Russia's Chechen Wars

Description

This report provides an analysis of Russian combat in Chechnya beginning with the first modern Chechen war of 1994–1996 and comparing and contrasting it with the ongoing conflict that began in 1999. While the focus is on combat in urban areas, more general aspects of the Chechnya wars are also discussed. The research reported here was initiated with the goal of better understanding what Russia’s urban experience in Chechnya indicates both about Russian capabilities and operations specifically and about urban warfare generally, with lessons to be drawn for other states, including, of course, the United States. Preface ......................................... iii Figures ......................................... vii Summary ....................................... ix Acknowledgments ................................. xvii Glossary ........................................ xix Chapter One INTRODUCTION .............................. 1 Background .................................. 1 Wider Implications of the Chechen Wars ............. 2 Approach and Organization ...................... 3 Chapter Two GROZNY I: 1994–1995 ........................... 5 A Step Back: The Historical Context ................ 5 Into Grozny ................................... 9 In Grozny: Chechen Strategy and Tactics ............ 16 Learning Under Fire: The Evolution of Russian Tactics .. 22 After Grozny: The War Continues .................. 28 Chapter Three RETURN TO GROZNY: 1999–2000 .................. 33 Strategic and Tactical Thinking Between the Wars ...... 33 Preparation and Planning for Round Two ............ 36 Chechnya Between the Two Battles for Grozny: Foreign Involvement and Tactics ..................... 39 The Russians Back in Grozny ...................... 41 Evolving Russian Approaches to Urban Combat: Changes Since 1994–1995 .................... 49 Casualties and Morale ......................... 49 Force Coordination ........................... 51 Communications ............................. 51 Aviation .................................... 53 Artillery .................................... 57 The Troops ................................. 59 The Press ................................... 62 The Chechens Still in Grozny ...................... 65 The End Game ................................ 73 Urban Operations After Grozny: Komsomolskoye ...... 76 Chapter Four CONCLUSIONS ................................ 81 Russia’s Capabilities 1994–2000: Lessons Learned and Lessons Forgotten .......................... 81 Learning from the Russian Experience ............... 84 Bibliography ..................................... 87