Mathematical Models of Social Evolution. A Guide for the Perplexed

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Cover Title page Preface 1 Theoretician's Laboratory 1.1 The structure of evolutionary theory 1.2 The utility of simple models 1.3 Why not just simulate? 1.4 A model of viability selection 1.5 Determining long-term consequenees 1.6 Nongenetic replication 2 Animal Conflict 2.1 The Hawk-Dove game 2.2 Retaliation 2.3 Continuous stable strategies 2.4 Ownership, an asymmetry 2.5 Resource holding power 2.6 Sequential play 3 Altruism & Inclusive Fitness 3.1 The prisoner's dilemma 3.2 Positive assortment 3.3 Common descent and inclusive fitness 3.4 Rediscovering Hamilton's rule 3.5 Justifying Hamilton's rule 3.6 Using Hamilton's rule 4 Reciprocity 4.1 The Axelrod-Hamilton model 4.2 Mutants and mistakes 4.3 Partner choiee 4.4 Indirect reciprocity 4.5 Reciprocity and collective action 5 Animal Communication 5.1 Costly signaling theory 5.2 Cheap, honest signals 5.3 Signaling and altruism 5.4 Social learning 6 Selection among Groups 6.1 Three views of selection 6.2 Deriving the Price equation 6.3 Selection within and between groups 6.4 Dispersal 7 Sex Allocation 7.1 Fisher's theory of sex allocation 7.2 Reproductive value and Fisherian sex ratios 7.3 Using the Shaw-Mohler theorem 7.4 Biased sex ratios 7.5 Breaking the eigen barrier 8 Sexual Selection 8.1 Quantitative genetic models 8.2 Fisher's runaway process 8.3 Costly choice and sensory bias 8.4 Good genes and sexy sons Appendixes A Facts about Derivatives B Facts about Random Variables C Calculating Binomial Expectations D Numerical Solution of the Kokko et al. Model E Solutions to Problems Bibliography Index