Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes

Description

Constitutions in authoritarian regimes are often denigrated as meaningless exercises in political theater. Yet the burgeoning literature on authoritarian regimes more broadly has produced a wealth of insights into particular institutions such as legislatures, courts and elections; into regime practices such as co-optation and repression; and into non-democratic sources of accountability. In this vein, this volume explores the form and function of constitutions in countries without the fully articulated institutions of limited government. The chapters utilize a wide range of methods and focus on a broad set of cases, representing many different types of authoritarian regimes. The book offers an exploration into the constitutions of authoritarian regimes, generating broader insights into the study of constitutions and their functions more generally. Cover Half-title Page Series Page Title Page Copyright Page Contents List of Contributors 1 Introduction: Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes PART I: The Category 2 Ruling against Rules* 3 Authoritarian Constitutionalism: Some Conceptual Issues PART II: Constitutional Design in Authoritarian Regimes 4 The Political Economy of Autocratic Constitutions 5 Authoritarian Constitution Making: The Role of the Military in Latin America* 6 Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes: The Egyptian Constitution of 1971 PART III: Contents of Authoritarian Constitutions 7 The Content of Authoritarian Constitutions 8 Constitutional Variation among Strains of Authoritarianism PART IV: Consequences of Authoritarian Constitutions 9 The Role of Presidential Power in Authoritarian Elections 10 The Informal Politics of Formal Constitutions 11 The Party’s Leadership as a Living Constitution in China Index