Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is"

Description

This book reconsiders the supposed impossibility of deriving "Ought" from "Is". John R. Searle’s 1964 article How to Derive "Ought " from "Is’’ sent shockwaves through the philosophical community by offering a straightforward counterexample to this claim of impossibility: from your promising something- and this is an "is" - it simply follows that you "ought" to do it. This volume opens with a brand new chapter from Searle who, in light of his subsequent philosophical developments, expounds the reasons for the validity of that derivation and its crucial significance for social ontology and moral philosophy. Then, in a fresh interview with the editors of this volume, Searle explores a range of topics including how his derivation relates to constitutive rules, and how he views Wittgenstein’s philosophy, deontic logic, and the rationality of action.   The remainder of the volume is dedicated to a deep dive into Searle’s essay and its implications by international scholars with diverse backgrounds ranging from analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and logic, to moral philosophy and the philosophy and sociology of law.  With thirteen original chapters, the contributors provide fresh and timely insights on hotly debated issues: the nature of "Ought"; the logical structure of the social world; and the possibility of deriving not only "Ought" from "Is", but "Is" from "Ought".   John Searle: From an Institutions-Based Metaethics to a Language-Based Ethics Contents Note on Contributors List of Tables Part I 1 How to Derive “Ought” from “Is” Revisited 1 History 2 Developments 3 Conclusion References 2 An Interview with John R. Searle 1 Wittgenstein 2 Deontics 3 Norms, Validity, Logic 4 Constitutive Rules 5 Ontology of Rules in General 6 Ontology of Money 7 Is, Ought, Facts, and Values References Part II 3 Is and Ought: Where Does the Problem Lie? 1 Taking Stock: A Couple of Distinctions 2 John Searle’s Breakthrough 2.1 To Derive, or not to Derive: That Is the Question … 2.2 Institutional Facts References 4 Searlean “Is” and “Ought” Revisited References 5 Some Remarks on Searle’s View on the Logic of Practical Reasoning References 6 On the Regulative Functions of Constitutive Rules References 7 Existence as a Source of Normativity: An Alternative to Searle’s View 1 Introduction 2 Civilized Social Life Back in the Focus of Philosophy 3 Constitutive Rules or Laws of Essence? 4 Pars Construens: On the Gift of Bonds 5 The Gift of Bonds: Concreteness and Normativity References 8 How to Derive Is from Ought 1 Introduction 2 Eidetic-Constitutive Rule: Katáphasis and Apóphasis 2.1 Katáphasis: Eidetic-Constitutive Rule—What Is It? 2.1.1 The Concept 2.1.2 History of the Concept 2.1.3 Typology of Eidetic-Constitutive Rules 2.2 Apóphasis: Eidetic-Constitutive Rule—What Is It Not? 2.2.1 Anankastic-Constitutive Rule 2.2.2 Anankastic Rule 3 Constitutive Rule in John R. Searle 3.1 X-Rule vs. Y-Rule 3.2 Searle’s Purported “Constitutive Rule” of Promise 4 The Semiotic and Epistemological Rôle of Eidetic-Constitutive Rules 4.1 A Thought-Experiment with Eidetic-Constitutive Rules 4.2 Eidetic-Constitutive Rules and Understanding (Verstehen) 4.3 Knowledge of Eidetic-Constitutive Rules References 9 Searle vs. Conte on Constitutive Rules 1 Introduction 2 A Limping Stair: Constitutive Rules in Searle’s Original How to Derive “Ought” from “Is” (Conte Against Searle) 3 Fixing the Stair: Constitutive Rules from the Construction of Social Reality On 4 Constitutive Rules Are Not Simply Conditions (Searle Against Conte) 5 Conclusion References 10 “Ought” Is Spoken in Many Ways 1 Introduction 2 Bouletic vs. Axiological “Ought” 3 Eidetic “Ought” References 11 Constitutive Rules, Criteria of Validity, and Law 1 Introduction 2 Constitutive Rules and Validity Criteria 3 Anankastic-Constitutive Rules and Legal Philosophy 4 The Need for a Different Approach References 12 Can Constitutive Rules Bridge the Gap Between Is- and Ought-Statements? 1 Introduction 2 Rules and Institutions 2.1 Regulative and Constitutive Rules 2.2 The Practice Conception of Rules 2.3 The Status Account 3 The Is-Ought Derivation 3.1 From Is to Ought 3.2 The Collective Acceptance Principle 3.3 The Irrelevance of Constitutive Rules 4 Collective Acceptance and Obligations 5 Conclusion Appendix 1: The Is-Ought Derivation and the Transformation View Appendix 2: The Case of Promising References 13 Searle and Conte on Deriving Ought from Is References 14 Why Moral Norms Cannot Be Reduced to Facts: On a Trilemma in Derivations of Moral “Ought” from “Is” 1 Two Approaches to the Problem of Justification in Ethics 2 Factual Statements: Value-Laden and Value-Free 3 A Trilemma of Attempts to Derive a “Moral Ought” from “Is” 4 A Case Study: John Searle’s Derivation of “Ought” from “Is” 4.1 An Analysis of Searle’s Derivation: An Illustration of the Trilemma 4.2 Interpretation 4.3 Further Reflections 5 Some Morals to Be Drawn from the Failure of the Naturalistic Justification of Ethical Norms References 15 On Searle’s Derivation and Its Relation to Constitutive Rules: A Social Scientist’s Perspective 1 Introduction 2 On Amphibious Words and Their Role in Deriving Ought from Is 2.1 Deriving Evaluative Statements from Descriptive Statements 2.1.1 Terms Whose Meaning Is Entirely Evaluative 2.1.2 Terms Whose Meaning Is Partly Evaluative 2.2 Evaluative Statements and Normative Statements 2.2.1 Terms Whose Meaning Is Entirely Normative 2.2.2 Terms Whose Meaning Is Partly Normative 3 Counts-as and Does-Not-Count-as Normative Sentences (and Their Difference from Constitutive Normative Expectations/Hypostatizations) 3.1 Abstract Extension-Narrowing, or Abstract Does-Not-Count-as, Legal Provisions or Legal-Dogmatic Statements 3.2 Abstract Extension-Broadening, or Abstract Counts-as, Legal Provisions and Legal-Dogmatic Statements 3.3 Concrete Extension-Narrowing, or Concrete Does-Not-Count-as, Legal Provisions and Legal-Dogmatic Statements 3.4 Concrete Extension-Broadening, or Concrete Counts-as, Legal Provisions and Legal-Dogmatic Statements 4 Conclusion References Index of Names Index of Subjects