Ockhamism and Philosophy of Time: Semantic and Metaphysical Issues Concerning Future Contingents

Description

This book discusses fundamental topics on contemporary Ockhamism. The collected essays show how contemporary Ockhamism can impact areas of research such as semantics, metaphysics and also the philosophy of science. In addition, the volume hosts one historian of Medieval philosophy who investigates the way in which William of Ockham “in flesh and bone” construed time and, more generally, future contingency. The essays explore the different meanings of this theory. They cover three main topics, in particular. The first examines the thesis that sentences and propositions about the future have a definite truth value, without any ensuing commitment to determinism or fatalism. The second topic looks at the problem whether the branching-time model needs to countenance a privileged branch (the so-called Thin Red Line). Finally, the third topic considers the idea that there are so-called soft facts. These would be the subject matter of sentences and propositions verbally about the present or the past, but metaphysically about a later time, and which might change in the future. Overall, the book provides an updated and rigorous idea of the debate about Ockhamism. It gives readers a deeper understanding into this philosophical approach influenced by William of Ockham, characterized by the rejection of the Aristotelian idea that, in order to preserve the contingency of the future, future contingents must be deemed neither true nor false. Preface Contents About the Editor 1 From William of Ockham to Contemporary Ockhamism and Back Again: An Overview References 2 Ockham on Time 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Permanent and Successive Things 2.3 Ontological Problems with Successive Things 2.4 Successive Things and the Razor-Principle 2.5 Reductionism of Change and Time to Permanent Things References 3 Ockhamistic Inspiration in Modern Tense-Logic 3.1 The Analysis of Future Contingents in Terms of Three-Valued Logic 3.2 Ockham's Rejection of the Argument from Divine Foreknowledge to Determinism 3.3 Ockham's Notion of Time and the Idea of a Thin Red Line 3.4 The Possible Use of Ockham's Ideas in Modern Tense-Logic 3.5 Conclusion References 4 Ockhamism Without Molinism 4.1 Branching Time and Prior's Ockhamism 4.2 ``True'' Ockhamism and the Molinist Objection 4.3 Ockhamism Defended 4.4 Counterfactuals 4.5 Homogeneous Theories of Future Contingents 4.5.1 Anti-Molinist Anti-Ockhamism 4.5.2 Non-Molinist Non-Ockhamism 4.5.3 Molinist Ockhamism 4.6 Ockhamism Without Molinism References 5 Future Contingents in a Branching Universe 5.1 Introduction 5.2 The Branching Approach to Indeterminism 5.3 Three Elaborations of the Branching Approach 5.4 Future-Directed Illocutions and the “Assertion Problem” 5.5 The Assertion Problem Defused 5.6 Future-Directed Illocutions and Creditworthiness 5.7 Future-Directed Illocutions and Assertoric Norms References 6 A Too Thin True Future: The Problem of Grounding Within Presentist TRL Semantics 6.1 Introduction 6.2 The Grounding Problem 6.2.1 Correspondence 6.2.2 Truthmaking 6.3 Grounding and Presentism 6.4 Toward the Future(s) 6.5 A Too Thin True Future 6.5.1 The Argument Against TRL Presentism 6.5.2 A Possible Presentist Answer 6.6 Conclusion References 7 Presentism, Ockhamism, and Truth-Grounding 7.1 The Grounding Problem for Presentism 7.2 The Nuclear Option 7.3 Nefarious vs Upstanding Presentism 7.4 The Revolutionary Strategy 7.5 Ockhamism 7.6 Ockhamists on the Revolutionary Road 7.7 Conclusion References 8 The Metaphysics of Ockhamism 8.1 Preliminary Clarifications 8.2 Presentism and the Growing Block Theory 8.3 The Shrinking Block Theory and Eternalism 8.4 Branching and Divergence 8.5 Three Ways to Understand the Openness of the Future 8.6 Other Definitions References 9 The Metaphysics of Passage in Dynamical Reduction Models of Quantum Mechanics 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Dynamical Reduction Models of Quantum Mechanics 9.2.1 The GRW Framework 9.2.2 The World According to GRW 9.2.3 The Relativistic Extensions of GRW 9.3 Callender's Objections to Quantum Becoming 9.3.1 Indeterminism and Openness in DRM 9.3.2 Passage and the Ontology of Superpositions 9.4 Indeterminacy and the Open Future in DRM 9.5 Considerations on Relativistic Extensions of the Proposed View 9.6 Conclusions References