Selection and Decision in Judicial Process around the World: Empirical Inquires

Description

This book empirically explores whether and under what conditions the judicial process is efficient. Three specific issues are addressed: first, disputants self-select into litigation. Do they tend to bring cases with merit? Second, filed cases differ in their social import. Do courts select more important cases to devote more resource to? Third, courts establish precedents, affect resource allocation in the cases at hand, and influence future behaviours of transacting parties. Do courts, like Judge Posner asserts, tend to make decisions that enhance allocative efficiency and reduce transaction costs? Positive answers to the above questions attest to the efficiency of the judicial process. What drive efficient or inefficient outcomes are the selections and decisions by litigants, litigators, and judges. Their earlier selections and decisions affect later ones. Eleven chapters in this book, authored by leading empirical legal scholars in the world, deal with these issues in the US, Europe, and Asia. Cover Half-title Title page Copyright information Dedication Contents List of Figures List of Tables List of Contributors Acknowledgments Introduction References 1 Do Patent Law Suits Target Invalid Patents? 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Literature Review 1.2.1 Patent Literature 1.2.2 Litigation Literature Generally 1.3 Background, Methodology, and Data 1.3.1 Background 1.3.2 Methodology 1.3.3 Data 1.4 Results 1.5 Discussion and Conclusion References 2 Platform Procedure: Using Technology to Facilitate (Efficient) Civil Settlement 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Background 2.3 Data and Empirical Strategy 2.4 Empirical Results 2.5 Possible Mechanisms 2.6 Conclusion References 3 Speedy Adjudication in Hard Cases and Low Settlement Rates in Easy Cases: An Empirical Analysis of Taiwanese Courts with Comparison to US Federal Courts 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Overview of the Courts of Taiwan 3.3 Patterns of Settlement, Judgment, and Appeal 3.3.1 Settlement 3.3.2 Trial and Other Adjudications (Summary and Default Judgments) 3.3.3 Appeal 3.4 Speed in Resolving Cases 3.5 Wasted Energy? Making Sense of High Trial Rates for ''Easy'' Cases 3.6 Conclusion References Appendix 3A Overall Picture of Civil Litigation in Lower Courts in Taiwan Appendix 3B Interview of Taiwanese Judges 4 How Lower Courts Respond to a Change in a Legal Rule 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The Legal Background: The Wiebe Door Factors and the Royal Winnipeg Rule Change 4.2.1 The Law Before the Royal Winnipeg Decision 4.2.2 The Legal Rule Changed with the Royal Winnipeg Decision 4.3 Our Data 4.3.1 Dependent Variable: Outcome of Case 4.3.2 Independent Variables: Facts of Each Case 4.3.2.1 Intention of the Parties 4.3.2.2 The Four Wiebe Door Factors 4.4 Results 4.4.1 Do Courts Uphold the Intention of the Parties? 4.4.2 Controlling for Wiebe Door Factors 4.4.3 Predicting Tax Court Decisions Following Royal Winnipeg 4.4.4 The Marginal Influence of Parties' Intention 4.4.5 Limitations of our Findings 4.5 Conclusion References 5 Career Judge System and Court Decision Biases: Preliminary Evidence from Japan 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Institutional Background 5.2.1 The Career Judge System 5.2.2 Incentives for Judges 5.3 International Civil Jurisdiction 5.4 Consumer Law 5.4.1 Unconscionability Cases 5.4.2 The NOVA Case 5.5 Corporate Law 5.5.1 Equity Offerings 5.5.1.1 Equity Offerings in Closed Firms 5.5.1.2 Case Laws by the Supreme Courts 5.5.1.3 Lower Court Cases Prior to the Supreme Court Decision of July 14, 1994, 172 Saibanshu Minji 771 5.5.2 Corporate Law Reform 5.6 Conclusion References 6 Judges Avoid Ex Post but Not Ex Ante Inefficiency: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Taiwan 6.1 Introduction: A New Judicial Behavioral Hypothesis 6.2 The Definition of (Substantive) Efficiency 6.3 Co-ownership Partition and Anticommons 6.4 Building Encroachment and Equity Power 6.5 Trespass and Unjust Enrichment 6.6 Conclusion References in English References in German 7 When Winning Is Not Enough: Prevailing-Party Civil Appeals in State Courts 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Why Worry about Appeals? 7.3 Data, Methodology, and Research Design 7.4 Preliminary Results 7.5 Selection, Rare Events, and Mixed Effects Models 7.5.1 Results 7.5.1.1 Decision to Initiate a Prevailing-Party Appeal 7.5.1.2 Successful Prevailing-Party Appeals 7.6 Discussion References 8 The Evolution of Case Influence in Modern Consumer Standard Form Contracts 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Sample and Summary Statistics 8.2.1 Sample Overview 8.2.2 Summary Statistics 8.3 Tracing Case Influence Over Time 8.3.1 Shrinkwraps 8.3.2 Browsewraps 8.3.3 Clickwraps 8.4 Conclusion and Implications References 9 Judging Insurance Antidiscrimination Law 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Evaluating Insurance Antidiscriminations Laws: A Primer 9.3 Data 9.3.1 Antidiscrimination Laws 9.3.2 Traffic Fatalities 9.4 Empirical Strategy 9.5 Results and Discussion 9.6 Conclusions References 10 Are Judges Harsher with Repeat Offenders?: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights 10.1 Introduction 10.2 The ECtHR and the ''Just Satisfaction'' Puzzle 10.3 The Role of Sanction and Damages: Looking for a Rationale 10.4 Data and Empirical Strategy 10.5 Results 10.6 Conclusions References 11 Does Efficiency Trump Legality?: The Case of the German Constitutional Court 11.1 Research Question 11.2 Related Literature 11.3 The German Constitutional Court 11.4 How Seriously Does the Court Take a Case? 11.5 Has the Court Been Biased? 11.6 Conclusions References Index