Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception

Description

Contemporary philosophy of perception is dominated by highly polarized debates. The polarization is particularly acute in the debate between naïve realist disjunctivists and their opponents, but divisions seem almost as stark in other areas of dispute, for example, the debate over whether we experience so-called 'high-level' properties, and the debate concerning individuation of the senses. The guiding hypothesis underlying this volume is that such polarization stems from insufficient attention to how we should go about settling these debates. In general, there is widespread, largely implicit disagreement concerning what philosophical theories of perception are supposed to explain, the claims that we should hold fixed in the course of theorizing, and the methods that such theorizing should employ. The goal of this volume is to move such methodological questions from the background to the front of the debate, in the hope of facilitating progress. The contributions constitute an initial effort to spur more explicit, systematic discussion of methodology in philosophy of perception, covering a wide range of relevant topics, from the relation between scientific and philosophical theorizing about perception, to lessons we can learn from the history of philosophy of perception. Cover Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception Copyright Contents Acknowledgements List of Contributors 1: Introduction 1. Background 2. Purpose and Procedure 2.1 Destinations 2.2 Origins 2.3 On the Way: Fixed Points 2.4 On the Way: Methods 3. Philosophy and the Science of Perception 3.1 Destinations 3.2 Origins 3.3 On the Way: Fixed Points 3.4 On the Way: Methods 4. Ways Forward 5. Summary of Papers References 2: Perceptual Paradigms 1. Introduction 2. Burge and McDowell on Disjunctivism 3. Burge v McDowell: A Clash of Paradigms? 4. Research Programmes 5. Methodological Lessons for the Philosophy of Perception References 3: Bridging the Gap? Naïve Realism and the Problem of Consciousness 1. Introduction 2. What Is to Be Explained? Naïve Realism and the Problem of Consciousness 3. Fixed Points? Naïve Realism and Physicalism 4. Methodology? Metaphysical, Descriptive, and Transcendental 4.1 Metaphysical Naïve Realism 4.2 Descriptive Naïve Realism 4.3 ‘Default’ Metaphysical Naïve Realism 4.4 Transcendental Naïve Realism References 4: Experiential Pluralism and Mental Kinds 1. Introduction 2. Visual Experience in the Good Case 3. The Argument from Abilities 3.1 Situation-Dependent Abilities (P1) 3.2 Explaining Possession of Situation-Dependent Abilities (P2) 3.3 The Explanatory Demand for World-Involvingness (P3) 4. World-Involving Experiences as a Mental Kind References 5: The Tractability of the Debate on Relationalism 1. The Debate on Relationalism 2. Philosophical Disagreement and Incommensurable Paradigms 3. Perception, Hallucinations, and Bullets to Bite 4. Phenomenal Character and Introspection 5. The Superficiality Constraint 6. Advancing the Debate with the Argument from Superficiality References 6: Neopragmatism and Philosophy of Perception 1. Introduction 2. Neopragmatism 3. A Case Study in Demystification: Naïve Realism 3.1 Naïve Realism and Disjunctivism 3.2 Demystification 4. A Neopragmatist Theory of Perception 5. Conclusion References 7: Perceptual Experience and Physicalism 1. Introduction 2. Representationalism and Physicalism 3. Non-relationalism 4. Perceptual Experiences and Accuracy 5. Conclusion References 8: High-Level Perception and Multimodal Perception 1. Introduction 2. Beyond Vision and the Unimodal Paradigm 3. Multimodal Perception and the Hunt for High-Level Content 3.1 The McGurk Effect 3.2 The Ventriloquist Effect 4. The High-Level Contents of the Rubber Hand Illusion 4.1 RHI on Liberalism and Conservatism 4.2 RHI and the Liberal’s Conjecture 4.3 Empirical Support for the Liberal’s Conjecture 5. Feeling What’s Not There 6. Conclusion References 9: What Can Predictive Processing Tell Us about the Content of Perceptual Experience? 1. Introduction 2. The Content of Perceptual Experience (CPE) Debate 3. The Predictive Processing Framework 4. Counterfactual Predictions and ‘Seeing As’ 5. Does the PPF Dissolve the CPE Debate? 6. The PPF as Supporting Liberalism 7. Four Illustrative Objections 7.1 Phenomenological Effects Are Attributable to Top-down Effects on the Experience of Low-Level Properties 7.2 Phenomenological Effects Are Attributable to Non-perceptual Phenomenology 7.3 The PPF Is Entirely Consistent with Conservatism 7.4 What Modality Are These So-Called Perceptual Experiences Happening In? 8. Conclusion Funding References 10: Wading in the Shallows 1. Introduction 2. Naturalism and Avoiding the Excess of Zettelism 3. Prediction Error Theory and Naïve Realism 3.1 Prediction Error Theory 3.2 Naïve Realism and the Asymmetric Discreditation Argument 3.3 Hallucination and Response-Dependent Properties 3.4 Perception–Cognition Divide 4. Sensory Kinds as Natural Kinds 5. Concluding Remarks References 11: Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Perception 1. Introduction 2. Two Approaches to Theorizing about Perception 2.1 Metaphysical Theories of Perception 2.2 Psychological Theories of Perception 2.3 Comparing the Metaphysical and Psychological Debates 3. Distinguishing the Metaphysical and Psychological Debates 3.1 Is There a Difference in the Modal Strength of the Theories? 3.2 Do the Theories Result from Different Methodologies? 3.3 Is There a Difference in Whether the Explanations Are Causal or Constitutive? 3.4 Are There Different Kinds of Constitutive Explanation? 4. Conclusion References 12: Phenomenology as Radical Reflection 1. Introduction 2. Humean, Kantian, and Husserlian Phenomenology of Perception 3. Problems with Authority 4. From Husserlian Phenomenology to Radical Reflection 5. Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology of Perception 13: Merleau-Ponty: Perception and Methodology 1. Introduction 2. Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology 2.1 Experience 2.2 The Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction 2.3 Description 2.4 Analysis 3. Application of Merleau-Ponty’s Method to Perception 4. Concluding Remarks References 14: Sensation and the Grammar of Life: Anscombe’s Procedure and Her Purpose 1. Introduction 2. The Raging Nerve Extracted 3. What Is an Object of Sight? 4. Anscombe’s Procedure 5. Two Ontological Errors in Brief 6. Anscombe’s Purpose References Index