expression of emotive noemas Section IV: Reason and Actuality Chapter 1: The Noematic Sense of the Relation to the Object §128 Introduction §129 "Content" and "object": the content as "sense" §130 Circumscribing the essence "noematic sense" §131 The "object," the "determinable X in the noematic sense" §132 The core as sense in the mode ofits fullness §133 The noematic posit, thetic and synthetic posits, and posits in the domain of presentations §134 Doctrine of apophantic forms §135 Object and consciousness: transition to the phenomenology of reason Chapter 2: Phenomenology of Reason §136 The first, basic form of rational consciousness: the "seeing" that affords something in an originary way §137 Evidence and insight: "originary" and "pure," assertoric and apodictic evidence §138 Adequate and inadequate evidence §139 lnterweavings of every kind of reason: theoretical, axiological, and practical truth §140 Confirmation, justification without evidence, and the equivalence of positional and neutral insight §141 Unmediated and mediated rational positing, and mediated evidence §142 Rational thesis and being §143 A thing's adequate givenness as an idea in the Kantian sense §144 Actuality and consciousness affording something in an originary way: concluding determinations §145 A critical remark on the phenomenology of evidence Chapter 3: Levels of Universality of the Problems of a Theory of Reason §146 The most universal problems §147 Problem-ramifications: formal logic, axiology, and the theory of practice §148 Rational-theoretical problems of formal ontology §149 The rational-theoretical problems of regional ontologies, and the problem of phenomenological constitution §150 Continuation: the region of the thing as the transcendental guide §151 Layers of the transcendental constitution of the thing: addenda §152 Carrying the problem of transcendental constitution over to other regions §153 The full extent of the transcendental problem: division of the investigations Extras English-German Glossary German-English Glossary Translator's Afterword Overview of the Text Final Remarks on My Aim and Decisions as Translator Index Back Cover