Securities against misrule juries, assemblies, elections

Description

"This book proposes a normative theory of collective decision making, inspired by Jeremy Bentham but not including his utilitarian philosophy. The central proposal is that in designing democratic institutions one should reduce as much as possible the impact of self-interest, passion, prejudice, and bias on the decision makers, and then let the chips fall where they may. There is no independently defined good outcome that institutions can track, nor is there any way of reliably selecting good decision makers. In addition to a long initial chapter that surveys theories of collective decision making, notably social-choice theory, and a chapter expounding and discussing Bentham, Ŵs views, historical chapters on the jury, constituent assemblies, and electoral systems develop and illustrate the main ideas. This work draws on a welter of case studies and historical episodes, from Thucydides and Plutarch to the present. It is also grounded in psychology, behavioral economics, and law"--;Cover; Contents; Preface and Acknowledgments; Introduction; 1 The Normative Study of Collective Decision Making; I. introduction: individual choice; II. Collective Decisions; III. Collective Decision-Making Processes; IV. Good Collective Decisions; V. Good Collective Decision-Making Procedures; Arguing Toward Unanimity; Deciding by Aggregation; Deciding by Bargaining; VI. Strategic Behavior; Strategic Uses of Argument; Strategic Behavior in Aggregation; VII. The Benthamite Approach to Collective Decision Making; 2 Ignorance, Secrecy, and Publicity in Jury Decision Making; I. Introduction. Cover Contents Preface and Acknowledgments Introduction 1 The Normative Study of Collective Decision Making I. introduction: individual choice II. Collective Decisions III. Collective Decision-Making Processes IV. Good Collective Decisions V. Good Collective Decision-Making Procedures Arguing Toward Unanimity Deciding by Aggregation Deciding by Bargaining VI. Strategic Behavior Strategic Uses of Argument Strategic Behavior in Aggregation VII. The Benthamite Approach to Collective Decision Making 2 Ignorance, Secrecy, and Publicity in Jury Decision Making I. Introduction. II. Composing the Pool, the Panel, and the JuryIII. The Trial IV. Jury Deliberation and Voting Choice of Foreperson Communication Among the Jurors Recording Jury Deliberations Giving Reasons Revealing the Deliberations Open or Secret Voting Revealing the Number of Votes and the Identity of Voters V. Conclusion 3 A Dialogue with Bentham I. Introduction II. Aptitude of Voters III. Aptitude of Deputies IV. Constitutionalism and Rights V. Bentham and Condorcet VI. Conclusion 4 The Optimal Design of Constituent Assemblies I. Introduction. II. The Task of the Constituent AssemblyIII. Location of the Assembly IV. The Size and Duration of the Assembly V. Elections to the Assembly VI. Secrecy and Publicity -- Interest and Passion VII. Ratifying the Constitution VIII. Conclusion 5 Cross-Voting: A Study in Failure I. Introduction II. Voters and Eligibles III. Cross-Voting at the Estates-General IV. Cross-Voting in the United States, 1787-1789 V. Some Contemporary Examples VI. Conclusion: The Fragility of Incentive Systems Conclusion I. Costs II. Diversity III. Overrides IV. Indeterminacy V. Political Will.