Thomasson on Ontology

Description

Amie L. Thomasson, the Daniel P. Stone Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy at Dartmouth College, has gained international recognition as a leading figure within various areas of philosophy. She has recently been celebrated as one of the most influential living philosophers for her significant contributions to metaphysics, ontology, phenomenology, and aesthetics. By engaging critically with her approach to metaphysics, modality, conceptual analysis, and the methodological issues concerning ontological questions about ordinary objects, social entities, and fictional characters, as well as including a chapter from Thomasson herself where she makes explicit the internal connections which run through her body of work, this volume delivers the first thorough discussion of Thomasson’s philosophy. Acknowledgements Contents Notes on Contributors 1: Introduction Amie Thomasson on Ontology Chapter Summaries 2: How it All Hangs Together Introduction Fiction Phenomenological Roots Social and Cultural Objects Metametaphysics Functional Pluralism Conceptual Engineering Conclusion References 3: Thomasson on Easy Arguments The Problem in a Nutshell What Needs To Be Explained? Easy Ontology, Focus, and Reference Conceptual and Other Language-based Connections Conceptual Connections and Quantifiers Conclusion References 4: Realism, Deflationism, and Metaphysical Explanation Easy Ontology and Simple Realism Joint-Carving Fundamentality Realism Creeping Minimalism and Metaphysical Explanation ‘Easy arguments’ for Fundamentality Realism Upshots References 5: Who’s Afraid of Conceptual Analysis? I II III IV V References 6: Modal Normativism and Metasemantics Introduction Modal Normativism and Compositionality Challenges Modal Normativism Vs. Modal Descriptivism The Compositionality Challenge Truth Conditional Meanings and Modal Claims Modal Normativism and Metasemantics Metasemantic Explanations Metasemantic Explanations: Ambitious (Modal) Descriptivism and Its Problems Metasemantic Explanations: Two Normativist Approaches The Moderate Approach The Ambitious Approach Objections: Substantivity in the Metalanguage Are Metaphysical Explanations Substantive? Using Talk of Possible Worlds in the Metalanguage Conclusion References 7: Thomasson on Modal Language Introduction Thomasson’s View on Modality Function and Meaning The Frege-Geach Problem Metaphysical Modality and Ordinary Language Metaphysical Modality and Weaker Modalities Necessity and Analyticity Concluding Remarks References 8: Thomasson’s Social Ontology Introduction: Thomassonian Social Ontology The Rule-based Account of Social Phenomena The Normative Conception of Social Groups The Normative Conception of Social Groups is Overly Narrow Conclusion: A Plea for Even More Pluralism References 9: Easy Social Ontology Introduction Social Ontology and Social Meta-Ontology The Easy Approach to Ontology Existence and Reference Conceptual Analysis and Conceptual Engineering Easy Social Ontology The Ontology of Social and Institutional Practices The Function of Social and Institutional Practice Terms The Prospects for Social Realism The Constructivist Approach to Social and Institutional Practices Conclusions References 10: Artifacts and the Limits of Agentive Authority Author-Intention-Based Accounts of Artifacts and Prototype Production Challenges for Author-Intention-Based Accounts Can User-Intentions Override Author-Intentions? The Creation Strategy: Historicity and Counter-Use A User-Based Account of Artifacts and Prototype Production The Limits of Agentive Authority Conclusion References 11: Mountains and Their Boundaries The Puzzle Robust Creationism Selectionism The Modest Creationist Compromise Boundaries in the Distant Past Modest Creationism for Permissivists Thomasson’s Plenitude Locating Mountains in the Plenitude References 12: Creationism, Easy Ontology, and Indeterminacy Introduction Creationism about Fictional Characters A New Threat from Indeterminacy Responding to the New Threat References Index