Not In Their Name: Are Citizens Culpable For Their States' Actions?

Description

There are many actions that we attribute, at least colloquially, to states. Given their size and influence, states are able to inflict harm far beyond the reach of a single individual. But there is a great deal of unclarity about exactly who is implicated in that kind of harm, and how we should think about responsibility for it. It is a commonplace assumption that democratic publics both authorize and have control over what their states do; that their states act in their name and on their behalf. In Not In Their Name, Holly Lawford-Smith approaches these questions from the perspective of social ontology, asking whether the state is a collective agent, and whether ordinary citizens are members of that agent. If it is, and they are, there's a clear case for democratic collective culpability. She explores alternative conceptions of the state and of membership in the state; alternative conceptions of collective agency applied to the state; the normative implications of membership in the state; and both culpability (from the inside) and responsibility (from the outside) for what the state does. Ultimately, Lawford-Smith argues for the exculpation of ordinary citizens and the inculpation of those working in public services. Cover Not In Their Name: Are Citizens Culpable For Their States’ Actions? Copyright Contents Acknowledgements 1: Introduction 2: What is The State? I. The Options II. Citizen-Inclusive States III. Membership: Location, Legal Status, Relations, Causal Contribution IV. Membership: Normative Interaction, Duty Transferral V. States as the Formal Apparatus of Governance 3: Is the Citizen-Inclusive State an Agent? I. Strong Accounts of Collective Agency II. Moderate Accounts of Collective Agency III. Weak Accounts of Collective Agency IV. Collective Agency and Collective Moral Agency V. Citizen-Inclusive States as Agents: The Upshot 4: Is the Citizen-Exclusive State an Agent? I. The Structure of the Citizen-Exclusive State II. From Decision to Action (Intention and Implementation) III. Subordinates as Extended Minds IV. Is the Citizen-Exclusive State an Agent? V. Is the Citizen-Exclusive State a Moral Agent? VI. Relationship between the Citizen-Exclusive State and Its Citizens 5: Citizens’ Culpability and Responsibility for States’ Actions Part One: Culpability I. Citizens’ Culpability for States’ Actions II. A Thought Experiment Three Ways III. Responsibility for Weak Shared Agency IV. One-Off and Episodic Agency, or, Culpability for Joint Action V. Citizens are not Culpable for States’ Actions Part Two: Responsibility VI. Commissioning, Coercion, Complicity Commissioning Coercion Complicity VII. Association, Benefiting, Privilege, Capacity Association Benefiting Privilege Capacity VIII. A Note on Comparative Demandingness IX. Citizen Responsibility in Summary 6: Governmental Culpability I. Collective Punishment: Some Clarifications II. The Challenge: Group and Member Culpability III. Corporations, Armies, Governments IV. Collective Culpability and Distributed Punishment V. Getting Members off the Hook VI. Double-Counting Responsibility 7: Conclusion References Index