Economic Analysis of Contract Law: Incomplete Contracts and Asymmetric Information

Description

This book examines the main issues arising in economic analysis of contract law with special attention given to the incomplete contracts. It discusses both the main features of contract law as they relate to the problem of economic exchange, and how the relevant legal rules and the institutions can be analysed from an economic perspective. Evaluate the welfare impacts, analyses the effects and the desirability of different breach remedies and examines the optimal incentive structure of party-designed liquidated damages under the different dimensions of informational asymmetry. Overall the book aims to contribute to the legal debate over the adoption of the specific breach remedies when the breach victim’s expectation interest is difficult to assess, and to the debate over courts' reluctance to implement large penalties in the event of breach of contracts. Front Matter ....Pages i-xvi Introduction (Sugata Bag)....Pages 1-22 Basics of Economic Theory of Contract (Sugata Bag)....Pages 23-58 Economics of Damage Remedies I: Unilateral Reliance, One-Sided Information Asymmetry (Sugata Bag)....Pages 59-90 Economics of Damage Remedies II: Bilateral Reliance, One-Sided Information Asymmetry (Sugata Bag)....Pages 91-110 Economics of Damage Remedies III: Incentives Under Expectation Damage With One-Sided Private Information – A Mechanism Design Approach (Sugata Bag)....Pages 111-145 Economics of Damage Remedies IV: Incomplete Contracts, Bilateral Reliance, Two-Sided Asymmetric Information (Sugata Bag)....Pages 147-189 Concluding Notes (Sugata Bag)....Pages 191-198 Back Matter ....Pages 199-203