The A Priori Without Magic (Elements in Epistemology)

Description

The distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori is an old and influential one. But both the distinction itself and the crucial notion of a priori knowledge face powerful philosophical challenges. Many philosophers worry that accepting the a priori is tantamount to accepting epistemic magic. In contrast, this Element argues that the a priori can be formulated clearly, made respectable, and used to do important epistemological work. The author's conception of the a priori and its role falls short of what some historical proponents of the notion may have hoped for, but it allows us to accept and use the notion without abandoning either naturalism or empiricism, broadly understood. This Element argues that we can accept and use the a priori without magic. Title page Imprints page Abstract page Contents The A Priori Without Magic Preface Introduction 1 Epistemic Evaluation 2 Characterizing the A Priori 3 A Priority through Innateness At this initial moment, does Robbie have warrant for believing that water will harm him? At this initial moment, is Robbie entitled to form beliefs on the basis of (for example) perception? 4 Against Rationalism 5 A Theory of the A Priori Which rules and principles are meaning-determining? Are there any constraints on which rules can determine meanings? Does this lead to radical pluralism? Aren’t some languages or concepts epistemically broken? Does this lead to truth by convention and isn’t that a problem? Doesn’t this make a priori warrant too easy? Does the meaning-based theory extend beyond the analytic or conceptual truths? 6 Challenge Cases 6.1 Memory and Long Proofs 6.2 Testimony 6.3 The Necessary A Posteriori 6.4 The Contingent A Priori 6.5 Inductive Reasoning 6.6 The Synthetic A Priori 6.7 God and Hardcore Metaphysics 7 Defending Robust A Priority 8 A Priority in the Epistemological Joints 9 The Nature of Epistemology Notes References Acknowledgments Epistemology Epistemology Elements in the Series