Foundations of an Ethics of Belief

Description

In our daily lives we make lots of evaluations of actions. We think that driving above the speed limit is dangerous, that giving up one's bus seat to the elderly is polite, that stirring eggs with a plastic spoon is neither good nor bad. We understand, too, that we may be praised or blamed for actions performed on the basis of these evaluations. The goal of this study is toillustrate the foundationsthat allow for these kinds of judgments. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION The initial intuition Main objective Preliminary clarificatory remarks Two central problems The problem of control and responsibility The normative problem Abstracts of the chapters Chapter 1: What the philosophy of action teaches us Chapter 2: The impossibility of acquiring beliefs directly for reasons Chapter 3: Pascalian and theoretical control Chapter 4: Doxastic responsibility as responsibility for consequences Chapter 5: Epistemic praiseworthiness and epistemic blameworthiness Chapter 6: Beyond epistemic justifiedness Chapter 7: Epistemic justifiedness and non-epistemic justifiedness Chapter 1: What the philosophy of action teaches us Actions and happenings Non-reductionist conception of action Reductionist conception of action Actions, happenings and activities Acting for reasons Three distinctions about reasons Motivating reasons vs. normative reasons Internalism vs. externalism about reasons Humean vs. anti-Humean conception of motivation Back to the doxastic realm Epistemic reasons, non-epistemic reasons and evidence Delineating the interesting issue Chapter 2: The Impossibility of directly acquiring beliefs for reasons Direct and indirect belief acquisitions Direct/indirect acquisitions of belief and epistemic/non–epistemic reasons Williams’ argument “To believe that p is to believe that p is true” Believing vs. imagining Transparency The teleological account Conclusions Chapter 3: Theoretical and Pascalian control Two forms of indirect doxastic control Theoretical control Pascalian control Indirect doxastic influence on belief acquisitions Unlimited doxastic control considered Ryan’s unlimited doxastic control Pieces of evidence vs. motivating reasons Steup’s unlimited doxastic control Chapter 4: Doxastic Responsibility as Responsibility for Consequences Responsibility for consequences Responsibility for basic actions Responsibility for the consequences of actions Responsibility for resultant belief acquisitions, theoretical and Pascalian control Responsibility for resultant belief acquisitions and indirect doxastic influence Responsibility for believing Chapter 5: Epistemic praiseworthiness and blameworthiness Epistemic and non-epistemic desirability The fundamental epistemic end Other epistemically desirable states The fundamental epistemic end: some specifications Epistemic and non-epistemic ends: summary Varieties of epistemic goodness* Final and instrumental epistemic goodness Epistemic rationality and epistemic commendability Varieties of epistemic praiseworthiness and blameworthiness Final and instrumental epistemic praiseworthiness and blameworthiness Epistemic praiseworthiness/blameworthiness for rational belief acquisitions Epistemic praiseworthiness for epistemically commendable belief acquisitions and epistemic blameworthiness for epistemically non-commendable belief acquisitions Chapter 6: Beyond epistemic justifiedness Accessibilism, mentalism, and externalism Accessibilism and perceptual disjunctivism Normative properties Valuable, rational, commendable belief acquisitions and the threefold classification of justifiedness Externalism: the goodness* of instrumental goodness Mentalism: the goodness* of rationality Accessibilism: the goodness* of commendability The reliabilist and the accessibilist explanation of the goodness* of justifiedness The reliabilist explanation of the goodness* of justifiedness The credit explanation of the goodness* of justifiedness Accessibilist explanation of the goodness* of justifiedness Chapter 7: Epistemic and non-epistemic justifiedness The divergence thesis The “pragmatic” refutation of the divergence thesis: Clifford and James Clifford’s ethics of belief James’ ethics of belief The point of agreement The divergence of rationality The objection against the divergence of rationality Conclusion Bibliography