Arab-Israeli Diplomacy Under Carter: The US, Israel and the Palestinians

Description

“The history of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East is marked by numerous stark failures and a few ephemeral successes. Jimmy Carter’s short-lived Middle East diplomatic strategy constitutes an exception in vision and approach. In this extensive and long-overdue analysis of Carter’s Middle East policy, Jorgen Jensehaugen sheds light on this important and unprecedented chapter in U.S. regional diplomacy. Against all odds, including the rise of Menachem Begin’s right-wing government in Israel, Carter broke new ground by demanding the involvement of the Palestinians in Arab-Israeli diplomatic negotiations. This book assesses the president's ‘comprehensive peace’ doctrine, which aimed to encompass all parties of the conflict, and reveals the reasons why his vision ultimately failed. Largely based on analysis of newly-declassified diplomatic files and American, British, Palestinian and Israeli archival sources, this book is the first comprehensive examination of Jimmy Carter’s engagement with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. At a time when U.S. involvement in the region threatens to exacerbate tensions further, Arab-Israeli Diplomacy under Carter provides important new insights into the historical roots of the ongoing unrest. The book will be of value to Middle East and International Relations scholars, and those researching U.S diplomacy and the Carter Administration.” Cover Title Copyright Dedication Contents Acknowledgements 1. President Carter and the Palestinians Carter’s rising star in Palestine 2. US Presidents and the Palestinians The first Arab – Israeli war The rise of pan-Arabism The six-day war: Shifting fronts Fatah takes charge 1970: Exiled from exile The 1973 Arab – Israeli war Step by step Sinai II Failing to see the Palestinians 3. The Comprehensive Approach Coming into office Developing the comprehensive approach Theory to practice: Visiting the Middle East The Clinton speech and tidings from Moscow Theory to practice: State visits To talk or not to talk? Talking around the dilemma: Palestinian back channels Begin the game-changer The Begin visit Second Vance tour Problems with the PLO Peace treaty drafts 4. Clinging to Comprehensive Peace Including the PLO through Syria and the Soviet Union Multi-bilateral negotiations: Israel sets the tone The US – Soviet joint communique´ Duelling with Dayan Who can accept the working paper? Selling the working paper Could Egypt go it alone? Jimmy gets personal 5. The Jerusalem Bombshell Going to Jerusalem Visiting Israel Taking the talks to Cairo Consequences of a separate peace Home rule for the Palestinians The Aswan statement 6. The Torturous Road to Camp David Missing an opportunity to pressure Begin Begin and Carter clash Carter’s face-off with the Israel lobby London talks The invitation to Camp David 7. Camp David and the Egyptian – Israeli Peace Treaty Study papers – still a comprehensive strategy Camp David Phase I: Openings and trilateral meetings Camp David Phase II: The US draft Camp David Phase III: Changing the framework, weakening the ties Camp David Phase IV: Endgame Evaluating the framework Difficult rounds ahead Settlement expansion without consequence Another go with the PLO? There goes the deadline Begin in Washington Arab reactions 8. Where do we Go Now, but Nowhere? Finding some Palestinians, any Palestinians Starting the Palestinian autonomy talks From bad to worse in the Middle East and beyond Begin the builder Things fall apart A last try 9. A Failed Ambition The Carter legacy Changing conditions Building a house of cards On shaky ground Sadat’s initiatives The cards fall down Camp David Whither the pressure Notes Bibliography Index