Self-Deception

Description

Self-deception poses longstanding and fascinating paradoxes. Philosophers have questioned whether, and how, self-deception is even possible; evolutionary theorists have debated whether it is adaptive. For Sigmund Freud self-deception was a fundamental key to understanding the unconscious, and from The Bible to The Great Gatsby literature abounds with characters renowned for their self-deception. But what exactly is self-deception? Why is it so puzzling? How is it performed? And is it harmful? In this thorough and clearly written introduction to the philosophy and psychology of self-deception, Eric Funkhouser examines and assesses these questions and more: Clarification of the conceptual background and "Basic problem" of self-deception, including Freud and Davidson and the important debate between intentionalists and motivationalists Deflationary accounts that appeal to cognitive and motivational biases, with emphasis on how motives and emotions drive self-deception Intentional self-deception and the "divided mind," including the role of the unconscious in recent psychological research Challenges that self-deception poses for philosophy of mind and psychology, especially for our understanding of intention, belief, and deception Biology and moral psychology of self-deception: Is self-deception functional or beneficial? Are the self-deceived to be held accountable? Combining philosophical analysis with the latest psychological research, and including features such as chapter summaries, annotated recommended reading and a glossary, Self-Deception is an excellent resource for students of philosophy of mind and psychology, moral psychology and ethics, as well as those in related fields such as psychology and cognitive science. Cover Half Title Series Page Title Page Copyright Page Dedication Contents Acknowledgements 1 Introduction 1.1 Self-deception: common, yet puzzling 1.2 Psychological tendencies 1.3 Why study self-deception? 2 The basic problem and a conceptual map 2.1 The Basic Problem 2.1.1 Static problems 2.1.2 Dynamic problems 2.2 A classic picture: Freud and Davidson 2.3 A minimal conception: motivated irrationality 2.3.1 Intentionalism and motivationalism 2.3.2 Degrees of deception 2.4 What is the content of the motive? What is the proximate goal? 2.5 What is the end state? 2.6 Conceptual map 2.7 Nearby phenomena 3 Deflationary accounts 3.1 Motivated bias accounts: eliminating intention 3.2 Mele’s account 3.3 Psychological details 3.3.1 Biases, hot and cold 3.3.2 Hypothesis framing and confirmation biases 3.3.3 Belief thresholds and errors 3.4 Issues with psychological measures 3.5 Objections 3.5.1 Negative self-deception 3.5.2 The selectivity problem 3.5.3 Is this even deception? 3.5.4 Tension is necessary 3.6 Anxiety-based deflationary accounts 4 Intentionalism and divided mind accounts 4.1 Intentionalism: the general case 4.1.1 What are intentions? 4.1.2 The case for intentions 4.1.3 Connection to divided minds 4.2 Divided mind accounts 4.2.1 Conscious and unconscious 4.2.2 Distinct functional units 4.3 Temporally divided selves 4.4 Other intentionalist and dual belief views 5 Revisionary accounts: belief and purpose 5.1 Revising belief 5.1.1 Subdoxastic attitudes 5.1.2 Partial or indeterminate belief 5.1.3 Thought, acceptance, imagination, and pretense 5.1.4 Suspicion, anxiety, and fear 5.2 Biological accounts: non-psychological purposiveness 5.3 Signaling accounts 5.3.1 Self-signaling 5.3.2 Other-signaling 5.4 Social influences on self-deception 6 Responsibility for self-deception 6.1 The ethics of belief 6.2 Self-knowledge 6.3 Rationality and responsibility 6.4 Does context matter? 7 Functions and cost-benefit analysis 7.1 The costs of false belief 7.2 Psychological benefits 7.3 Social benefits 7.4 Biological benefits 8 Conclusion 8.1 Future directions 8.2 Warning Glossary Bibliography Index