Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy

Description

Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive. 01.0_pp_i_iv_Frontmatter 02.0_pp_v_vi_Dedication 03.0_pp_vii_vii_Contents 04.0_pp_viii_viii_List_of_Tables 05.0_pp_ix_x_List_of_Figures 06.0_pp_xi_xiv_Acknowledgements 07.0_pp_1_2_The_Logic_of_Nuclear_Skepticism 07.1_pp_3_21_Nuclear_Blackmail_in_International_Politics 07.2_pp_22_60_Nuclear_Coercion_and_Nuclear_Skepticism 08.0_pp_61_62_Trends 08.1_pp_63_71_Roadmap_for_Part_II 08.2_pp_72_95_Standoffs_Nuclear_Weapons_in_Crisis_Bargaining 08.3_pp_96_122_Stalemates_Territorial_Disputes_and_Nuclear_Politics 09.0_pp_123_124_Cases 09.1_pp_125_131_Roadmap_for_Part_III 09.2_pp_132_172_Brinkmanship_Busts_When_Nuclear_Coercion_Fails 09.3_pp_173_232_Think_Again_Reassessing_Nuclear_Victories 10.0_pp_233_234_Conclusions 10.1_pp_235_258_Nuclear_Coercion_in_Myth_and_Reality 11.0_pp_259_289_Appendix_Methods_and_Data 12.0_pp_290_317_References 13.0_pp_318_333_Index