Phenomenal Intentionality

Description

Since the late 1970's, the main research program for understanding intentionality -- the mind's ability to direct itself onto the world -- has been based on the attempt naturalize intentionality, in the sense of making it intelligible how intentionality can occur in a perfectly natural, indeed entirely physical, world. Some philosophers, however, have remained skeptical of this entire approach. In particular, some have argued that phenomenal consciousness - - the subjective feel of conscious experience -- has an essential role to play in the theory of intentionality, a role missing in the naturalization program. Thus a number of authors have recently brought to the fore the notion of phenomenal intentionality, as well as a cluster of nearby notions. There is a vague sense that their work is interrelated, complementary, and mutually reinforcing, in a way that suggests a germinal research program. With twelve new essays by philosophers at the forefront of the field, this volume is designed to launch this research program in a more self-conscious way, by exploring some of the fundamental claims and themes of relevance to this program. Cover Contents About the Contributors 1. The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program 2. The Access Problem 3. Indexical Thought 4. Phenomenal Presence 5. Consciousness and Synthesis 6. Constructing a World for the Senses 7. Phenomenal Objectivity and Phenomenal Intentionality: In Defense of a Kantian Account 8. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Role of Intentional Objects 9. Unconscious Belief and Conscious Thought 10. Intellectual Gestalts 11. Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content? 12. Phenomenality and Self-Consciousness Index B C E H I L M N P Q R S T