Moral Relativism and Pluralism

Description

The argument for metaethical relativism, the view that there is no single true or most justified morality, is that it is part of the best explanation of the most difficult moral disagreements. The argument for this view features a comparison between traditions that highly value relationship and community and traditions that highly value personal autonomy of the individual and rights. It is held that moralities are best understood as emerging from human culture in response to the need to promote and regulate interpersonal cooperation and internal motivational coherence in the individual. The argument ends in the conclusion that there is a bounded plurality of true and most justified moralities that accomplish these functions. The normative implications of this form of metaethical relativism are explored, with specific focus on female genital cutting and abortion. Cover Title page Copyright page Moral Relativism and Pluralism Contents 1 Why Are People So Exercised about Moral Relativism? 2 How Should Theses about Moral Relativism Be Framed? 3 Relationship and Community, Autonomy and Rights 4 Epistemic Reasons to Delve Further into the Conflict between Relationship-Centered and Rights-Centered Moralities 5 An Ethical Argument for Extended Inquiry into Rivals to One’s Own Ethical Views 6 Overcoming Stereotypes of Relationship-Centered Moralities 7 Complicating the Contrast between Relationship- and Autonomy-Centered Moralities 8 The Underdiscussed Question of What Morality Is 9 A Naturalistic Approach to Understanding Why Human Beings Have Moralities 10 Putting Together Moral Ambivalence and a Naturalistic Conception of Morality 11 Constraints on the Range of Viable Moralities 12 The Social Construction of Morality: By the Individual or Group? 13 When People Differ in Their Moral Beliefs about an Issue, When Do They Actually Disagree? 14 Why We Have Different Beliefs in Metaethics 15 How Moral Reasons Enter into the Truth Conditions of Moral Judgments and Help Shape Our Moral Motivations 16 Summary of the Argument for a Pluralistic Form of Metaethical Moral Relativism 17 Confused Reasoning That Is Sometimes Attributed to Those Who Believe in Normative Moral Relativism 18 An Argument for Normative Moral Relativism That Is Contingent upon the Acceptance of Certain Values and the Adoption of Metaethical Moral Relativism 19 Why Normative Moral Relativism Cannot Be a Simple Matter of Letting Others Be 20 What Is Female Genital Cutting? 21 Accommodation and the Fraught Issue of Abortion 22 Undermining Stereotypes of the Other Side 23 Fostering Pluralistic Encounters 24 Summary of Normative Moral Relativism References Acknowledgments