Epistemic Instrumentalism Explained

Description

Do epistemic requirements vary along with facts about what promotes agents' well-being? Epistemic instrumentalists say 'yes', and thereby earn a lot of contempt. This contempt is a mistake on two counts. First, it is incorrectly based: the reasons typically given for it are misguided. Second, it fails to distinguish between first- and second-order epistemic instrumentalism; and, it happens, only the former is contemptible. In this book, Nathaniel P. Sharadin argues for rejecting epistemic instrumentalism as a first-order view not because it suffers extensional failures, but because it suffers explanatory ones. By contrast, he argues that epistemic instrumentalism offers a natural, straightforward explanation of why being epistemically correct matters. What emerges is a second-order instrumentalist explanation for epistemic authority that is neutral between competing first-order epistemic theories. This neutrality is an advantage. But, drawing on work from cognitive science and psychology, Sharadin argues that instrumentalists can abandon that neutrality in order to adopt a view he calls epistemic ecologism. Epistemic Instrumentalism Explained will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of mind. Cover Half Title Series Page Title Page Copyright Page Table of Contents Acknowledgements Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Overview of Argument 1.3 Avoiding Reading the Entire Book Chapter 2: Preliminaries 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Assumptions 2.3 Kinds of Correctness 2.3.1 Maximal Pluralism about Kinds of Correctness 2.3.2 Restricted Pluralism about Kinds of Correctness 2.3.3 Monism about Kinds of Correctness 2.3.4 Authoritativeness–Monism Connection and All-Things-Considered Correctness 2.3.5 Correctness–Authoritativeness Connection 2.4 Conclusion Notes References Chapter 3: First-Order Epistemic Theory 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Epistemic Correctness 3.3 First-Order Theories: Extension and Explanation 3.4 Epistemic Correctness Explanatory Principles 3.5 Ambits and Focal Points 3.6 Conclusion Notes References Chapter 4: Epistemic Correctness and the Minimal Functional Criterion 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The Question 4.3 Earmarks of the Epistemic 4.4 Blind Alleys 4.4.1 Object-Based Earmarks 4.4.2 Content-Based Earmarks 4.5 Functional Earmarks and the Minimal Functional Criterion 4.6 Conclusion Notes References Chapter 5: First-Order Epistemic Instrumentalism 5.1 Introduction 5.2 The Many Epistemic Instrumentalisms 5.3 Unpacking Epistemic Instrumentalism’s ECEP 5.4 The Goldilocks Problem 5.5 Replying to the Goldilocks Problem 5.6 Stalemate Notes References Chapter 6: The Functionalist Challenge 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Explanation–Justification Connection 6.3 No Interference 6.4 Cooking Up the Challenge Notes References Chapter 7: Second-Order Epistemic Theory 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Authoritative and Formal Correctness 7.3 Pluralism and Monism Redux 7.4 Epistemic Authority Explanatory Principles 7.5 The Minimal Conception of Epistemic Authority 7.5.1 Potential Psychological Impact 7.5.2 Usually Authoritative 7.5.3 Recap 7.6 Skepticism about Authoritative Correctness 7.7 Conclusion Notes References Chapter 8: Second-Order Epistemic Instrumentalism 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Epistemic Instrumentalism’s Epistemic Authority Explanatory Principle 8.3 The Adequacy of Instrumentalism 8.4 The Immediate Appeal of Second-Order Epistemic Instrumentalism 8.5 The Ubiquity of Second-Order K Instrumentalism 8.6 The Naturalism of Instrumentalism 8.7 The Lamentable Unpopularity of Instrumentalism Notes References Chapter 9: The Content Constraint 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Explanations First 9.3 First-Order Things First 9.4 Can We Instead Explain De Dicto ? 9.5 The Content Constraint 9.6 Against the Content Constraint 9.6.1 Dogmatic Epistemicism 9.6.2 Quietism 9.6.3 What about Ethics? 9.7 Conclusion Notes References Chapter 10: Bespoke Explanations 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Tailoring Bespoke Explanations 10.3 Bespoke Explanations for Evidentialists 10.3.1 Preliminaries 10.3.2 Sui Generis Evidentialism 10.3.3 Constitutivist Evidentialism 10.3.4 Veritistic Evidentialism 10.3.5 Recap 10.4 Bespoke Second-Order Epistemic Instrumentalism? 10.5 Are Bespoke Explanations Somehow Better? 10.5.1 Are Bespoke Explanations Better in Themselves? 10.5.2 Are Bespoke Explanations Better Jointly? 10.6 Conclusion Notes References Chapter 11: New View, Old Problems 11.1 Introduction 11.2 Goldilocks Problem Redux? 11.3 Functionalist Challenge Redux? 11.4 Conclusion Chapter 12: Going Further 12.1 Introduction 12.2 Deliberative Correctness 12.3 Invariantism about Deliberative Correctness 12.4 The Case for Ecologism about Deliberative Correctness 12.5 Invariantism about Epistemic Correctness 12.6 The Case for Ecologism about Epistemic Correctness Notes References Index