Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics

Description

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant famously criticizes traditional metaphysics and its proofs of immortality, free will and God's existence. What is often overlooked is that Kant also explains why rational beings must ask metaphysical questions about 'unconditioned' objects such as souls, uncaused causes or God, and why answers to these questions will appear rationally compelling to them. In this book, Marcus Willaschek reconstructs and defends Kant's account of the rational sources of metaphysics. After carefully explaining Kant's conceptions of reason and metaphysics, he offers detailed interpretations of the relevant passages from the Critique of Pure Reason (in particular, the 'Transcendental Dialectic') in which Kant explains why reason seeks 'the unconditioned'. Willaschek offers a novel interpretation of the Transcendental Dialectic, pointing up its 'positive' side, while at the same time it uncovers a highly original account of metaphysical thinking that will be relevant to contemporary philosophical debates. Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics: The Dialectic of Pure Reason Contents Note on References and Citations Preface Introduction 0.1 Beginning at the Beginning(s) 0.2 The Rational Sources Account 0.3 One Argument, Four Levels 0.4 Kant’s Two Projects in the Transcendental Dialectic 0.5 Overview Part I: From Reason to Metaphysics Introduction to Part I 1 Kant’s Conceptions of Reason and Metaphysics 1.1 Kant’s Conception of Reason 1.1.1 Reason as the Capacity for Mediate Inference 1.1.2 Reason as a Faculty (Vermögen) and Reason as a System of Principles 1.1.3 Speculative and Practical Reason, Pure Reason, and Universal Human Reason 1.1.4 Two Aspects of Reason: A Historical Digression 1.1.5 The Logical and the Real Use of Reason 1.1.6 Pure Speculative Reason 1.2 Kant’s Conception of Metaphysics 1.2.1 Kant’s Conception of Metaphysics in the First Critique 1.2.2 Kant on the Prospects and Failures of Metaphysics 1.3 Conclusion 2 The Logical Use of Reason and the Logical Maxim 2.1 The Logical Use of Reason 2.1.1 Formality 2.1.2 Rational Inference 2.1.3 Inferential Concatenation 2.1.4 System and Science 2.2 The Content of the Logical Maxim 2.2.1 Conditioned Cognition 2.2.2 Unconditioned Cognition 2.2.3 The Logical Maxim: The Full Formulation 2.3 The Logical Maxim, Science, and Universal Human Reason 2.3.1 The Logical Maxim and Science 2.3.2 The Logical Maxim and Universal Human Reason 2.4 Conclusion 3 The Supreme Principle of Pure Reason 3.1 ‘Given’ 3.2 Real Conditioning 3.2.1 The Formal Features of Real Conditioning 3.2.2 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions and Real Conditioning as a Disjunctive Concept 3.2.3 Real Conditioning and the Relational Categories 3.2.4 Is There an Analytic Link between Condition and Conditioned? 3.2.5 Real Conditioning: Conclusion 3.3 The Unconditioned 3.3.1 Unconditioned Series 3.3.2 Completeness and Totality 3.3.3 Totality of Conditions and the Principle of Comprehension 3.3.4 Conclusion: The Unconditioned and the Supreme Principle 3.4 The Supreme Principle and the Principle of Sufficient Reason 4 Understanding the Transition Passage (A307–8/B364) 4.1 Objective Validity 4.2 Regulative and Constitutive Use of Principles in the Appendix and in the Resolution of the Antinomy 4.2.1 Logical and Transcendental Principles in the Appendix 4.2.2 Regulative and Constitutive (Use of ) Principles in the Appendix: Two Readings 4.2.3 The Regulative Use of the Supreme Principle 4.3 A Transition in Two Steps 4.3.1 A Reading of the Transition Passage 4.3.2 The Transition Passage and Transcendental Illusion 4.3.3 Understanding the Transition Itself 5 The Transition from the Logical Maxim to the Supreme Principle of Pure Reason 5.1 Step 1: From the Logical Maxim to the Regulative Supreme Principle 5.1.1 Why the Logical Maxim Presupposes the Regulative Supreme Principle 5.1.2 How the Supreme Principle Corresponds to the Logical Maxim 5.1.3 Conclusion to Step 1 5.2 Step 2: From the Regulative to the Constitutive Supreme Principle 5.2.1 Transcendental Illusion 5.2.2 Transcendental Realism as the ‘Key’ to Transcendental Illusion 5.2.3 Transcendental Realism and the Transition from the Regulative to the Constitutive Supreme Principle 5.2.4 Transcendental Realism as Part of ‘Universal Human Reason’ 5.2.5 Conclusion 5.3 Why Does the Supreme Principle Hold for Things in Themselves (but Not for Appearances)? Conclusion to Part I: The Transition from the Logical Maxim to the (Constitutive) Supreme Principle and the Rational Sources Account Part II: The Other Side of the Transcendental Dialectic Introduction to Part II 6 The System of Transcendental Ideas 6.1 Transcendental Ideas 6.2 On the Metaphysical Deduction of the Transcendental Ideas 6.2.1 Where to Look for the Metaphysical Deduction of the Transcendental Ideas 6.2.2 Transcendental Ideas as Inferred Concepts 6.3 The Concept of the Unconditioned 6.3.1 Totality of Conditions 6.3.2 The Unconditioned 6.4 The Three Classes of Transcendental Ideas 6.5 Conclusion 7 The Paralogisms and Antinomy Arguments as ‘Necessary Inferences of Reason 7.1 The Psychological Ideas and the Paralogisms 7.1.1 The First Paralogism 7.1.2 The Other Three Paralogisms 7.2 Transcendental Illusion and Transcendental Realism in the Paralogisms 7.2.1 The Paralogisms as Fallacies 7.2.2 Which Transcendental Realism for the Paralogisms? 7.2.3 Kant’s Diagnosis of the Paralogisms 7.3 The Cosmological Ideas 7.3.1 The Metaphysical Deduction of the Cosmological Ideas 7.3.2 Transcendental Realism in the Metaphysical Deduction of the Cosmological Ideas 7.4 The Antinomies 7.4.1 The Rational Inferences Underlying the Antinomies 7.4.2 Transcendental Realism in the Antinomies 7.5 Conclusion 8 Reason and Metaphysics in the Transcendental Ideal and the Appendix 8.1 The Transcendental Ideal and the Natural Argument for God’s Existence 8.1.1 The Transcendental Ideal 8.1.2 The Principles of Determinability and Complete Determination 8.1.3 Kant’s Derivation of the Concept of an ens realissimum 8.1.4 The Natural Argument for God’s Existence 8.1.5 Kant’s Critical Diagnosis of the Natural Argument 8.1.6 Conclusion 8.2 The Constitutive Use of Ideas and Principles in the Appendix 8.2.1 Part One of the Appendix: Principles 8.2.2 Part Two of the Appendix: Ideas 8.2.3 Conclusion 9 Transcendental Realism and Kant’s Critique of Speculative Metaphysics 9.1 Transcendental Realism and Transcendental Idealism 9.2 A Critique of Transcendental Realism 9.2.1 Kant’s Rejection of Transcendental Realism in the Transcendental Dialectic 9.2.2 Rejecting Transcendental Realism without Accepting Transcendental Idealism 9.3 Limits of Cognition without Transcendental Idealism 9.4 Transcendental Ideas as Empty Concepts 9.4.1 The Radical Reading Explained 9.4.2 The Radical Reading Defended 9.5 Conclusion Conclusion to Part II: Transcendental Illusion and the ‘Other Side’ of the Transcendental Dialectic Postscript: Kant’s Practical Metaphysics Bibliography Works Referred to by Short Title Other Works Index of Names Index of Subjects